The Neuro-cognitive Profile of Theory of Mind in Healthy Ageing by Rahman, Foyzul
  1 














©Foyzul Rahman, 2021 







This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to 
recognise that its copyright belongs to its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no 




F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
Aston University 
Thesis Abstract 
Theory of mind (ToM) is often reported to decline with age. While early studies of ageing 
ToM produced mixed outcomes, the literature generally reports that ToM declines with 
ageing.  However, many ageing ToM investigations employ paradigms that have sources 
of interference that are non-social in nature, comprising additional demands on 
executive function, which also declines with age. Consequently, these tasks may 
disproportionately disadvantage older adults. As a result, existing work may portray an 
inflated effect of age. To assess this, a meta-analysis was conducted. This showed that, 
while an overall age effect emerged, there was significant heterogeneity in the 
magnitude of the reported effects. The scale of the age effect varied and, in some cases 
diminished, based on paradigm type and sampling considerations, such as age and 
education, highlighting the problem of non-uniformity and non-specificity in ageing ToM. 
Next, using a novel paradigm, in-task manipulations which separated out executive 
demands that are relevant to ToM – outcome knowledge, self-other and attentional 
conflict – were examined to observe how these processes differentially affect older 
versus younger adults. Results showed that individual differences in attention and 
processing speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through incongruent 
self-other perspectives. However, older adults were disproportionately affected by 
managing attentional conflict, and this source of interference was predicted by spatial 
working memory, highlighting that non-social demands can partially explain reduced 
ToM performance in ageing. Finally, fMRI was used to show differentiation in the neural 
response to social and non-social manipulations embedded within false belief tasks. 
Age-related differences in the recruitment of cortical regions, as informed by a ToM 
functional localizer, were also assessed. Overall, these findings bring greater clarity to 
our understanding of ToM in healthy ageing, disentangling classic experimental 
parameters to highlight which sources of interference best explain age-related difficulty 
in ToM reasoning. 
 
Keywords: theory of mind; mentalizing; ageing; executive function; fMRI 
  
3 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 






For my little peanut – Haleema  
4 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
Acknowledgements 
I have been extraordinarily lucky to work under the mentorship of three world-class 
academics: Dr Charlotte Hartwright, Prof Klaus Kessler, and Dr Dan Shaw. Charlotte, thank 
you firstly for believing in me, and for your unwavering support throughout. You have taught 
me to be a principled scientist; that academic and scientific rigour comes before output or 
recognition. Klaus, your (characteristically German) mentorship both within and beyond 
academia has been transformational; thank you for backing me through the thick and thin. 
Dan, thank you for enduring the long Skype calls – it must have been so painful watching me 
fumble around aimlessly in FSL! Thank you for being so generous and supportive with your 
time.  
I’ve been lucky to become friends with brilliant PhD students from Aston, past and present – 
there are too many to name here, but I would like to especially thank Nic Alexander, Adam 
Shephard, and Nathan Taylor, Lucie Thomas, Rachel Green, Cliona Kelly, and Nikki Ngombe. 
A special thanks also goes to an outstanding placement student – Dwayne May. Thank you 
also to everyone in office SW506, for the wonderful conversations, camaraderie, and moral 
support.  
The Psychology Department, Aston Brain Centre, and ALIVE research facility also deserve a 
special mention. Special thanks also go to two brilliant radiographers at the ABC, Shaheen 
Lateef and Liz Squire. Thank you for putting up with my long scan sequences!  
Thank you to my mum, dad, sisters Thameena, Najeerah, and (bhabi) Shahana, brother 
Mohibur, and of course my beautiful little niece, Mairah. Amma – without you, there simply 
would be no PhD. You set aside your own hopes and aspirations to make this all possible. To 
my mother-in-law, thank you for everything you have done, and especially the home-cooked 
Thai food – it made the writing process a lot less painful. To my Nana and Dada ( ا هللاهمرحم ); no 
accomplishment comes close to repaying the sacrifices you made for us. Without your 
selflessness, this PhD would have remained an insurmountable, far-away dream.  
Finally, two people who are the centres of my universe – my wife Margaret and to whom this 
thesis is dedicated, my daughter Haleema. Haleema, though the timing of your arrival was 
not ideal (raging global pandemic and PhD write-up year), your smile gives me the strength I 
need to tackle any and every challenge. Margaret, you have been my backbone and source of 
strength in the most testing of times. Your encouragement is the sole reason this thesis is 
now complete. I promise to never again be a ‘student’.  
5 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
List of Contents 
Chapter One: General Introduction 9 
     Aims of the current thesis 31 
Chapter Two 35 
     Introduction 38 
     Methods 53 
     Results 60 
     Discussion 81 
Chapter Three 91 
     Introduction 93 
     Methods 97 
     Results 107 
     Discussion 125 
Chapter Four 130 
     Introduction 133 
     Methods 155 
     Results 174 
     Discussion 196 












F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
List of Abbreviations 
  
ACC Accuracy 
AC-PC Anterior Commissure - Posterior Commissure 
AQ Autism Quotient 
BET Brain Extraction Tool 
BOLD Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent 
EF Executive Function 
EHI Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
EV Explanatory Variable 
FB False Belief 
FEAT FMRIB's Expert Analysis Tool 
FLIRT FMRIB's Linear Image Registration Tool 
fMRI Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
FMRIB Oxford Centre For Functional MRI Of The Brain 
FSL FMRIB's Statistical Library 
GLM General Linear Model 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HRF Haemodynamic Response Function 
ICA Independent Components Analysis 
ISI Inter-Stimulus-Interval 
ITI Inter-Trial Interval 
m-ACE Mini Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination 
MCFLIRT Motion Correction FMRIB's Linear Image Registration Tool 
MELODIC Multivariate Exploratory Linear Optimized Decomposition into Independent Components 
MMSE Mini Mental State Examination 
MNI Montreal Neurological Institute 
MRI Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
OA Older Adult(s) 
ROI Region Of Interest 
RT Response/Reaction Time 
SCF Social Cognitive Function 
SOCK Spatially Organized Component Klassifikator 
STS Superior Temporal Sulcus 
TB True Belief 
TFCE Threshold-Free Cluster Enhancement 
ToM Theory of Mind 
TPJ Temporoparietal Junction 
VOI Volume Of Interest 
WRAT Wide Range Achievement Test 
YA Younger Adult(s) 
7 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
List of Tables 
  
Table 1.1. Summary of cognitive skills in older vs younger cohorts 19 
Table 1.2. Comparison of models of cognitive ageing 23 
Table 2.1. Examples of common theory of mind tasks 42 
Table 2.2. Included studies and their respective participant and task characteristics.   63 
Table 2.3. Statistical outcomes of sub-group analyses 73 
Table 3.1. Summary of experimental factors and levels 99 
Table 3.2. Summary of preregistered hypotheses 106 
Table 3.3. Sample characteristics by groups: PT and EF 107 
Table 3.4. Mixed ANOVA results for RT and error-rate 110 
Table 3.5. Pairwise comparisons of RTs in YAs for OOC * SOC 116 
Table 3.6. Multiple regression results for reaction time and error rate cost factors 121 
Table 4.1. Theory of mind brain regions 139 
Table 4.2. Summary of experimental factors and levels 157 
Table 4.3. Tools and imaging applications 169 
Table 4.4. Overview of contrasts in fMRI analysis 171 
Table 4.5. Sample characteristics by group 174 
Table 4.6. Trials removed per condition  175 
Table 4.7. Mixed ANOVA on accuracy data 177 
Table 4.8. Mixed ANOVA on RT data 178 
Table 4.9. Pairwise comparisons comparing KOR and Age 180 
Table 4.10. Correlations of experimental conditions (RT) and questionnaire measures 181 
Table 4.11. Correlations of experimental conditions (Acc) and questionnaire measures 181 
Table 4.12. fMRI regions in KOR contrast 186 
Table 4.13. fMRI regions in K0S0 > K0S1 contrast 189 
Table 4.14. fMRI regions in Belief > Photo contrast 192 
8 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
List of Figures 
 
  
Figure 1.1. Age differences in Fluid and Crystallised Intelligence 17 
Figure 1.2. Scatterplots of age-related changes in brain volume 21 
Figure 2.1. Growing trend of ToM-ageing publications 51 
Figure 2.2. Search strategy and PRISMA flow diagram  61 
Figure 2.3. Forest plot of studies included in meta-analysis 71 
Figure 2.4. Funnel plot examining heterogeneity 80 
Figure 3.1. False belief task diagram 100 
Figure 3.2. Condition latencies and condition summaries 109 
Figure 3.3. Schematic of key events in false belief vs. conflicting OOC trial 114 
Figure 3.4. Estimated marginal means for error-rate and RT across YA and OA 117 
Figure 3.5. Correlation matrix of all FB task conditions and EF measures 124 
Figure 4.1. Mapping of different aspects of social cognition 140 
Figure 4.2. Illustration of RMET 145 
Figure 4.3. Factor structure of false belief task 157 
Figure 4.4. False belief task outline and timings 160 
Figure 4.5. Typical order of scan sequences and their respective parameters 165 
Figure 4.6. Mean error-rates and RTs across experimental conditions 176 
Figure 4.7. Interaction between Age Group and KOR 179 
Figure 4.8. Accuracy and RT means as a function of Age Group 183 
Figure 4.9. KOR 0 > KOR 1 effect axial slices 185 
Figure 4.10. KOR 0 > KOR 1 effect 3D reconstruction 185 
Figure 4.11. KOR & TPJ overlap 187 
Figure 4.12. K0S0 > K0S1 effect axial slices 188 
Figure 4.13. K0S0 > K0S1 effect 3D reconstruction 189 
Figure 4.14. Belief > Photo effect axial slices 191 
Figure 4.15. Belief > Photo effect 3D reconstruction 193 
Figure 4.16. Mean parameter estimates of FB contrasts in ROIs 211 
Figure 5.1. ATOMS framework 213 
Figure 5.2. Percentage of population aged 60+ globally 216 
Figure 5.3. Cognitive and affective theory of mind across lifespan 223 




F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
Chapter One: General Introduction 
 
Humans are naturally driven towards cooperation and interaction, and this often requires 
a mutual or shared understanding of the complex, and typically muddled, world. As 
humans, and especially adults, we manage these social complexities with relative ease 
and thus typically do not expend much effort in appreciating the cognitive dexterities 
that underlie such processes. Central to social cooperation and understanding are the 
mentalistic notions of beliefs and desires, and how we use them in our understanding of 
others’ mental and knowledge states. Inference, imputation, and representation of 
others’ mental states – abilities commonly referred to as mentalizing, and collectively 
termed a theory of mind (ToM) – while not unique to humans (more of which later), are 
foundational to everyday, routine social functioning. 
 A functioning ToM has been shown to be associated with a wide range of real-
world social outcomes in both children and adults. Peterson and Siegal (2002), for 
example, investigated mindreading abilities in 109 pre-school children that were divided 
into groups of ‘popular’ and ‘rejected’ based on mutual friendships and peer-popularity. 
Popular children, who had stable and reciprocal friendships, showed significantly greater 
understanding of false belief (FB) – representing others’ mental states that are evidently 
untrue – relative to their less popular playground peers. Moreover, a reciprocal stable 
friendship accounted for variability in mindreading ability above and beyond the 
influence of age and verbal maturity. Similarly, in a prospective longitudinal study 
examining the link between friendlessness and ToM, Fink et al. (2015) studied 114 
children over the course of two years and investigated ToM as a predictor of mutual 
friendship from ages 5 to 7 (Time 1 & 2, respectively). After controlling for language 
ability, Fink and colleagues reported that five-year-olds with a mutual friend fared 
significantly better compared to their friendless peers on a wide-ranging battery of ToM 
10 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
measures. In terms of a longitudinal effect, seven-year-olds who possessed no friends at 
either time of testing exhibited remarkably poor ToM at Time 1, even after controlling for 
group popularity, age, and language capacity.  
Both Peterson and Siegal and Fink et al.’s findings mirror the key results of 
Slaughter et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis which examined ToM and peer popularity in early 
school years. Slaughter and colleagues, from their review of 20 studies comprising over 
2000 children, reported that children with higher ToM performance also were more 
popular among their peers. Childhood friendships are important for longer-term psycho-
social development as longitudinal studies of childhood friendships and peer 
popularity/acceptance have been shown to be related to psychological difficulties in 
later life. For example, friendless children have been shown to be statistically more likely 
to exhibit maladaptive psychological symptoms into adulthood, such as depression, 
anxiety, psychosomatic complaints, and lower self-esteem (Sakyi et al., 2015; Witvliet et 
al., 2010).  
The corpus of ToM literature has typically focused on child and adolescent 
populations and therefore much less has been documented on the link between ToM 
and wider social outcomes in older age. An emerging literature, however, has shown the 
link between ToM in old age and broader social functioning. For example, older adults 
(OA) who demonstrate poorer ToM typically also show lower levels of social 
participation (e.g., being members of social clubs and societies, hobby groups, visiting 
friends and family, etc.; Bailey, Henry, & Von Hippel, 2008). Further, cognitive empathy1 – 
a concept thought to be related to ToM – has been associated with measures of social 
                                                          
1 There is a substantial divergence in what is thought to constitute a theory of mind, both in terms of a definition and in the 
methodologies used to investigate this phenomenon (e.g., see Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). This heterogeneity and lack of 
specificity is explored further through a meta-analysis in Chapter Two. 
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economic decision-making in advanced age (i.e., financial payoffs in the Ultimatum 
Game, Beadle et al., 2012). 
Reduced social participation, which, as discussed above, is linked with poorer 
ToM, can be a serious concern in ageing due to its association with loneliness and social 
isolation. Research has shown that loneliness and isolation in the elderly are particular 
risk factors for all-cause morbidity and mortality (e.g., Pantell et al., 2013; Rico-Uribe et 
al., 2016), have been linked with obesity and high blood pressure (e.g., Freedman & 
Nicolle, 2020), and various mental health conditions, including depression (e.g., Smith & 
Victor, 2019). Further, the link between ToM and social-economic decision-making is of 
particular concern as fraud victimisation (being victims of irreversible financial fraud or 
exploitation) is most prevalent in the older age groups (see Shao et al., 2019). It is clear, 
then, that studying the precise nature of social cognitive function in ageing is important 
as there are potentially far-reaching consequences of ToM impairment in old age. 
 
Origins of theory of mind 
 
While early philosophical accounts of a ‘representational mind’ and ‘beliefs about 
beliefs’ were prevalent long before the contemporary understanding of mental state 
attribution (e.g., see Dennett, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1978), the formal coining of the term 
theory of mind is attributed to primatologists David Premack and Guy Woodruff. In their 
seminal 1978 investigation titled ‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’, 
Premack and Woodruff defined ToM as the imputation of mental states to oneself and 
others, and used the terminology of ‘theory’ insofar as mental states are not directly 
observable but are understood through implicit and indirect concepts and methods of 
12 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
assessment (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). What constitutes a mental state was loosely 
outlined as intentions, beliefs, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, and liking.  
 In their study, Sarah, a 14-year-old African chimpanzee, was presented with 30-
second videotaped scenarios of a human actor facing a set of four different challenges. 
These challenges were physical in nature, where the actor was depicted attempting to 
obtain particular objects that were out of his reach, or extricate himself from enclosed 
spaces. Following the videotaped problems, Sarah was shown a set of still photographs 
of potential solutions to the aforementioned problems. She was tasked with selecting 
the most appropriate solution to the problem from among the photographs. One example 
problem is where the human actor attempts to reach towards a bunch of bananas 
hanging from the ceiling, and the respective solution photograph showed an actor 
stepping onto a box. Sarah consistently selected the most appropriate solution to the 
respective problems, and this was interpreted by Premack and Woodruff as evidence of 
the animal showing an understanding of the actor’s intentions, purpose, and desires (i.e., 
a ToM).  This was the first experimental investigation into ToM. 
 However, in a commentary on Premack and Woodruff’s seminal paper, Dennett 
(1978) questioned whether the chimpanzee genuinely represented the mental state of 
the actor, or, if more basic, lower-level problem-solving mechanisms could account for 
Sarah’s success in resolving the scenarios. To specifically address this issue and provide 
robust evidence of mental state representation, Dennett – using the example of a 
children’s Punch and Judy show – proposed a paradigm wherein the subject must hold in 
mind and reason about others’ FBs. At its most basic form, FB understanding – which 
has subsequently been thought of as a litmus test for an operational ToM – requires one 
to manage the contrast between a perspective that is contrary to the true state of affairs 
(i.e., a FB) and what is evidently true (Wellman, 1993).  Conceptually, FB is typically 
13 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
separated into first- (John thinks that…) and second-order (John thinks that Sarah 
thinks…) processes (Apperly, 2012; Astington, 1993; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-
Flusberg, 1994). 
 On the basis of Dennett’s proposition of requiring an understanding of ‘falseness’ 
in relation to one’s own beliefs, Wimmer and Perner (1983) developed the now well-
known object transfer task (also sometimes called the change-of-location task). In a 
visual sketch, participants are shown Character A placing an object into a location X and 
then leaving the scene. Then, in Character A’s absence, Character B moves the object 
from X into location Y. As Character A was unaware of the change of location, 
participants had to assume that A still believed the object was in the original location. 
Participants are then asked where A will look for the object upon her return. Wimmer 
and Perner found that none of the 3-4-year old children in their study correctly pointed 
to location X; whereas 57% of 4-6-year olds and 86% of 6-9-year olds successfully 
resolved the task. The authors concluded that a functioning (though not complete) ToM 
develops around age 4-6 and that the higher proportion of errors experienced prior to 
this developmental milestone could reflect higher levels of cognitive egocentrism in pre-
school-aged children. Wimmer and Perner’s findings were the first to provide 
experimental evidence of a ToM in human subjects and their object–location protocol 
has become the template paradigm for subsequent and contemporary FB investigations.  
 
Theory of mind disruption 
 
As discussed above, children are typically successful on tests of ToM (in particular, false 
beliefs) around ages 4 – 6 (Wellman, 1992; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; for a recent review, 
see Slaughter, 2015). At this age, neurotypical children are able to understand the 
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contrast in self-other beliefs and can effectively attribute and represent beliefs that are 
contrary to their own experience (Frith & Frith, 2005; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Disruption to 
the typical ToM trajectory can occur with the presence of particular developmental 
disorders and/or learning difficulties. In their seminal study, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and 
Frith (1985) tested children with autism and Down’s syndrome alongside a matched 
group of typically-developing controls. Based on Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) original FB 
change-of-location task, Baron-Cohen and colleagues reported that children with autism 
showed significantly poorer mental state understanding compared to typically-
developing children and children with Down’s syndrome. The authors concluded that a 
disruption to ToM proficiency is independent of a global developmental and cognitive 
delay and is perhaps instead specific to autism spectrum disorders (for a detailed 
analysis of ToM in autism, see Tager-Flusberg, 2007). ToM continues to develop and 
mature through childhood and into adolescence, until stabilising in adulthood (see 
Dumontheil, Apperly, and Blakemore, 2010). Though, even in adulthood, where ToM 
competence seems to peak, individual differences in inhibitory control (Qureshi, Apperly, 
& Samson, 2010) and memory (Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010) have been shown to predict 
overall ToM performance. Disruptions to adult ToM can occur, however, as a result of a 
range of different psychiatric, neurological, and social disorders. These include, but are 
not limited to, schizophrenia (e.g., Kronbichler et al., 2017), depression and anxiety 
disorders (e.g., Bora & Berk, 2016), multiple sclerosis (e.g., Chalah et al., 2017), epilepsy 
(e.g., Morou et al., 2018), and in patients with acquired brain injury (e.g., Martín-
Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010).  
In healthy, non-pathological ageing, the extant behavioural and neuroscientific 
literature suggests an age-related impairment in ToM proficiency. However, the precise 
nature and magnitude of an age effect is still unclear as the earliest studies of ToM in 
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ageing showed mixed outcomes. While more recent investigations have shown greater 
(but not complete) convergence with respect to an effect of age on social cognitive 
function (SCF), substantial theoretical and methodological heterogeneity still exist within 
the literature that precludes a definitive account being drawn on the relationship 
between cognitive ageing and ToM. For example, many investigations on ToM and 
ageing typically employ experimental protocols which require participants to manage 
non-social, fronto-executive demands – i.e., demands that older adults 
disproportionately find difficulty with. Thus, it is unclear from the existing knowledge 
base the extent to which non-social demands account for the reported deficit in ageing 
ToM, and how much of this reported ageing effect can be explained by genuine age-
related modification in SCF. It is the purpose of this thesis, therefore, to disentangle an 
ageing ToM on a more granular level, to separate and identify the neurocognitive 
mechanisms that may explain variation in performance in older adults when reasoning 
about the beliefs of others. It is hoped, through the chapters/experiments in this thesis, 
a clearer understanding of how natural, healthy ageing modifies different features of 




A thorough analysis of an age-related modification of ToM first requires explicating the 
wider cognitive degeneration that is present in healthy, advanced ageing. Cognitive 
abilities can be generally divided into specific domains including attention, memory, 
executive function, language, and visuospatial reasoning. Each of these domains can be 
further fractionated into smaller sub-processes (e.g., attention alerting, attention 
orienting, etc.) and the trajectory of each of these abilities differ in natural healthy 
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ageing. Another important distinction is in the difference between fluid and crystallised 
abilities. Fluid aptitudes (or intelligence) require the on-line processing of novel 
information, to manage and resolve conflicting or distracting information or to reason 
about abstract and non-concrete problems. Crystallised abilities, on the other hand, rely 
on cultural or social learning; and can be typically thought of as aptitudes relating to 
general knowledge, vocabulary, and reasoning based on long-term, acquired information 
(Cattell & Horn, 1978; Horn & Cattell, 1967). Importantly, fluid and crystallised abilities 
have different trajectories with respect to ageing. 
 
Fluid vs. crystallised intelligence 
The most marked age-related change can be seen in fluid abilities (Bugg et al., 2006; 
Kievit et al., 2014; 2018; Salthouse, 2009; Salthouse et al., 1998). For example, Staff, 
Hogan, and Whalley (2014) examined 751 participants aged 62 – 83 in a longitudinal 
design where fluid intelligence was indexed using a variant of the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (RPM). After standardising raw RPM scores to a mean test score of 100, Staff 
and colleagues reported that one additional year of life amounted to over .5 decrease in 
fluid intelligence.  
In addition to longitudinal designs, cross-sectional investigations of fluid 
intelligence have also shown a reliable age-related deterioration, where, on average, 
individuals aged 60 score one standard deviation point below relative to 20-year-olds on 
measures including processing speed and efficiency (e.g., Salthouse, 2004; 2010; see 
Figure 1.1 below).  Further, consistent linear decline in ageing has also been found on a 
wide range of measures of working memory (McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami, & 
Woodcock, 2002; Salthouse, 1992) and attention (Craik & Salthouse, 2000). However, 
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while there is a steady decline in fluid abilities with age, older adults typically show 
greater crystallised capacities relative to their younger counterparts. The greatest 
increment can be seen in abilities relating to language, typically assessed through tests 
of vocabulary and word pronunciation (Craik & Salthouse, 2011; Wechsler, 1997); though 
it should be noted that older adults experience greater difficulties in lexical retrieval 
(e.g., Segaert et al., 2018).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. From Salthouse (2010): Age differences in Fluid and Crystallised Intelligence. Means (SD) of 




Executive functions (EFs; also known as executive control or cognitive control) 
encompass a set of top-down cognitive skills that drive attention, help set and maintain 
goals, resist temptation or primed responses, and preserve concentration when 
‘automatic’ functioning would be ill-advised or insufficient (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Three 
core domains of EFs have been established in the literature (Miyake et al., 2000): 1) 
inhibition, which includes inhibitory control and interference control; 2) working memory 
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(WM), including working memory updating; and 3) cognitive flexibility, which includes 
abilities related to set shifting or task switching. 
There is a substantial literature delineating a now well-established relationship 
between cognitive ageing and deterioration in all three components of EF. For example, 
older adults show increased difficulty, relative to their younger counterparts, at inhibiting 
both visual and auditory distractions (Alain & Woods, 1999; Gazzeley et al., 2005), and 
specifically show impairments in suppressing to-be-ignored distractors in attentional 
control tasks (Ashinoff, Geng, & Mevorach, 2019; Gazzeley et al., 2005; Mevorach et al., 
2016). In stop-signal tasks, where participants are required to suppress or inhibit a pre-
potent response, older participants again show poorer performance compared to 
younger adults (Hu et al., 2018). For a recent and comprehensive review of inhibitory 
control in ageing, see Rey-Mermet and Gade (2017). With respect to memory, there is an 
inverse relationship between age and the number of items that can be stored in WM 
(Craik & Salthouse, 2000; for meta-analysis, see Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005). A well-
known measure of WM is the digit span test which comprises forward and backward 
recall components. Choi et al. (2014), in their study of 784 community-dwelling, healthy 
older adults aged 60-90 years, reported a significant effect of age where older 
participants recalled fewer backward and forward digits overall. Finally, with respect to 
cognitive flexibility, Ferguson, Brunsdon and Bradford (2021) reported age-related 
impairment in a component of a task switching paradigm, where the authors reported a 
greater mixing (global task-shifting) cost in old age. Though, switching (local task-
shifting) costs decreased in ageing. Further, in investigations measuring set-shifting 
through the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, an age deficit is classically reported (e.g., 
Isingrini & Vazou, 1997; Raz et al., 1998). Taken together, though there is some 
heterogeneity across tasks, the literature reviewed thus far points toward a relatively 
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robust association between ageing and weakening of executive control abilities. See 
Table 1.1 below for summary of changes in cognitive skills in ageing.  
Table 1.1. 
Summary of cognitive skills in older versus younger cohorts. 
Cognitive Ability Crystallised vs. Fluid Age Effect 
Attention Fluid Simple tasks: No difference 
Complex tasks: YA > OA 
Executive function Fluid Inhibition: YA > OA 
Flexibility: YA > OA 
Language Mixed Vocabulary: OA > YA 
Lexical retrieval: YA > OA 
Processing speed Fluid YA > OA 
Visuospatial  Fluid YA > OA 
Note: YA = Younger adults. OA = Older adults.  
 
Neurocognitive ageing 
A more fine-grained review of the ageing brain, with respect to both structural and 
functional changes, is provided in the Introduction of Chapter 4; accordingly, to avoid 
repetition and redundancy, I will outline only the broader models of cognitive and 
neurobiological ageing here.  
The age-related impairment of cognitive abilities discussed previously can mostly 
be traced back to neurological modifications that are present in the brains of elderly 
individuals, which include alterations in neuroanatomy, functional and structural 
connectivity (FC and SC, respectively), and brain chemistry (for comprehensive reviews 
of neurocognitive ageing, see Cabeza et al., 2018; Grady, 2012; Harada, Love, & Triebel, 
2013). First, with respect to neuroanatomical changes, ageing is associated with cerebral 
atrophy, particularly in the PFC, and studies have shown total grey matter volume begins 
to decline as early as within the third decade of life (Terry & Katzman, 2001). See Figure 
1.2 below for illustration of age-related changes in brain volume, grey and white matter, 
and white matter lesions, separated by sex. On the specific link between atrophy and 
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changes in cognitive function, Manard et al. (2016) tested young and older participants 
on a battery of neuropsychological measures, including inhibition, working memory, and 
set-shifting, and investigated changes to grey matter volume using voxel-based 
morphometry. Manard and colleagues reported a significant relationship between 
executive performance and age-related reduction in grey matter volume in anterior 
(frontal, insular, cingulate cortex) and posterior (temporal and parietal) brain regions. 
Though beyond the scope of this thesis, age-related atrophy and cortical thinning is 
thought to be associated with a proliferation of beta-amyloid protein and its association 
with neuronal death in ageing (e.g., see Harada, Love, & Triebel, 2013).  
Changes in SC and FC may in part also drive behavioural differences between 
young and older participants. Briefly, FC is an index of the temporal linking of discrete 
brain regions whereas SC describes the integrity and presence of white matter 
tractography that interconnects separate regions (Uddin, 2013). Zonneveld et al. (2019) 
examined resting-state FC in 2878 healthy OA in a Dutch population-based study. 
Resting-state scan sequences derive data participants in a state of ‘rest’; where 
participants are typically instructed to ‘do nothing’. Resting state data is useful therefore 
in quantifying a baseline measure of intrinsic (i.e., task-free) activity, and is commonly 
used in the study of FC. Zonneveld and colleagues reported significantly lower FC within 
the anterior default mode network, ventral attention, and sensorimotor networks in older 
participants. Though, it useful to consider that FC was higher within the visual network 
in the older group. Linking FC and SC in ageing to cognitive performance, Fjell et al. 
(2017) reported that both SC and FC changes were related to longitudinal reductions in 
executive function.  
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Finally, there is a well-established literature showing age-related changes in 
brain function or ‘activity’ across a number of cognitive tasks. Activity, in the context of 
























Figure 1.2. Scatterplots of age-related changes in brain volume, separated by sex. Reused with 
permission from Ikram et al. (2008): 10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2006.12.012 (A) Brain volume; (B) 
grey matter; (C) normal white matter; (D) total white matter; (E) white matter lesions (natural log 
transformed). Volumes are expressed as percentage of intra-cranial volume. Women: open triangles 
and dotted line. Men: closed circles and solid line. 
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signal in response to stimuli. A more comprehensive analysis of the BOLD signal in 
ageing is provided in Chapter 4. Although fMRI studies of ageing have shown that peak 
stimulus-related BOLD responses are comparable in young and older subjects (e.g., 
Aizenstein et al., 2004; Huettel, Singerman, & McCarthy, 2001), there are task-based 
differences between young and old age groups in where the neural activity is 
concentrated. There are two primary conceptual devices that can be used to explain 
differential recruitment and activity between young and older participants: compensation 
and dedifferentiation (for a review of these processes, see Grady, 2012).  
Compensation describes the phenomenon wherein OA sometimes engage 
particular brain areas, particularly within the frontal lobes, above the level seen in YA to 
compensate for weakened function somewhere else in the brain (Grady et al., 1994). For 
example, older adults have been shown to display more activity in the PFC during 
memory tasks compared to their younger counterparts (e.g., Madden et al., 1999). This 
has been interpreted as compensation for lower activation in other parts of the brain, 
particularly the visual processing regions (Grady et al., 1994). The preponderance of 
frontal activity in ageing, in comparison to poster regions, is known as the posterior–
anterior shift with ageing (or PASA). See Table 1.2 below for a summary of models of 
neurocognitive ageing.  Dedifferentiation, which is not mutually exclusive to 
compensation, describes the more diffuse, bilateral patterns of activity seen in OA on 
tasks where YA show lateralised and circumscribed – or asymmetric – activity (Madden 
et al., 1999). For example, Dennis and Cabeza (2011), in an ageing fMRI study of implicit 
and explicit memory, found that YA showed increased hippocampal activity during 
explicit learning and increased recruitment of the striatum during implicit learning. OA, 
however, showed less specific activity during these two conditions, and 
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Table 1.2. 
Comparison of models of neuro-cognitive ageing 
Model Acronym Model Name Key 
Publication(s) 
Key Postulates of Model 
CRUNCH Compensation-Related 






The model posits that older adults are generally more likely to show increased 
activation than younger adults during tasks that have low-level demands, even 
when performance between groups is comparable. When task-related demands 
rise, older adults reach capacity for compensatory recruitment, and further 
compensation becomes no longer possible. Accordingly, during particularly 
challenging tasks, activation levels of older adults may drop below those of 
younger adults. The point of inflection on the task demand axis where activity 
reaches its optimal (peak) level and begins to decrease is known as the crunch 
point. This point is specific to individuals and could be shifted by exercise, 
cognitive training, neural damage, sleep deprivation, or genetic predisposition. 
 
HAROLD Hemispheric Asymmetry 
Reduction in Older Adults 
Cabeza 
(2002) 
The HAROLD model suggests that compared to younger adults, who show 
unilateral patterns of activity, older adults show greater bilateral activity, 
especially in the prefrontal cortex. For example, during verbal and spatial 
working memory tasks, older adults exhibited bilateral prefrontal activity 
compared to younger adults who showed left-lateralised recruitment during 
verbal and right-lateralised recruitment during spatial working memory tasks 
(Reuter-Lorenz et al., 2000). The increased laterality is thought to drive either 
compensatory processes or dedifferentiation; these mechanisms are not 
considered to be mutually exclusive under this Model.  
 
PASA Posterior-Anterior Shift in 
Ag[e]ing 





The PASA model suggests that older adults show less activation of posterior 
regions (e.g., occipital lobe) and greater activation of frontal regions, compared 
to younger adults. The preponderance of frontal activity in older adults may be 
present even in the absence of behavioural age differences in task performance. 
The PASA model favours the compensation hypothesis, where increased 
recruitment of frontal regions in older adults is thought to offset under-
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The STAC theory posits that older adults recruit compensatory neural 
scaffolding as an adaptive response to declining brain structure and brain 
function. Those older adults with less neural degeneration, greater ability to 
recruit compensatory scaffolds, or both will have better cognitive performance 
than older adults who are unable to use scaffolding to compensate for their 
neural declines. Scaffolding involves the recruitment of additional, 
complementary neural resources to sustain dedicated circuitry to preserve 
cognitive performance. 
 
STAC-r Scaffolding Theory of Aging 




STAC-r is a revision of the original STAC model. In addition to incorporating 
all aspects of STAC, the revised model also includes flexibility to account for 
longitudinal change in cognition and individual differences in life experiences, 
which can be categorised as either neural enrichment (e.g., education, physical 
fitness) or neural depletion (e.g., depression, vascular disease) factors. These 
factors are thought to impact brain structure and function, and the potential for 
compensatory scaffolding, which collectively predict the level of cognition and 
rate of cognitive change. 
 
STAC-r is the broadest model in this comparison, as it factors in flexibility to 
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showed comparable activity in both aforementioned regions during implicit and explicit 
memory conditions. Overall, natural healthy ageing brings about material changes in a 
wide range of cognitive skills; and the modification of these skills is sometimes 
associated with altered or impaired patterns of neural activation. This background to 
cognitive ageing is important to consider when examining an age-related weakening of 
ToM. 
 
Interplay between executive control and ToM proficiency 
 
At the broadest level, ToM comprises many different constructs and each construct has 
a multitude of unique methods and experimental protocols. For a review of the different 
facets of ToM, see Quesque and Rossetti (2020). The ToM component that is the focus 
of this discussion, and indeed the wider dissertation, is FB understanding. FB is most 
commonly (though not exclusively) assessed using the previously-discussed object-
transfer paradigm, and the three measures of EF – inhibition, working memory updating, 
and attention shifting – can be mapped somewhat directly onto the subcomponents of 
the object-transfer task. For example, a typical representation of the task includes 
multiple agents, each with their own mental state and multiple – and often competing – 
locations. In order to represent the mental state of another agent, a participant must 
suppress their own knowledge of reality and this ostensibly draws on mechanisms of 
inhibition or inhibitory control. The shifting of attention from one spatial location to 
another – e.g., the basket and the box – is thought to require attention shifting (cognitive 
flexibility) skills while keeping in mind the contents of each location and the subsequent 
change of the target location is thought to require working memory updating.  More 
recent FB paradigms comprise more complex problems where more than two locations 
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are presented (e.g., three locations in Wysocka et al., 2020) or have more intricate visuo-
spatial demands (e.g., the ‘sandbox task’ in Bernstein, Thornton, and Sommerville, 
2011), and therefore perhaps draw on these executive abilities more deeply.  
 From a developmental perspective, it is important to consider causality or 
‘direction’: does emerging EF drive developments in ToM, or is the development of ToM 
central for an advancement in EF capacities? Hughes and Ensor (2007) addressed this 
issue directly in their study of 122 socially diverse children tested at ages 2, 3, and 4. 
The authors examined the predictive relationship between ToM and EF using partial 
correlations and hierarchical regression models, which included factors of verbal ability 
and social disadvantage in addition to tests of ToM and EF. Hughes and Ensor 
concluded that the strongest predictive relationship supported the view that EF abilities 
facilitated children’s performance on ToM tasks. Indeed, numerous longitudinal and 
cross-sectional developmental studies have examined the specific ToM-EF relationship 
and have reported EF as a precondition to an operational ToM (e.g., Austin, Groppe, & 
Elsner, 2014; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Hughes, 1998; Marcovitch et al., 2015; 
Perner & Lang, 2000).  
 However, only a limited number of studies have attempted to delineate the 
relationship between EF and ToM in non-clinical, adult populations. In one study, 
researchers analysed the predictors of cognitive and affective ToM in young and older 
adults separately (Fischer, O’Rourke, & Thornton, 2017). Digit span, Colour-Word Stroop, 
and Letter-Number Sequencing measures were performed in addition to semantic and 
episodic memory and pulse pressure (the difference between systolic and diastolic blood 
pressure values, in mmHg). Path analyses showed that EF, semantic memory, and pulse 
pressure predicted cognitive ToM in young adults, whereas semantic memory was the 
only predictor for affective ToM (Fischer, O’Rourke, & Thornton, 2017). It is difficult to 
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establish precisely which measure of EF (e.g., inhibition, working memory, or attention) 
was most predictive of young adult ToM as the authors did not test these predictors 
individually. Bull, Phillips, and Conway (2008) on the other hand used dual-task 
manipulations of EFs (inhibition, updating, and switching) to examine the influence of 
these cognitive functions in mental and non-mental state tasks in 150 young participants 
(age range 16-31). The authors reported ToM task costs when concurrently performed 
with an inhibition task (but not updating or switching), suggesting a specific link 
between inhibitory control and mental state reasoning. However, the evidence to date 
linking specific and individual cognitive control functions with specific manipulations of 
ToM tasks in healthy younger adults is limited. 
 In advanced age, executive abilities have been shown to predict ToM 
performance. Phillips et al. (2011) studied 129 adults aged 18 – 86 on visual and verbal2 
FB paradigms and found that working memory updating partially mediated age-based 
differences in FB reasoning. Likewise, Nolaker et al. (2018) reported that, above and 
beyond the effect of age, a combination of measures of EF explained individual 
differences in performance on a composite of three naturalistic tests of ToM. Finally, in 
their study of 27 young and 20 older adults matched on crystallised intelligence, 
Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, and Sturm (2012) examined the influence of domain-general 
abilities in old-age ToM decline. General cognitive skills were measured using the Trail 
Making Test, the Stroop task, a processing speed measure, and the day-night task (an 
index of interference control). SCF was measured using two ToM tasks: a German 
translation of Happé et al’s (1998) Strange Stories paradigm and Sullivan and Ruffman’s 
                                                          
2 Theory of mind (false belief) paradigms are typically constructed as either verbal or non-verbal tasks. Verbal 
tasks predominantly present stimuli textually (i.e., vignettes) whereas non-verbal tasks usually present stimuli 
pictorially (i.e., cartoon/comic strips or video-taped scenarios). A more in-depth discussion on verbal/non-
verbal tasks can be found in Chapter 2. 
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(2004) video task. Overall, OA performed worse on both measures of ToM (more of 
which later) but importantly the age-related deficits were partly explained by domain-
general decays in processing speed and EF (Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 2012). 
Though the effect of age was not completely abolished, these results indicate that a 
potential effect of age is in part attributable to wider cognitive functions; which also 
happen to decline with age.  
 
Theory of mind in old age 
A comprehensive analysis of ageing ToM is provided in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis; therefore, I will only briefly discuss the broader literature here. In their meta-
analysis of 23 studies comprising over 1400 participants, Henry et al. (2013) examined 
the effect of age on ToM across a range of tasks, modalities (visual, verbal, static, 
dynamic, etc.), and domains (cognitive, affective, or mixed). Overall, collapsed over all 
task types, OA were reported to perform more poorly than YA. The effect of age was not 
homogenous, however; there was variability in the magnitude of the age effect 
depending on the specific sub-group analysis, suggesting that task and sampling 
parameters might in part explain some of the difference in young vs. older adult ToM 
performance. The proposed effect of age has been further demonstrated in more recent 
empirical investigations using a range of different paradigms, including animated cartoon 
films (e.g., Baksh et al., 2018), naturalistic social movies (e.g., Lecce et al., 2019), first-
person virtual reality tasks (e.g., Grainger et al., 2020), in addition to traditional vignette-
based paradigms (e.g., Hughes et al., 2019; Rakoczy et al., 2018).  
 It is worth noting, however, the evidence is not entirely homogenous respect to an 
age effect. Indeed, the earliest study of the effect of ageing on SCF reported enhanced 
29 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
abilities in older subjects (Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998). However, Happé and 
colleagues noted that the young and old groups were not IQ-matched, and it seems 
probable that selection bias may explain this effect. Even in studies where age 
differences are present, there is substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude of effects, 
as the effect seems to vary depending on a range of factors relating to sampling (e.g., 
age and education) and task design (modality, domain, and preferred outcome measure). 
The nature and magnitude of an age effect is explored in further detail in a meta-
analysis in Chapter 2. The non-uniformity can perhaps be explained by qualitative 
differences in task difficulty. In addition to theoretical heterogeneity in the traditional 
understanding of what ToM actually constitutes, there is substantial divergence in task 
design, with particular tasks placing greater demands on non-social executive 
processing (for a recent analysis of ToM tasks, see Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). For 
example, where some naturalistic tasks are rich in detail and provide comprehensive and 
individualised backstories to the narratives accompanying protagonists, animated 
shapes tasks are devoid of this social ‘richness’ and present only moving shape forms 
that perhaps have lower demands on particular EFs, such as working memory. Further 
examples of this inconsistency can be seen even within the same task type. Consider 
Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) classic object-location paradigm and a more recent variant 
by Bernstein, Thornton, and Sommerville (2011). As discussed previously, the 
conventional object-location (also known as change-of-location) task typically requires 
participants to infer the beliefs of a character who holds a FB regarding the location of a 
target object, which is contrasted with the participant’s updated and privileged belief of 
the scene. The participant is critically asked to indicate which location the protagonist 
will search upon her return in order to retrieve the target object. In Bernstein, Thornton, 
and Sommerville’s (2011) sandbox task, a similar problem is offered to the participant, 
30 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
but instead of indicating which two-dimensional location the protagonist will search, the 
participant here is asked to manually point to a location within a physical sandpit where 
the protagonist is likely to search. The physical distance between the correct location 
and the participant’s indicated position – as measured by a ruler – is taken as the 
outcome variable. Ostensibly, both paradigms are purported to test FB understanding, 
contain identical numbers of protagonists and ‘correct’ locations, and are non-verbal in 
their format in that the stimuli are visually presented, and thus can be argued to have 
similar processing demands. Therefore, any age effect resulting from these paradigms 
might be considered comparable. However, it is at least arguable that there are greater 
visuo-spatial/motor processing demands – which are known to diminish with age (e.g., 
Bendayan et al., 2017) – in Bernstein and colleagues’ sandbox task as it requires 
participants to visually orient and estimate a physical, three-dimensional location. These 
differences in task design may introduce additional non-social processing that 
disproportionately disadvantage OA, and in turn inflate any genuine age-related 
differences in SCF. It is important, therefore, to examine ageing ToM using carefully-
constructed tasks wherein social and non-social manipulations are systematically varied 
to highlight precise sources of interference, and delineate which of these processes are 
differentially affected by age.  
 
Models of cognitive ageing and age-related theory of mind decline 
As discussed previously, there are a number of different models which explain the age-
related deterioration of cognitive function both on a behavioural and neural level. The 
models are mostly iterative with shared underlying concepts and mechanisms; however, 
for the current work—that is, ToM reasoning in healthy ageing—the STAC-r model 
(Reuter-Lorenz & Park, 2014) represents the most compatible account. An extension of 
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the original Scaffolding Theory of Aging Cognition model (STAC; Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 
2009), the revised STAC model is flexible in that it accommodates life-course variables 
such as education, cognitive and physical training, disease, genetics, and so-on, and 
thus allows for a more fine-grained analysis of individual differences in ageing. While 
there is a general downward trajectory in most (but not all) cognitive functions in ageing, 
as discussed previously, the speed and extent of decline varies greatly depending on a 
range of individual factors (see Harada, Love, & Triebel, 2014). Similarly, age-associated 
deterioration of ToM is not uniform (see Chapter 2 for a more comprehensive discussion 
on non-uniformity in ageing-ToM). For example, individual differences in EF have been 
shown to predict ToM performance in older age (e.g., Rahman et al., 2021). Moreover, 
studies of ToM training, where authors have aimed to promote social-cognitive abilities 
in older adults, have also found that ToM is indeed sensitive to practise and learning 
(see Cavallini et al., 2015; Rosi et al., 2016). That ToM ability in ageing varies as a result 
of individual factors and is sensitive to training effects, suggests that STAC-r is perhaps 
the most compatible model of neuro-cognitive ageing in the context of social cognition.  
 
Aims of the current thesis 
 
At the broadest level, the aims of this thesis were to clarify and bring greater specificity 
to a potential effect of age on ToM functioning. As discussed above, there is substantial 
variability in the magnitude of age effects in the literature, with a number of studies 
showing comparable performance between young and older groups. This inconsistency 
is in part driven by non-standardised, non-uniform tests of ToM where processing 
demands or cognitive load varies as a function of task type. The variation in processing 
demands, especially those processes that rely on capacities known to diminish with old 
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age (e.g., EF), may partially explain the discrepancy in effects both within and between 
age groups. The first aim of this thesis, then, was to elucidate the precise 
methodological parameters (e.g., task design, sampling, etc.) which might differentially 
contribute to the oft-reported effect of age. Systematically probing an age effect across 
a number of theoretically-driven task and sampling considerations will provide a more 
nuanced and granular account of age-associated changes in ToM function. This aim is 
realised primarily through a meta-analysis in Chapter 2. 
 The second general aim of the thesis was to examine precisely the sources of 
difficulty in reasoning about others’ mental states, and how the sources of interference 
may differentially change with age. As alluded to previously, social and non-social 
demands are typically confounded in the social cognition literature. While this is perhaps 
not a critical issue in ToM studies with younger participants employing within-subjects 
designs, the matter of differentiating processes that are fundamental to belief reasoning 
from those that are driven by more domain-general abilities is important when examining 
an age effect. As discussed above, FB tasks contrast the participant’s true and privileged 
belief with the protagonist’s outdated and superseded belief; and the competition arising 
from keeping in mind these two conflicting belief states is a source of difficulty or 
interference. At the same time, FB tasks, through methodological confounds as 
discussed above, such as managing multiple and competing locations, introduce 
interference that is non-social in nature. This particular aim, then, focused on 
delineating social and non-social parameters to evaluate which cognitive components 
associated with belief-reasoning explain age-specific deficits in performance. This 
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Thesis structure 
 
In addition to this current Introduction (Chapter 1), there are four subsequent chapters 
in this thesis. Chapter 2 comprises a meta-analysis of behavioural studies investigating 
age-related decline in ToM. Chapter 3 is an empirical investigation of the precise 
sources of interference in FB reasoning, and how these sources of interference 
differentially impact performance between young and older participants. Chapter 4 is a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of FB reasoning in older age, 
where, using a modified version of the task employed in Chapter 3, we attempted to 
delineate a neurocognitive account of ToM reasoning in healthy ageing. Finally, Chapter 
5 comprises a general discussion which includes limitations, future directions, and a 
conclusion. Each of the three empirical chapters – 2, 3, and 4 – are outlined briefly 
below.  
Chapter 2. What follows in Chapter 2 is a meta-analysis of behavioural 
investigations of age-related ToM decline, where we specifically examined a young vs. 
older comparison across a range of theoretically-driven sampling and ToM task-related 
variables. Previous meta-analyses have shown an overall age-related decline in ToM 
abilities. We extended the literature by examining the heterogeneity in the effect of age 
across two novel sampling considerations, explicitly probing the reported age effect as a 
function of OA’ mean age and level of education. We additionally examined differences 
in ToM performance in domain (cognitive vs. affective) and task modality (verbal vs. no-
verbal).  
Chapter 3. In the first empirical investigation, we broadly studied if FB reasoning 
is effortful for OA beyond the non-social cognitive demands of classic ToM 
investigations. We assessed older and younger adults’ ToM on a novel FB paradigm, and 
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examined how age interacted with three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within 
ToM: competing Self-Other perspectives; competing cued locations, and outcome 
knowledge (or a knowledge of reality). We also used measures of EF to assess the 
relationship between successful belief reasoning and executive abilities, and examined if 
this relationship changed with age.  
Chapter 4. Building on Chapter 3, we again tested young and older adults on an 
amended version of our novel FB paradigm, while administering fMRI. In an effort to 
again examine the precise nature of difficulty in ToM reasoning across young and older 
adults, we manipulated whether the participant had a privileged knowledge of reality and 
varied the congruence between Self and Other beliefs. We also administered Saxe and 
Kanwisher’s (2003) classic ToM localizer to inform our analyses of the fMRI data. 
Further, for the first time, we included in our neuroimaging protocol an index of 
neurovascular coupling to account for age-related differences in neurophysiology. In 
addition to probing behavioural differences, we aimed to delineate between our task 
manipulations on a neural level, and aimed to show differential recruitment of 
established regions within the classic mentalizing network (as informed by the localizer) 
between young and older participants.  
Thesis format. The chapters in this thesis were written in a ‘publication format’, where 
each chapter was constructed as a self-contained manuscript. To this effect, naturally, 
there is a degree of redundancy and repetition, especially with respect to the 
introductory segments across the chapters. Lastly, while this work is my own, I 
frequently (and preferably) use the term ‘we’ to better acknowledge the collaborative 
nature of studying for a PhD, which has benefitted and taken from the expertise of many 
academics and scholars.   
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Chapter Two: Meta-analysis of ToM in ageing 
 
Meta-analysis of the nature and magnitude of age-related change in theory of mind. 
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Chapter précis and background 
 
Early studies of theory of mind (ToM) in ageing produced mixed results, with some 
studies suggesting preserved or even enhanced social cognitive function in advanced 
age. More recently, the literature has converged (though not completely) to suggest that 
natural, healthy ageing brings about deterioration of ToM irrespective of task domain 
and modality. Indeed, meta-analyses have shown an age-related deficit across a wide 
range of ToM protocols, suggesting a stable and robust effect of age. However, these 
quantitative reviews have frequently reported significant heterogeneity in effect sizes 
when examining performance between young and older adults. This variability is perhaps 
explained, at least in part, by substantial theoretical and methodological heterogeneity in 
the extant literature, with considerable variability in conceptualising what ToM actually 
is, what ToM tasks actually measure, and the cognitive social and non-social demands 
that are unique to each ToM paradigm. Against this backdrop, here in Chapter 2, I 
examined the effect of age through a meta-analysis comparing young vs. older adults’ 
performance across a range of different theoretically-motivated analyses. In an effort to 
probe the heterogeneity in effect sizes, we specifically examined the effect of age as a 
function of task type, domain (cognitive, affective), and modality (verbal, non-verbal). 
Crucially, we extended the literature base by examining an age effect across two further 
considerations with respect to sampling demographics: age and education level of older 
adults.  
 Overall, in line with previous meta-analyses, we found a general effect of age, 
with poorer ToM performance observed in older compared to younger adults. However, 
our analysis showed significant heterogeneity in observed effect sizes. The 
predetermined sub-group analyses showed an effect of age across domain and modality 
categories; though there was again significant heterogeneity even within sub-group 
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analyses, with some particular categories showing no effect of age. Likewise, the overall 
effect was also seen within the categories of education and age, though, as before, the 
magnitude of the effect varied substantially. Finally, the education and age sub-groups 
were combined to examine if there was interaction behind these two variables. As 
expected, the effect again showed specificity according to sub-group, with older and less 
educated older adults showing the worst ToM performance.  
The use of sampling variables is novel to meta-analyses of ToM in ageing, and, at 
the time of writing, has not been tested prior to this current investigation. While we 
replicated an overall effect of age, we showed that the reported age effect is closely 
dependent on the nature of the tasks being employed and the sampling make-up of the 
population being tested.  Indeed, in some sub-analyses, there was no effect of age. In 
sum, it is likely that the classically reported effect of age has been somewhat inflated 
due to differential task demands and a lack of consensus regarding testing protocols and 
sampling considerations. These findings have important implications for future 
investigations of ToM and ageing and we recommend greater methodological and 
theoretical standardisation, which are further detailed herein.   
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Introduction 
 
The social cognitive ability to impute, infer, and respond to others’ mental states – i.e., 
having a theory of mind (ToM) – is crucial to navigate the social world (Frith & Frith, 
2005). Disruption or difficulties in reasoning about the mental states of others, especially 
appreciating a Self-Other distinction, can have profound social consequences that may 
diminish one’s quality of life (e.g., see Bailey, Henry, & von Hippel, 2008). Namely, 
individual differences in adult ToM have been linked with peer acceptance, peer 
rejection, and social anxiety (Ronchi, Banerjee, & Lecce, 2019).  
In humans, an intact, operational ToM develops around age 4 – 5 and remains 
relatively uninterrupted until older adulthood (Wellman, 1992; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 
2001), where age-related deficits have been reported in a range of ToM tasks including 
false belief reasoning (e.g., Phillips et al., 2011), detection of social faux pas (e.g., 
Bottirolli et al., 2016), and detection of double-bluffs, mistakes, and white lies (e.g., 
Maylor et al., 2002). However, there is inconsistency in the literature regarding the 
nature and magnitude of any age effect, and indeed some studies have reported no 
difference or even improved ToM in old age (e.g., Happé et al., 1998). This disparity may 
be explained by substantial heterogeneity across ToM protocols and the wider non-
social cognitive demands within social cognitive tasks. The lack of specificity in classic 
ToM measures may have resulted in an under-estimation of ToM in healthy older adults: 
differences in performance between younger and older adults may be, at least in part, 
explained by methodological and sampling properties. To address the lack of clarity in 
the ageing ToM literature, this review will assess the nature and magnitude of an effect 
of age in ToM, using theoretically-driven sub-analyses to interrogate the potential age 
effect across various task and sampling considerations. This will provide a better 
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understanding of what ToM looks like in older adults, when taking into account 
methodological considerations.  
ToM, at the broadest level, refers to both cognitive and affective components (or 
modalities). Where cognitive ToM involves imputing and representing intentions and 
knowledge states, affective ToM refers to the appreciation and attribution of others’ 
feelings and emotional states (Kalbe et al., 2010). Early accounts of ageing ToM, and 
indeed ToM more generally, however, seldom differentiate cognitive from affective 
components and typically confounded one capacity with the other (for a discussion, see 
Apperly, 2010). This is potentially problematic as the two modalities have been shown to 
be distinct both on a behavioural and neural level (Sebastian et al., 2012; Shamay-
Tsoory & Peretz, 2007); and have different developmental trajectories in advanced age 
(Bottiroli et al., 2016; Fischer, O’Rourke, & Thornton, 2017). Specifically, where cognitive 
ToM has been reported to decline with age, affective ToM appears to be preserved (for a 
recent investigation on the differentiation of the two modalities of ToM in healthy 
ageing, see Ruitenberg, Santens, & Notebaert, 2020). With respect to ageing ToM, then, 
this distinction between the two modalities should be considered with respect to the 
nature and magnitude of an age-related decay in ToM. 
At the broadest level, this heterogeneity is manifested in the proliferation of non-
specific terminology that is used to loosely describe ToM and its associated processes. 
Terms such as mentalizing, mindreading, empathy, cognitive empathy, perspective-
taking, belief reasoning, mental state attribution, among others, ostensibly all refer to a 
single underlying concept: the imputation or attribution of mental states to oneself and 
others (Apperly, 2012; Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). In their analysis of tasks purported to 
test ToM, Quesque and Rossetti (2020) identified 23 distinct paradigms. They 
categorised each according to whether there was a necessity to represent mental states 
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(which the authors termed Mentalizing criterion), and if the task distinguished between 
self and other mental states (Nonmerging criterion). The authors argue that these 
criteria form the foundation of social inference as they involve representing mental 
states that differ from what is ostensibly true in reality, and being cognisant of and 
understanding the distinction between one’s own beliefs and the beliefs of others 
(Apperly, 2010; 2012). Critically, in their review, Quesque and Rossetti identified that 
many paradigms – although purported to be ‘ToM tasks’ – did not comprise mentalizing 
nor self-other distinction elements, with several tasks lacking both mechanisms. These 
tasks, that are devoid of mental state representation, may in fact tap lower-level basic 
cognitive processes as opposed to social cognitive function; and according to the 
authors, tasks that do not satisfy the Mentalizing and Non-merging criteria “[S]hould no 
longer be discussed as a measure of theory of mind” (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020, pp. 
386). As can be seen from Table 2.1 below, the variability in age effects across studies is 
perhaps reflective of the theoretical underpinning of the different task types. Some tasks 
are qualitatively more difficult to resolve than others as they tap into divergent facets of 
ToM and wider social cognition. Where some tasks require the detection of awkward or 
inappropriate human behaviour in complex social scenarios (e.g., the Faux Pas test), 
others require discerning the intentional state of non-human, inanimate shape forms 
(e.g., Castelli et al., 2002). These tasks may pose substantially different demands on 
supporting systems for language and executive functions, which in turn may drive 
variability in performance in older age, and modify the reported difference in SCF 
between young and old. 
On a task level, the inconsistency of age effects may reflect the substantial variation in 
incidental and non-social cognitive demands embedded within ToM tasks. For example, 
consider Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) well-known FB change-of-location task: the ‘Sally-
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Ann’ paradigm. Based on the first experimental investigation of children’s FB by Wimmer 
& Perner (1983), participants are presented with two characters – Sally and Ann – in a 
static picture-based paradigm. Sally, who is playing with a ball, places her ball in a 
basket and leaves the scene. While Sally is away, Ann removes the ball from its location 
and places it inside a box (unbeknown to Sally). In the final part, Sally returns to the 
scene and the participant is asked where Sally will look for her ball. To successfully 
resolve the task, participants must suppress their own knowledge of reality (or true 
belief; the ball is in the box) to keep in mind and represent a false belief (the ball is 
[still] in the basket). Often, there is more than one location to keep track of. Further, 
where some studies require mentalizing about one single character, others present 
multiple characters each with their own distinct mental states. This potentially drives 
further variability as there may be an increased burden or cognitive load when keeping in 
mind and reasoning about multiple mental states simultaneously compared to attributing 
beliefs to a single character. These processes manifestly rely on working memory 
(multiple locations, multiple agents), attention or attention switching (shifting attention 
between candidate locations), and inhibitory control (suppression of one’s own [often 
privileged] belief). Indeed, studies have shown that EFs, and in particular inhibitory 
control, are strongly related to false belief reasoning even when age and general 
intelligence are controlled for (Carlson et al., 2002; Kloo & Perner, 2003).  
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Table 2.1. 
Examples of common theory of mind tasks and their respective properties. 
Task type Paradigm Example Domain Modality 
Detection of socially awkward 
or inappropriate utterances 
Participants must detect and respond to faux pas set within social 
scenarios. A faux pas, which typically has negative social 
consequences, happens when a speaker utters something that is 
inappropriate or awkward, without considering if the listener is 
aware of the true state of affairs. 
Faux Pas Test: Baron-




Inference of mental states of 
protagonists in short fictional 
stories. 
Original Strange Stories paradigm comprised 24 short passages, 
which were of three types: ToM, control, and jumbled text. ToM 
stories centred on double bluffs, mistakes, persuasions, and white 
lies. Each passage was followed by a test question, and for ToM 
trials, this involved inferring story characters’ intentions. Control 
stories and test questions were based on physical (not mental) 
processes, i.e., physical causation. 
Strange Stories: Happé 
et al. (1994). 
Cognitive Verbal 
Inferring mental-emotional 
states from photographs 
Participants are presented with 25 photographs of only the eye-
region of faces and are asked to match words and terms that best 
describe the mental-emotional state of the photographed actor.   
Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes (RME): 
Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1997). 
Affective Non-verbal 
Static FB protocols. Object 
displacement tasks (e.g., 
Sally-Anne or Maxi task) - 
inferring mental states of 
naïve agents precluded from 
privileged knowledge. 
Protagonist places an object in location X and then leaves the 
scene. In their absence, the object is moved from location X to 
location Y. The protagonist returns to the scene and then the 
participant is asked the critical question: “Where will he/she look 
for the object?” To resolve the task, the participant must represent 
the protagonist’s false belief (that the object is in location X) and 
inhibit their own true belief (object is in location Y). 
Wimmer and Perner 
(1983). 
Cognitive Non-verbal 
Inference of mental states of 
characters in dynamic, 
ecological social scenarios 
Short films depicting social scenarios. Film is periodically paused 
and participants are asked questions related to characters’ mental 
states. Purported to possess greater ecological properties compared 
to static paradigms.  
Movie for Assessment 
of Social Cognition 





Inference of characters’ 
mental states in ToM 
Participants are presented with a sequence of comic-book-style 
stills depicting a social interaction. Participants are asked to 
infer/attribute first- and second-order FBs in addition to answering 
ToM Picture Story 
Task: Brüne (2003). 
Cognitive Non-verbal 
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storyboard or comic-strip 
tasks. 
non-social control questions. In some variants, participants are 
required to ‘finish’ the story by selecting the most appropriate 
ending to the comic-strip sequence based on inference of 
characters’ mental states. 
Imputation and inference of 
mental states in non-human, 
animated shape forms. 
Participants shown a video of two animated triangles moving in a 
manner that implies intentions (e.g., pretending, deceiving, etc.). 
Participants asked to describe the intentionality of the presented 
triangles, where ‘appropriateness’ (given the implied social 





Note: This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all published ToM protocols, rather it is a summary of a selection of the most popular experimental ToM 
paradigms. Due to task heterogeneity (in modality, domain, administration [online, ‘in-person’], experimenter involvement, and outcome measure), it is not 
possible to neatly taxonimise all variants and iterations of the above-mentioned tasks into single, clearly defined categories. For a breakdown of paradigms 
according to ToM ‘mechanisms’, see Byom & Mutlu (2013). 
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Children below age 4-5, who have as yet immature neural systems to support some EFs, 
typically ‘fail’ false belief tasks. It has been suggested that this ‘failure’ reflects 
processing demands rather than a specific inability to represent and mentalize about 
false beliefs (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). Similarly, in advanced age, there is an 
established literature detailing age-related vulnerabilities in cognitive function, 
particularly processes that are traditionally thought to rely on the prefrontal cortex 
(West, 1996; 2000). Models such as the disconnected brain theory (e.g., Fjell et al., 2017) 
or the frontal lobe hypothesis of ageing (e.g., Cabeza & Dennis, 2012; West, 2000) 
generally posit a framework through which cognitive ageing can be understood and 
indexed. Accounts of age-related structural and functional deficits in the brain, such as 
changes in connectivity between regions that are important for particular executive 
abilities – i.e., the inferior frontal gyrus with respect to inhibitory control (Banich and 
Depue, 2015) – have advanced our understanding of the changes in the respective 
neural mechanisms that underlie particular aspects of cognitive ageing. EF, commonly 
conceptualised as inhibitory control, attention switching or set-shifting, and working 
memory updating (Miyake et al., 2000), have been reliably shown to decline with age (for 
reviews, see Harada, Love, & Triebel, 2013; Salthouse, 2010; 2019). For example, in a 
recent longitudinal investigation of 781 older adults, Caballero et al. (2020) used eight 
different neuropsychological indicators to map changes in the above-mentioned EFs. 
The authors reported significant longitudinal decline with increasing age, where the 
decline with age was more prominent in older-old participants. Interestingly, and more of 
which later, after age, the variability in the downward trajectory of EF was related to 
level of education. 
More recently, Maldonado et al. (2020) meta-analysed age differences in EF on 
multiple levels, including task level (e.g., Stroop, Flanker, Trail Making Test, etc.) and a 
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domain and global EF level (inhibition, updating, shifting, and processing speed). In their 
analysis of 16 different EF tasks, a robust age difference emerged (Hedge’s g = 1.29); 
though it is worth noting that three task-types yielded a non-significant age effect: 
Go/No-Go, Task Switching, and Letter Comparison tasks. More broadly, strong effects 
were also observed on the domain level, ranging from .8 in Updating to 1.64 in Inhibition. 
While there is variability in the magnitude of an age effect depending task type, the 
literature generally points toward an age-related decay of EFs in later life.  
With respect to SCF, there is noticeable disparity across ToM tasks (Quesque 
and Rossetti, 2020). Indeed, there are numerous methods with which to assess ToM; 
however, some protocols may be more burdensome than others due excessive reliance 
on supporting language and EF systems. As we have seen above, healthy ageing brings 
about wide-ranging declines across multiple facets of EF. Taken together, as typical 
ToM protocols involve EF demands to varying degrees, and as EFs have been shown to 
reliably wane with age, conventional ToM protocols may inadvertently inflate age-related 
effects through non-social (i.e., EF-related), incidental task demands that 
disproportionately disadvantage older adults. Likewise, the nature of ToM tasks, with 
respect to how stimuli are constructed and presented, and their subsequent differential 
cognitive demands, may also in part drive heterogeneity in age effects.  
ToM tasks can be broken down into verbal and non-verbal modalities, where 
verbal tasks present stimuli primarily in textual form, comprising stories or vignettes 
(e.g., Happé et al., 1998; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). Non-verbal tasks, on the other 
hand, are primarily picture-based and depict ToM scenarios through static comic-strips 
or images (e.g., Mind in the Eyes task, Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) or movies/animations 
(e.g., Movies for Assessment of Social Cognition, MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006). Given the 
differential prominence of language content between these two task modalities, it is 
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plausible that individual differences in language ability may, at least in part, explain 
variability in ToM performance. This is an important consideration when examining an 
ageing-ToM effect as particular faculties of language have also been shown to change 
with age. In terms of language production, OA typically produce syntactically simpler 
speech in comparison to their younger counterparts and have more frequent (and 
longer) empty pauses (Kemper & Sumner, 2001). Further, OA typically show more 
difficulty with word finding, and have been shown to produce more ‘tip of the tongue’ 
states (a language failure) in comparison to YA (Juncos-Rabadán et al., 2010; Segaert et 
al., 2018). With respect to language comprehension, the evidence of an age difference is 
less clear. Studies have shown that core aspects of comprehension are preserved and 
even improved in advanced age, however, significant variability exists depending on the 
method by which performance is assessed (for reviews, see Schneider, Pichora-Fuller, & 
Daneman, 2010; Thornton & Light, 2006). Most pertinent to text-based ToM paradigms 
is perhaps OA’ reading and word recognition abilities. Behavioural reading speed studies 
have shown that OA exhibit up to 30% slower reading speeds relative to their younger 
counterparts (Liu, Patel, & Kwon, 2017; Rodriguez-Aranda, 2003). Similarly, eye-tracking 
studies have also found that OA show slower lexical recognition across a range of 
textual stimuli compared to YA (e.g., see Kliegl et al., 2004). Finally, the age effect in 
reading and word recognition speed seems also to vary as a function of word frequency: 
how common and/or well-known a word is within a language. Overall, OA are slower and 
find more difficulty with accessing less well-known words relative to YA (DeDe & Flax, 
2016). 
The differences in language processing between young and older participants is 
an important consideration when examining an overall ToM age effect. Verbal ToM tasks 
typically present text-based stimuli at relatively (and un-naturalistically) fast speeds. 
47 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
The content of the stimuli itself also qualitatively varies in lexical difficulty. Consider, for 
example, Saxe and Kanwisher’s (2003) original ToM localizer task. This task comprises 
ToM vignettes that depict either mental content that requires mentalizing about the 
knowledge states of characters (i.e., FB trials), or vignettes depicting outdated physical 
content that can be resolved based on mechanical or physical inference (i.e., True Belief 
trials; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). While the ToM localizer has been used extensively in 
the ToM literature, the authors of the task, however, did not account for word frequency 
or syllable count when constructing their task stimuli. For example, the relatively 
infrequent and somewhat specialist word, petroglyphs, appears in one vignette in the 
original Saxe and Kanwisher stimuli set. Indeed, the majority of vignette-based 
paradigms in the literature do not account for lexical difficulty (word frequency, syllable 
count, sentence length, etc.). This highlights a broader point about the lack of carefully 
controlled stimuli and wider experimental design in classic ToM paradigms. It is 
plausible, then, given the evidence presented with respect to age-related modification of 
language abilities, and the variability in lexical difficulty across ToM (especially, verbal 
ToM) tasks, that an age effect in ToM emanating from these protocols may in part 
reflect non-social language and EF changes.   
The heterogeneity in ToM age effects may also reflect sampling and 
methodological design. First, in terms of investigating an age effect, what constitutes 
‘advanced age’ or ‘old’ appears to vary from study to study. For example, in a recent 
study by Calso et al. (2020) where the authors tested young vs. older adults on a picture-
based story paradigm that depicted social scenarios of deception and cooperation, the 
mean age of the older adult cohort was over 84. In contrast, Zhang et al. (2018) tested 
young and older adults on an animated shape form paradigm, where participants were 
asked to describe the intentionality of the presented triangles. The older sample in 
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Zhang et al. was aged, on average, around 65. Further, to address the issue of within-
group age heterogeneity in older adults, studies have commonly subdivided older 
participants into young-old and old-old groups. However, even with these smaller, 
constrained age groupings, there is a slight (but meaningful) inconsistency in the 
literature as to what constitutes young-old and old-old. For example, Maylor et al. (2002) 
and Lecce et al. (2019) used a threshold of 75+ years to demark old-old, whereas Calso 
et al. (2020) used a higher cut-off of 80+. Overall, the variation in age in older 
participants groups is an important consideration when assessing the effect of age on 
ToM. As we have discussed previously, EF – abilities which typically drive aspects of 
ToM performance – decline with age, and this age-related modification is most severe in 
the older-old groups (Salthouse, 2010; 2019). Therefore, due to these sampling 
inconsistencies, it is difficult to make reasonable comparisons between studies to 
discern a true effect of age, as the effect of age seems to be confounded with EF, 
language, and sampling inconsistencies.  
 Aside from an age consideration, there is also heterogeneity in the ToM literature 
with respect to OA’ education. For example, in the previously-discussed Calso et al. 
(2019), the average education of the OA sample was 9.8 years, whereas Lie et al. (2013) 
reported an average age of almost 16 years. The disparity in education is an important 
factor when assessing age-related changes in SCF (and indeed, cognitive ageing more 
generally) as education has been shown to be protective against some forms of cognitive 
decline associated with advanced age. For instance, in a non-parametric quantitative 
review of 18 different studies comprising over 47 000 individual participants, Valenzuela 
and Sachdev (2006) examined the relationship between education and longitudinal 
cognitive decline. The authors reported a significant and large effect (ϕ= 2.63) of 
education on cognitive decline, where lower levels of education were associated with 
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greater magnitudes of deterioration. More recently, Opdebeeck, Martyr, and Clare (2019) 
conducted a meta-analysis to examine the association between cognitive reserve (i.e., 
cognitive flexibility) and education, occupation, and engagement in cognitively-
stimulating activities, in healthy older adults. The authors reported a modest, significant 
association between level of education and measures of working memory, executive 
function, visuospatial ability, and language.  
In terms of the link between education and intelligence in older age, there is 
divergence with respect to the domains of intelligence. There is general agreement that 
fluid intelligence (cognitive adaptation, novel problem-solving, etc.) declines with age, 
and that this decline is somewhat moderated by years of education (see meta-analysis 
by Ritchie & Tucker-Drob, 2018). Crystallised intelligence, conversely, seems to be 
preserved and even improved with age (Horn & Cattell, 1967; Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 
2006; Salthouse, 2004). Evidence has shown that, for example, brain regions that are 
involved in mediating the storage of fact and object-based information – e.g., the 
parahippocampal cortex – show resistance to typical age-related structural changes 
(Aminoff, Kveraga, & Bar, 2013). Kaufman, Kaufman, and Johnson (2009) examined the 
association between educational attainment and fluid and crytsallised intelligence in 
over 1000 adult participants, ranging in age 22 to 90. Participants’ education was 
categorised as 8th-11th Grade, High School Graduate, Some College, and 4-year Degree. 
After covarying out the effect of age, Kaufman and colleagues reported significant 
associations between education level and both fluid and crystallised intelligence. More 
specifically, adjusted for age, participants who had obtained a 4-Year Degree exhibited 
significantly greater scores on measures of fluid and crystallised intelligence relative to 
their lower-educated counterparts. In addition to measures of intelligence, the authors 
also administered measures of academic ability (math, writing, and reading) and then 
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also related these to educational attainment. Interestingly, and related to a previous 
discussion about language abilities in older age and a possible confound in verbal ToM 
tasks, the highest academic abilities (of which reading is pertinent here) were found in 
those participants with the highest level of education. Intelligence is an important factor 
when considering ageing ToM. Studies have shown that intelligence can, at least in part, 
predict SCF. For example, Ibanez et al. (2013) reported that intelligence (in particular, 
fluid intelligence) was found to partially explain individual differences in ToM 
performance. It should be noted, however, Ibanez and colleagues tested only affective 
ToM (via Baron-Cohen et al.’s [2001] RMET).  
In classic studies of ageing ToM, however, education is seldom carefully 
considered. Further, as we have seen above, wider demographic and cognitive variables, 
such as age (of OA), language abilities, and intelligence, that have been shown to either 
directly or indirectly influence SCF, are also largely overlooked when comparing young vs 
old ToM. Thus, an uncorrected like-for-like comparison of existing ToM studies, where 
there is substantial variability in the above-mentioned factors, may potentially inflate an 
effect of age. It is important, therefore, to explore the specificity of an age effect across 
and within studies with respect to a wide range of factors beyond those ordinarily 
included in studies of ageing ToM. 
 
Purpose and scope of current review 
The purpose of the current review was to address three objectives. 1) First, we aimed to 
build upon and extend the reviews of Henry et al. (2013), Moran (2013), and Moran, Jolly, 
and Mitchell (2012) to interrogate the literature-base since the publication of these 
papers. While there has been a marked increase in publications investigating ToM in 
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ageing since 2013 (see Figure 2.1), to our knowledge, there has been no meta-analysis 
of young vs. old behavioural, cognitive ToM since the release of the above-mentioned 
reviews. It is our aim, therefore, to chart the extant ToM-ageing data and provide a 
contemporary analysis and highlight the nature and magnitude of the much-reported 







Figure 2.1. Growing trend of ToM-ageing publications. Data represents number of hits in response to 
the search query ((“theory of mind” or “social cognition”) and “ag?ing”) on PubMed (December 
2020).  
 
2) Second, we set out to aggregate and quantify the magnitude of a potential age effect 
within only cognitive ToM tasks. Previous meta-analyses have included both cognitive 
and affective domains when computing an overall age effect. In contrast to Henry et al. 
(2013), we only included experiments where the critical aspect of the task involved 
reasoning or mentalizing about knowledge, belief, or intentional states (i.e., cognitive 
ToM). Indeed, the literature often reports differential age effects for cognitive and 
affective ToM, where, for example, Bottiroli et al. (2016) reported selective age-related 
deficits only in cognitive – but not affective – ToM. At the time of writing, there is no 
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an age-related difference in measures of cognitive ToM. 3) The final objective of this 
study was to examine the specificity of any age effect within specialised, theoretically-
driven sub-group analyses. We aimed to investigate the potential effect of age as a 
function of task domain, modality, and participant characteristics, namely, OA age and 
education. These analyses were performed to address the insufficient clarity in the 
current literature about the specificity of an age effect. We expected that if there was 
indeed an effect of age, there would be heterogeneity in its magnitude according to task 
and participant characteristics. This was based on work suggesting that there is large 
variation in the neuropsychological demands across different tasks, where some tasks 
tap domain general, non-social resources more than others, for example, some tasks 
may require language comprehension and reading abilities for successful performance 
(e.g., Happé  et al.’s Strange Stories), other tasks typically may mask non-social 
demands within social manipulations – e.g., attentional resources necessary to keep 
track of contents of revealed locations in typical Sally-Ann-style ToM paradigms. It was 
our aim, therefore, to disentangle and highlight the separate influences of task demands 
and participant characteristics in a set of specialised series of sub-group analyses, 
through theoretically-driven task taxonomies and participant (demographic) variables.  
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Method 
 
Where applicable, the current analysis was conducted in adherence with the guidelines 
of the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA; 




A review of the literature was performed in May 2020 by searching the Web of Science 
(Thomson Reuters), Psych INFO (American Psychological Association), and PubMed 
(United States National Library of Medicine) databases. The reference lists of included 
studies were also scrutinised to identify additional relevant papers. Grey literature and 
unpublished theses were precluded from the study. 
The search parameters were based on earlier reviews by Henry et al. (2013) and 
Shurz et al. (2014). In the current review, the key terms were centred on two core areas: 
1) theory of mind (e.g., theory of mind, mentalizing, false belief, belief reasoning, 
mindreading, perspective-taking, and 2) ageing (e.g., ageing, older adults, elderly, and 
old). The search strategy, including the use of wildcards, was as follows: 
(‘theory of mind’ OR ‘mentaliz*’ OR ‘false belief’ OR ‘belief reasoning’ OR 
‘mind?read*’ OR ‘perspective-taking’) AND (‘ag?ing’, ‘older adult*’, ‘elderly’, 
‘old*’.)  
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Inclusion Criteria 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were determined prior to performing and examining the 
results of the literature search. Studies were included based on the following criteria: 1) 
Comparison of healthy young vs. older adults, with ‘healthy’ defined as the reported 
absence of any neuropsychological disorder. 2) Community-dwelling older groups (i.e., 
not institutionalised). 3) Behavioural measure of ToM ability must have been based on 
cognitive (not affective) ToM. 4) At least one form of ToM behavioural measure reported 
with a young vs. old comparison. 5) ‘Older’ defined as adults aged >60. 6) Sufficiently 
precise (M and SD for cognitive ToM measure, per age group) reporting of statistics as 
to enable calculation of effect sizes. 7) Papers must have been written in English.  
 
Exclusion Criteria 
Literature was rejected based on the following exclusion criteria: review papers, 
conference proceedings/abstracts, non-peer reviewed literature, grey literature, and 
papers published in a language other than English.  
 
Screening and Data Extraction 
Titles, abstracts, and full-texts were screened by the author and an independent 
reviewer (Dwayne May, Aston University), and disagreements were resolved in meetings 
to reach consensus. The following data were extracted from the included studies for 
data synthesis: author(s) and year of publication, country, number of participants (total 
and per group), descriptives (M, SD) of age per group, sex ratio (if reported), education 
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(years) per group, ToM task type, and ToM performance (M & SD of accuracy of ToM 
task). 
As with Henry et al. (2013), only accuracy (not response-time measures) were 
permitted for analysis. For studies that employed a ‘lifespan’ approach that fractionated 
age into smaller, more granular groups, only the youngest and oldest groups contributed 
to the analysis (provided that the groups met the Inclusion Criteria outlined above). 
Studies that did not group age into discrete young and old categories – i.e., studies that 
track the trajectory of ToM ability with age in a continuous or longitudinal manner – were 
not permitted. To be consistent with the wider ageing literature, healthy ageing was 
defined as individuals aged 60 and over with no current diagnosis of severe or life-
limiting morbidity. Younger adults were defined as healthy individuals aged 18+ (and 
less than 60); though, in reality, the majority of studies used university students as their 
younger sample, which naturally skews the average age of the younger group toward the 
early 20s. In the context of multi-study papers, if only some experiments met the 
inclusion criteria, these were included and those experiments that that did not fit the 
criteria were excluded. Likewise, where studies used ToM tasks that comprised both a 
cognitive and affective component (e.g., the Yoni task, as in Fischer, O’Rourke, & 
Thornton, 2017), only the cognitive ToM data contributed to the analysis. Some studies 
reported both unadjusted and adjusted ToM performance data (i.e., with complementary 
measures of executive function and/or intelligence; for example Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 
2007), whereas others reported only unadjusted scores (e.g., Bernstein, Thornton, & 
Sommerville, 2011). For consistency, only the unadjusted data were permitted for 
analysis. Self-reported, subjective measures of social cognitive ability were not 
permitted (e.g., the ‘Perspective-Taking’ component of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index; Davis 1980). Finally, for studies that reported more than one outcome for the 
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same cognitive ToM task (e.g., Maylor et al., 2002), data were pooled to create a unitary 
effect size estimate. For studies that reported more than one outcome from different 
cognitive ToM tasks, two approaches were taken: 1) for the overall meta-analytic effect, 
data were pooled across tasks to create a single effect size (as above); and 2) for the 
sub-groups analysis, task data were grouped according to type and if there was non-
individuality or statistical dependence in the data, e.g., where multiple (different) 
cognitive ToM experiments are reported from the same cohort of participants, a 
conservative approach was taken where the ToM experiment which yielded the smallest 
effect was included. These data processing decisions align with previous published 
cognitive ageing meta-analyses (e.g., Henry et al., 2013; Rey-Mermet & Gade, 2018).  
 
Statistical Analysis 
Effect sizes were computed based on standardised mean difference (SMD) between the 
two age groups. SMD is statistically identical to Cohen’s d, and thus effect sizes are 
reported as d henceforth. Interpretation of effect sizes was based on the conventional 
thresholds of Cohen’s d: small (d = 0.20), moderate (d = 0.50), and large (d = 0.80). 




The significance and extent of heterogeneity was calculated using Cochran’s Q 
statistic and I2, respectively. Cochran’s Q, distributed as a chi-square statistic, is 
calculated as the weighted total of squared differences between each study effect and 
Mean 1 – Mean 2 
Pooled SD ([SD1 + SD2]/2) 
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the pooled effect across studies (Hoaglin, 2016). Relatedly, the I2 is a measure of the 
variability (in percentage terms) in the estimated effect that is based on heterogeneity 
as opposed to sampling error or chance. A rough but useful guide in interpreting I2 is as 
follows: 0% to 40%: might not be important; 30% to 60%: may represent moderate 
heterogeneity; 50% to 90%: may represent substantial heterogeneity; and 75% to 100%: 
considerable heterogeneity (see Higgins, 2003). 
In a meta-analysis, when computing an overall ‘true’ effect size, there are two 
fundamental models that can be adopted: the fixed-effect model and the random effects 
model (for a detailed account of fixed vs. random effects models in meta-analyses, see 
Hunter & Schmidt, 2000). A central process of a meta-analysis is the computation of the 
combined effect (or the overall, mean effect size). As there are differences in the 
precision of the estimated means across studies, a simple unweighted overall mean of 
effect sizes is likely to inflate or diminish any true effect. To account for this, means are 
typically weighted according to level of precision (sampling error), where studies with 
larger Ns typically being assigned greater weight. The designation of these weights is 
where the two previously mentioned approaches (fixed vs. random) essentially differ. 
With a fixed-effect model, there is a core assumption that there is one universal true 
effect that underlies all studies included in the analysis. With a random effects model, 
however, the aim is to estimate the mean of a distribution of ‘true’ effects. Studies with 
larger Ns may return more precise estimates than smaller studies; and each study is 
effectively estimating a dissimilar effect size where each of these effects serve as a 
sample from the population under investigation. Therefore, compared with the fixed 
effect model, where there is the assumption that all studies compute qualitatively the 
same effect, the designation of weights under random effects are better adjusted. Larger 
studies are less likely to have an overbearing influence in the analysis and smaller 
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studies are less likely to be underestimated. For these reasons, a random effects model 
was used in the current analysis. This is in line with previous ageing ToM meta-analyses 
(e.g., Henry et al., 2013).  
 
Publication Bias 
Meta-analyses aggregate data from a large corpus of studies and thus benefit from 
higher statistical power and more robust point estimates compared to individual 
experiments. However, within the pipeline of conducting a meta-analysis, the researcher 
makes various judgements which may ultimately affect the outcome of the overall 
analysis. These decisions include (but are not limited to) deciding on and implementing 
the literature search strategy, devising inclusion and exclusion criteria, resolving 
incomplete data, and determining the parameters of the statistical analyses. Another 
important consideration in undertaking a meta-analysis is the issue of publication bias, 
where the outcome of a study may influence the decision whether or not it is published 
(Begg, 1994). This bias can take one of many forms: deliberate non-publication of non-
significant results, partial (selective) reporting or ‘cherry picking’ of results, manipulation 
or ‘massaging’ of data to transform non-significant results into nominally significant 
outcomes (Ioannidis, 2017). As a result of these practices, the body of literature 
available when conducting a summary of the evidence is potentially not a valid reflection 
of all work undertaken in the given discipline. Due to the ‘file drawer problem’, where 
non-significant findings are less likely to be written up for submission or go on to be 
published, there may be a biased distribution of effect sizes where the magnitude of the 
results of published studies are exaggerated. These are important considerations as the 
selective reporting of positive (statistically significant, in the expected direction) results 
59 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
pose a potentially serious threat to the validity of a meta-analysis. The detection of 
potential publication bias within the context of a meta-analysis is therefore crucial. 
One such method of detecting publication bias is through the visual examination 
of funnel plots. The funnel plot is essentially a scatterplot of effect size against a 
measure of sampling precision (typically indexed as standard error). When there is little-
to-no publication bias, the plotted effects form a symmetric inverted funnel shape. 
Asymmetry, or a shape that is not consistent with the conventional funnel pattern, is 
interpreted as indication of publication bias. The inspection of funnel plots is visual and 
therefore subjective in nature. While more sophisticated and objective statistical 
methods exist for the detection of publication bias (e.g., Egger’s regression test, see 
Egger et al., 1997), a visual examination of funnel plots is sufficient for non-complex 
meta-analyses in the first instance. Accordingly, in the current study, a funnel plot was 
used to detect potential publication bias. 
 
Analysis Software 
The desktop version of the open-source RevMan 5 (version 5.4.1) meta-analysis 
package was used for the current analysis. RevMan is an analysis tool developed and 
maintained by the Cochrane Collaboration for the purposes of formulating systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses. In addition, Metafor – a meta-analysis package for R (run in 
RStudio v. 3.5.0) – was used for data visualisation. Coding and manipulation of raw data 
was performed in Microsoft Excel.  
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The initial searches returned 426 articles, of which 178 full-text articles were assessed 
for eligibility; see Figure 2.2 for PRISMA flow diagram of identified articles. Overall, 28 
articles that comprised 35 datasets met the inclusion criteria, with a total of 1151 (53%) 
YA and 1033 (47%) OA included in the analysis. Within the YA cohort, there were 453 
(41%) male and 643 (59%) female participants, and in the OA cohort, 383 (39%) males 
and 600 females (61%). Two studies (Cavallini et al., 2013 & Duval et al., 2011) did not 
report sex data. The YA cohort had a mean reported age of 22.34 (SD = 2.59, range 18 – 
30) and OA had a mean age of 73.46 (SD = 4.95, range 60 – 84). In terms of education, 
the YA cohort reported a mean of 15.02 years (SD = 1.36) and OA reported 13.34 years 
(SD = 2.10). Education data were unobtainable from nine studies either due to omission 
(where study authors were contacted and there was no response) or education was 
reported as a categorical variable (e.g., “Undergraduate Bachelor’s Degree”) which 
prevented the computation of descriptive statistics. These studies were Franco et al. 
(2013), Grainger et al. (2020), Johansson Nolaker et al. (2018), Moran et al. (2012), 
Phillips et al. (2011), Rakoczy et al. (2012), Reiter et al. (2017), Sullivan & Ruffman 
(2004), and Zhang et al. (2018). 
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Figure 2.2. Search strategy and PRISMA flow diagram of identification and screening of articles. OA 
= older adults. YA = younger adults.  
Records identified through database 
searching 






























 Additional records identified through 
screening reference lists 
(n = 12) 
Records after duplicates removed 
(n = 388) 
Records screened 
(n = 388) 
Records excluded after title/abstract 
screening 
(n = 210) 
Full-text articles assessed for 
eligibility 
(n = 178) 
Full-text articles excluded, with 
reasons (n = 156): 
- Affective ToM only (n = 35) 
- Clinical sample (n = 34) 
- Institutionalised OA sample (n = 18) 
- No YA vs. OA comparison (n = 48) 
- OA sampled aged <60 years (n = 9) 
- Unable to obtain (n = 12) 
Studies included in quantitative 
synthesis 
(n =  28) 
 
(35 datasets) 
PsycINFO (1967 – present), PubMed (MEDLINE; 1954 – present) and Web of Science (Core Collection; 1988 – 
present). 
Search strategy: (‘theory of mind’ OR ‘mentaliz*’ OR ‘false belief’ OR ‘belief reasoning’ OR ‘mind?read*’ OR 
‘perspective-taking’) AND (‘ag?ing’, ‘older adult*’, ‘elderly’, ‘old*’.) 
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For each included study, author(s), year of publication, country, total N, N per group, age 
M/SD, sex ratio, task information (task name, modality, paradigm), and effect size 
(standardised mean difference, expressed as d and its associated 95% CI), are 
presented in Table 2.2. Studies that comprised more than one ToM experiment/outcome 
are marked with an asterisk (*). 
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Table 2.2. 
Included studies and their respective participant and task characteristics.   
  Participant characteristics ToM task information Effect size (SMD) 
  n M age Sex (M:F)  
Task & task origin 
   
Study Country YA OA YA OA YA OA Modality Paradigm note d 95% CI 
Baksh et al. 
(2020) 
UK 30 31 22.57 72.29 12:18 16:15 ESCoT; 




Computerised animation of social 
interactions. Comprises both cognitive 
and affective ToM; only cognitive ToM 
included in current analysis. 
.97 .43 – 1.50 
Bernstein et 
al. (2011) 
Canada 37 37 19.20 67.6 9:28 9:28 Sandbox Task Non-verbal; 
static cartoon / 
comic strips 
Based on classic Sally-Ann paradigm; 
participants physically point to ‘correct’ 
location. Spatial distance between 
participant response and correct 
response taken as DV. 
.98 .49 – 1.46 
Bottiroli et 
al. (2016) 





Detection of faux pas in social 
scenarios. Comprises both cognitive and 
affective components – only cognitive 
ToM data used in current analysis. 
1.32 .63 – 2.01 
Calso et al. 
(2019)* 
France 30 20 25.60 83.30 15:15 5:15 MPS-TOMQ Non-verbal; 
static cartoon / 
comic strips 
Picture stories involving deception and 
social reciprocity. Participants required 
to arrange pictures in logical order, and 
then respond (detect) deception, 
cheating, reality, and first-/second-order 
belief. 
1.32 .69 – 1.77 




static cartoon / 
comic strips 
First- & second-order FB task 
comprising picture stories; participants 
required to choose correct response from 
two possible options. Control condition 
tests non-mental aspects of stories. 
1.72 1.05 – 2.38 
Calso et al. 
(2020) 




static cartoon / 
comic strips 
Picture stories depicting social scenarios 
of deception and cooperation; first- and 
second-order FB understanding also 
tested. 
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Cont’d  Participant characteristics ToM task information Effect size  (SMD) 
  n M age Sex (M:F)  
Task & task 
origin 
   
Study Country YA OA YA OA YA OA Modality Paradigm note d 95% CI 
Calso et al. 
(2020) 




cartoon / comic 
strips 
Picture stories depicting social 
scenarios of deception and 
cooperation; first- and second-order 
FB understanding also tested. 
1.92 1.32 – 2.51 
Cavallini et 
al. (2013) 
Italy 30 29 23.63 74.99 NR NR Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Detection of protagonists’ intention, 
irrespective of reality. Stories contain 
double-bluff, lie, joke, sarcasm, and 
pretence. 
2.67 1.96 – 3.38 
Duval et al. 
(2011)* 




cartoon / comic 
strips 
Comic strips depicted social scenes. 
Participants selected most logical 
conclusion for each scenario. Two 
conditions: character intention 
(ToM) or control scenarios 
(properties of objects).  
.02 -.54 – .57 







cartoon / comic 
strips 
Comic strips followed by test 
questions, comprising true and false 
belief scenarios. First- and second-
order FB. Requires inference of 
naïve protagonists’ (outdated) 
knowledge/mental state. 
.29 -.27 – .85 
El Haj et al. 
(2016) 
France 40 36 23.13 69.53 18:22 16:20 FB object-
displacement; 
Desgranges et al. 
(2012) 
Non-verbal; static 
cartoon / comic 
strips 
Variation of classic categorical 
object-location FB task, based on 
Sally-Ann paradigm (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). 
.84 .37 – 1.31 
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Cont’d  Participant characteristics ToM task information Effect size  (SMD) 
  n M age Sex (M:F)  
Task & task 
origin 
   





83 89 19.10 69.40 51:32 39:53 Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 
.05 -.25 – .35  
Fischer et 
al. (2017)* 




static cartoon / 
comic strips 
Depiction of a fictional character – 
“Yoni” – that is presented with four 
images from which participants 
chose most appropriate mental or 
affective state.  
.74 .43 – 1.05 
        Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 








Participants exposed to stories 
involving belief-desire reasoning 
problems, and control stories with no 
mental state content.  
.42 -.16 – 1.01 
Grainger et 
al. (2018) 
Australia 51 50 20.45 71.67 19:32 24:26 FB Movies; 




Eye-tracking study using traditional 
Sally-Ann-style (object-location), 
categorical scenarios in film form. 
Only behavioural responses included 
in current analysis. 
.03 -.36 – .42 
Grainger et 
al. (2019)  





Videotaped vignettes of social 
interactions; testing the detection of 
intention, attitudes, and meaning. 
1.75 1.28 – 2.22 
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Cont’d  Participant characteristics ToM task information Effect size  (SMD) 
  n M age Sex (M:F)  
Task & task 
origin 
   
Study Country YA OA YA OA YA OA Modality Note d 95% CI 
Grainger et 
al. (2020)* 








Computerised, first-person virtual 
shopping task with virtual friends. 
Participants perform shopping 
‘errands’, and answer questions 
about interactions involving their 
virtual friends. 
.47 .02 - .91 
        Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 
.10 -.34 – .54 
Happé 
  et al. 
(1998) 
UK/USA 67 19 21.75 73.00 33: 34 9:10 Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 
-1.12 -1.66 – -.58 
Hughes et 
al. (2019) 






Task has two conditions: False 
belief and False story, requiring 
participants to mentalize or make 
mechanical/physical inferences, 
respectively. 
.48 .02 – .94 
Lecce et 
al. (2019)* 









Short, ecological films depicting 
social scenarios. The film is 
periodically paused and 
participants are asked questions 
related to characters’ mental 
states. 
2.46 1.79 – 3.14 
        Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 





1.03 .50 – 1.57 
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Cont’d  Participant characteristics ToM task information Effect size  (SMD) 
  n M age Sex (M:F)  
Task & task 
origin 
   
Study Country YA OA YA OA YA OA Modality Note d 95% CI 
Li et al. 
(2013)* 







Short stories based on Wimmer & 
Perner’s (1983) object-location 
paradigm. Mix of ToM and 
control (physical causation) 
stories.  
.01 -.52 - .52 





Detection of faux pas in social 
scenarios. Comprises both 
cognitive and affective 
components – only cognitive ToM 
data used in current analysis. 
.07 -.45 - .60 
Maylor et 
al. (2002) 
UK 55 55 20.10 80.80 29:26 19:36 Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 
2.01 1.38 – 2.63 
Moran et 
al. (2012) 






ToM Localizer task as described 
previously. 
.66 -.01 – 1.33 
Nolaker et 
al. (2018) 
UK 20 19 21.00 70.00 3:17 10:9 Strange Stories 
Film Task; 




Ecological ToM films based on 
Happé et al.’s (1994) Strange 
Stories. ToM films involved 
telling a white lie, double bluff, & 
persuasion.  
.91 .25 – 1.58 
Phillips et 
al. (2011) 




Cartoonised films of a ToM 
object-displacement task with 
three possible target locations, 
testing first-order FB. 
1.04 .58 – 1.49 
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Cont’d  Participant characteristics ToM task information Effect size  (SMD) 
  n M age Sex (M:F)  
Task & task 
origin 
   
Study Country YA OA YA OA YA OA Modality Note d 95% CI 
Rakoczy et 
al. (2012) 
Germany 27 20 22.67 73.3 13:14 11:9 Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 
.80 .19 – 1.40 
Rakoczy et 
al. (2018) 
Germany 40 40 24.35 68.43 15:25 17:23 Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 
.61 .61 – 1.06 
Reiter et 
al. (2017) 
Germany 55 52 24.29 72.08 24:31 22:30 EmpaToM; 




Comprises cognitive & affective 
ToM, and empathy/compassion. 
15-s video clip of actor narrating 
an autobiographical experience. 
Participants answer questions 
pertaining to first-order FB. 
1.21 .79 – 1.62 
Slessor et 
al. (2007) 
UK 40 40 20.08 66.95 12:28 15:25 Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 
.21 -.23 – .65 
Sullivan et 
al. (2004) 
UK 24 24 30.00 73.00 13:11 8:16 Strange Stories; 
Happé  (1994) 
Verbal; 
stories/vignettes 
Strange Stories task as previously 
described. 
1.36 .73 – 1.99 
Zhang et 
al. (2018)* 







Participants shown a video of two 
animated triangles moving in a 
manner that implies intentions 
(e.g., pretending, deceiving, etc.). 
Participants asked to describe the 
intentionality of the presented 
triangles. 
.92 .60 – 1.23 
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Cont’d  Participant characteristics ToM task information Effect size  (SMD) 
  n M age Sex (M:F)  
Task & task 
origin 
   
Study Country YA OA YA OA YA OA Modality Note d 95% CI 
Cont’d - 
Zhang et al. 
(2018)* 





Faux pas test as previously 
described. 
.23 -.07 – .53 
Note:  *More than one ToM experiment reported.  YA = Young adults. OA = Older adults.  SMD = Standardised mean difference.  d  = Cohen’s d. CI = 
Confidence interval. FB = False belief.  NR = Not reported. DV = Dependent variable.  Positive effect sizes (i.e., > 0) indicate poorer OA ToM performance 
relative to YA; negative effect sizes indicate the opposite (i.e., poorer YA ToM). 
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Young vs. Older Adults 
Both individual-level study data and overall group-level analyses were modelled with a 
random effects model. A weighted effect for each individual study was computed and 
these were then aggregated to create the overall young vs. old analysis. The data were 
organised such that a positive effect indicates poorer OA ToM performance (or better YA 
performance), and a negative effect indicates better OA performance.  
All 28 studies contributed to the analysis of the overall YA vs. OA effect. Where 
studies reported multiple ToM outcomes, effects were pooled to create a single effect 
size. Overall, in comparison to their younger counterparts, OA performed more poorly on 
ToM measures (Random effects model: d = .80 [.54 – 1.06 95% CI], Z = 6.01, p < .001), 
corresponding to a large effect size (Cohen, 1962). Individual study effects and the 
overall meta-analytic outcome can be seen in the forest plot below (Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3.  Forest plot of studies included in meta-analysis. Studies listed alphabetically by first author surname. Effect sizes for each study are indicated by 
the position of each green square on the horizontal axis. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for each effect size.  The black diamond 
represents the point estimate and confidence intervals averaged across all individual studies. OA = older adults. YA = younger adults.
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Younger vs. Older Adults: ToM Tasks and Participant Characteristics 
To understand the specificity of the age effect a series of sub-group analyses were 
performed on different types of ToM tasks and participant characteristics. Individual, 
un–aggregated experiment-level data contributed to the sub-group analyses. Task 
distinctions and categories were adapted from Henry et al. (2013). Tests of sub-group 
differences were also performed to illustrate between-category differences.  
First, the distinction between verbal and non-verbal ToM tasks was examined. 
Verbal tasks primarily constitute a written or spoken component (e.g., Happé’s Strange 
Stories) whereas non-verbal tasks typically present ToM stimuli visually, such as movies, 
comic strips, or cartoons (e.g., Wimmer & Perner’s (1983) object-location/displacement 
task). It should be noted, however, many tasks do not adhere to this demarcation of 
exclusively either verbal or non-verbal as many contain both written and visual elements. 
For example, the visual Sally-Ann-style false belief task in Duval et al. (2011) comprised 
a classic change-of-location paradigm that was presented with short written 
descriptions beneath the stimuli. In the present study, a verbal or non-verbal distinction 
was made based on the critical ToM task component, and in the example of the above-
mentioned Duval et al. (2011) paper, this was determined to be non-verbal.  
There were a total of 18 datasets that were categorised as verbal and 17 as non-
verbal (a full list of categories and their constituent datasets can be found in Appendix 
A).  For verbal tasks, there was a medium effect (d = .61) in the difference of ToM 
competence between YA and OA. For non-verbal tasks, there was a substantially (and 
significantly) greater age effect (d = 1.05). Table 2.3 below includes the results of all 
sub-group analyses.
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Table 2.3. 
Statistical outcomes of sub-group analyses. 
  YA vs. OA effect  
Taxonomy Variant No. of 
experiments 
d (95% CI) z p Test of subgroup 
differences: X2, p 
Domain       
 Verbal 18  .61 (.31 - .91) 3.98 <.0001 X2 = 4.11, p = .04 
Non-verbal 17 1.05 (.75 – 1.34) 7.00 <.0001 
       
Task Taxonomy‡ 
(V = Verbal, NV = Non-
verbal) 
      
      
 Movies (NV) 9 1.34 (.92 – 1.77) 6.18 <.0001 X2 = 11.60, p = .02 
 Static Cartoons-Comics (NV) 6 .96 (.61 – 1.31) 5.42 <.0001 
 Immersive – VR (NV) 1 .47 (.02 – .91) 2.05 .040 
 Vignettes – False belief (V) 16 .63 (.28 – .98) 3.49 <.0001 
 Vignettes – Faux pas (V) 3 .48 (-.13 – 1.09) 1.55 .120 
       
OA Age†       
60 – 74 24 .63 (.40 – .86) 4.35 <.0001 X2 = 6.12, p = .01 
≥ 75 11 1.27 (.82 – 1.71) 6.52 <.0001 
       
OA Education^       
 <14 years 14 1.13 (.70 – 1.56) 5.16 <.0001 X2 = 3.19, p = .07 
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  YA vs. OA effect  
Taxonomy Variant No. of 
experiments 
d (95% CI) z p Test of subgroup 
differences: X2, p 
Domain x OA Education^       
 Verbal, <14 years 7 1.07 (.45 – 1.69) 3.38 <.001 X2 = 16.47, p = .02 
 Verbal, ≥ 14 years 7 .20 (-.40 – .81) .66 .51 
 Non-verbal, <14 years 6 1.19 (.57 – 1.81) 3.76 <.001 
 Non-verbal, ≥ 14 years 4 1.11 (.65 – 1.58) 4.69 <.0001 
Note: ‡ Task taxonomy adapted from Henry et al. (2013). † Based on the average OA’ reported mean age. ^ Education only reported in 24 (/35) datasets. YA = 
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A test of sub-group differences – where the null hypothesis is that the effects share the 
same distribution – showed that these two effects (Verbal vs. Non-verbal) were 
significantly different (p = .04).  In other words, the deficit in OA ToM performance 
(relative to YA) is greater in non-verbal ToM measures compared to verbal measures. 
The specificity of the age effect was also examined across the different types of 
ToM tasks, namely: Movies (d = 1.34), Static Cartoons-Comics (d = .96), Immersive-
Virtual (d = .47, Vignettes False Belief (d = .63), and Vignettes Faux Pas (d = .48). The 
effect of age was statistically significant across all categories save for Vignettes Faux 
Pas, which did not yield a significant effect (p = .120). It should be noted, however, that 
there was only one dataset that constituted the analysis for the Immersive-Virtual task 
category, and thus the age effect here – though significant – should be interpreted with 
caution. 
Next, the effect was examined as a function of the mean reported age of the OA 
cohort in the included studies. There was wide range in the mean OA age across the 
included studies, with the lowest reporting an average OA age of 65 (Zhang et al., 2018) 
and the highest reporting an average of 84 (Calso et al., 2020). Given the general 
negative association between social cognitive abilities and age (e.g., see Laillier et al., 
2019), it was important to investigate the overall effect within distinct OA age categories. 
To achieve this, a median-split (median OA age: 73.65) was performed on the reported 
mean age of each dataset; this led to the creation of two discrete age categories: 60 – 74 
and ≥ 75. The YA vs. OA age effect was then probed within each of these two 
categories. There was a medium age effect within the 60 – 74 grouping (d = .63) and a 
large effect in the ≥ 75 (d = 1.27). Interestingly, there was a statistically significant sub-
group difference (p = .01) which suggests that the difference in YA-OA ToM 
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performance is more pronounced when the OA cohort were, on average, aged 75 and 
over. 
A similar procedure was undertaken with the OA education data (indexed in 
years), where again a median-split was performed to create dichotomous categories: 
<14 years and ≥14 years. Education was considered an important variable to investigate 
as it has been linked with individual differences in performance on a wide range of 
neuropsychological tests in cognitive ageing, some of which are relevant for a 
functioning ToM. A number of studies were excluded from this particular analysis due to 
either not reporting education data or reporting education as a categorical variable (see 
Appendix B for list of excluded studies from education sub-group analysis). The effect of 
age was significant in both the <14 (d = 1.13) and ≥14 (d = .58) categories. While there 
was a seemingly larger age effect in the <14 years education category, the test of sub-
group differences was not statistically significant (p = .07). 
Finally, ToM task modality and OA education variables were combined to 
interrogate the specificity of the age effect on a task modality-by-education level. The 
justification for this particular demarcation of the data is that we suspected that the 
specificity of the overall ToM ageing effect may have been confounded in the above-
mentioned education sub-analysis. It is reasonable to assume that verbal tasks – which 
are primarily administered in textual form – are reliant on wider cognitive abilities related 
to reading and language comprehension; abilities that are not typically purported to be 
necessary for an operational ToM. Relatedly, language abilities (production and 
comprehension) in non-pathological ageing have also been shown to be associated with 
education (e.g., see Thow et al., 2018). With the view to disentangle these features in 
the context of comparing young vs. old cognitive ToM, we ran sub-group analyses on 
ToM domain (verbal, non-verbal) as a function of OA education (<14 years, ≥14 years); 
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which resulted in the creation of four cells: 1) Verbal, <14 years; 2) Verbal, ≥14 years; 3) 
Non-verbal, <14 years; and 4) Non-verbal, ≥14 years. 
 Three of the four cells yielded effects that were statistically significant, except for 
Verbal, ≥ 14 years, where there was no significant age effect (d = .20, p = .51). For 
brevity, these effects are not enumerated here, but can be seen in Table 2.3. The test of 
sub-group differences showed that the magnitude of the effects from each cell were 
significantly different, suggesting that the variability in the magnitude of the age effect 
may be contingent on the domain of the ToM task combined with the education level of 
the OA cohort. 
 
Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity was assessed via the conventional method using Cochran’s Q statistic 
and I2. Cochran’s Q – distributed as a chi-square statistic – is the classic statistical test 
of effect size inconsistency and is computed as the weighted sum of squared differences 
between study effects and the pooled effect across studies. As a complement to the Q 
statistic, the I² value represents the percentage of variation between studies that is a 
result of innate heterogeneity rather than chance, with 100% representing complete and 
full variation between studies due to true effect size inconsistency and 0% suggesting 
that all variation between studies is due to chance alone (Higgins et al., 2003). Together, 
the Q and I2 illustrate the statistical significance and magnitude of heterogeneity across 
the meta-analysed effects. 
In the overall age effect analysis, there was substantial and significant 
heterogeneity between the included studies (Q[X2] = 208.20, p < .001, I2 = 88%), 
suggesting that 88 per cent of the variation between the reviewed effect sizes was down 
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to innate inconsistency (as opposed to chance); this equates to “considerable” 
heterogeneity according the conventional rule-of-thumb (Schünemann et al., 2013). To 
probe the issue of heterogeneity further, first, statistically anomalous results were 
examined. 
 The effect of one study (Happé et al., 1998) was three SDs below the overall 
pooled effect (d = -1.12 [95% CI = -1.66 – -.58), and was in fact the only included study 
to report a statistically significant negative effect, where OA exhibited better ToM 
performance compared to their younger counterparts. To examine the relative 
contribution of this outlier on the measure of heterogeneity and indeed the overall age 
effect, the core YA vs. OA meta-analysis was re-run without Happé et al., (1998). This 
marginally decreased heterogeneity by four percentage points (I2 = 84%). Relatedly, 
removal of Happé et al. also subsequently increased the overall meta-analytic effect of 
age (New model: d = 0.86 [0.66 – 1.06 95% CI], Z = 8.41, p < .001; Original model: d = 
.80 [.54 – 1.06 95% CI], Z = 6.01, p < .001).  
Sub-group analysis is a valuable tool in examining the overall meta-analytic effect 
within a smaller, theoretically-driven selection of conceptually homogenous experiments. 
As the overall effect is probed within and across specialised ‘groups’, more nuanced and 
refined conclusions can be drawn. In the context of effect inconsistency, as studies are 
classified and clustered according to conceptual likeness, an analysis of sub-groups 
allows researchers to examine the relative change in heterogeneity, with the view of 
reducing effect inconsistency by carefully constructing qualitatively ‘valid’ and 
conceptually-driven sub-groups. Practically, a new and separate set of heterogeneity 
statistics are computed for every sub-group classification. In the current analysis, 
however, though heterogeneity reduced with the addition of sub-groups, the minimum I2 
value was 74% which still amounts to “substantial” heterogeneity.  
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It should be noted, however, large variation or inconsistency in effects should not 
be interpreted as a commentary on the quality of the evidence reviewed (Schünemann et 
al., 2013). It is instead perhaps a better reflection of inhomogeneity in task design, within 
and cross-study participant variability, differences in the calculation of outcome 
measures, and other methodological particulars. Therefore, in the present case, effect 
inconsistency can be thought of as an indicator of non-standardisation of 
methodological/experimental design rather than qualitative differences in study quality.  
 
Publication Bias 
Publication bias was examined through a funnel plot (Figure 2.4). To determine the 
degree of bias, the extent of plot asymmetry was examined. Where there is no bias, the 
scatter plot should resemble a symmetrical inverted funnel shape with a wide base 
(consisting of small studies with large effect estimate variability) and a narrow top 
(larger studies with small effect estimate variability). 
In the present case, though there is slight asymmetry in the shape of the plot, the 
violation is not sufficiently severe to determine that significant publication bias exists 
within the included studies of this review. As such, it is reasonable to propose that 
publication bias was not a significant concern in the current analysis. 
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Figure 2.4. Funnel plot. Effect estimates are presented on the x-axis and study precision (study size; 
S.E. of Standardized Mean Difference) is shown on the y-axis. 
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Discussion 
 
This quantitative review aimed to clarify the effect of age on ToM proficiency. A further 
motivation of the current review – which at the time of writing is the first of its kind – 
was to examine only measures of cognitive ToM in the context of an ageing effect. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we aimed to highlight the specificity of an effect 
of age across the varied and heterogeneous nature of ToM paradigms. 
 
Overall ToM age effect  
 
With the exception of a small number of null and one negative effect (Happé et al., 
1998), a strong age effect (d = .80, range -1.12 – 2.67) emerged across all measures of 
ToM, irrespective of task parameters. This is consistent with previous meta-analyses of 
ageing ToM (e.g., Henry et al., 2013). In line with studies that have mapped ToM abilities 
across the adult lifespan (e.g., Laillier et al., 2019), a young vs. older adult comparison of 
the published literature suggests that OA exhibit poorer ToM compared to YA. While 
there was significant heterogeneity in effect sizes, the overall effect of age was robust 
even after taking into consideration different task types and inconsistent sampling.  
 
Specificity of the age effect across task and sampling considerations  
 
Verbal vs. Non-verbal ToM Tasks 
We examined the nature of an effect of age across two broad distinctions of ToM tasks, 
verbal and non-verbal. While there was indeed an overall effect of age within both verbal 
and non-verbal tasks, a difference in young vs. old ToM was substantially more 
pronounced in non-verbal paradigms. One reason for this disparity may be the 
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underlying cognitive abilities that subserve each task domain. Verbal ToM tasks are 
primarily presented in textual form, and therefore ostensibly tap language abilities (e.g., 
reading and comprehension) more so than non-verbal tasks. With this in mind, in ageing, 
while lexical retrieval is generally impaired, vocabulary or lexical diversity has been found 
to be preserved and even improved in older age (Kemper & Sumner, 2001; McCabe et al., 
2010). It is plausible, therefore, while not completely abolished, the effect of age in 
verbal tasks is in part attenuated (relative to non-verbal tasks) due to older adults’ 
enhanced capabilities in aspects of language. Indeed, in preschool samples, language 
training interventions have been shown to improve performance across a range of ToM 
tasks in pre-post experimental designs (e.g., see Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003). 
However, to empirically measure the association between OA’ language abilities and 
performance in verbal vs non-verbal ToM tasks, studies must examine the specific 
relationship between language skills and ToM performance in advanced age. This would 
disentangle the influence of language in verbal ToM tasks and provide a more refined 
estimate of an age-related effect. 
 
Task Type 
To further investigate the observed heterogeneity in the overall YA vs OA comparison, 
tasks were grouped into one of five classifications: movies, static cartoons-comics, 
immersive – VR, vignettes false belief, and vignettes faux pas. These classifications were 
adapted from Henry et al. (2013) and Quesque and Rossetti (2020). We found that there 
was substantial variation in the magnitude of the effect size across these classifications, 
with the greatest effect seen in the movies classification and the smallest effect seen in 
the vignettes faux pas grouping, where the effect of age was statistically non-significant. 
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This variability in effects perhaps speaks to the differential demands that are involved 
behind each task type, where again tasks that were non-verbal in nature – i.e., movies 
and static cartoons-comics – produced greater age effects relative to the two verbal 
tasks: vignettes false belief and vignettes faux pas. The exception here, however, is the 
immersive VR classification which produced an effect smaller in magnitude than 
vignettes false belief; though, the immersive VR grouping only contained a single study 
and therefore it is difficult to draw meaningful comparisons with the other 
classifications.  
One interpretation as to why movies produced the largest effect is perhaps due to 
increased processing and executive demands from task manipulations that are naturally 
less carefully controlled relative to, say, static picture-based paradigms. For example, 
the MASC paradigm is reported to be a naturalistic and sensitive measure of ToM, 
comprising complex social scenarios depicting interpersonal relationships between four 
different characters, who each have their own comprehensive backstories. The scenes 
are rich in detail and the characters were composed with basic needs and sub-needs 
that varied throughout the task. The authors purposely built in ambiguity between 
characters’ basic and sub-needs and created “[Items] that pose particularly challenging 
demands on social cognitive functioning” (Dziobek et al., 2006, pp. 627). To illustrate the 
potential difference in processing demands between tasks, contrast the MASC paradigm 
with the Geometric Triangles Animation task utilised in Zhang et al. (2018). Based on 
Castelli et al.’s (2002) original animated triangle task, participants are shown two 
animated, non-human inanimate shape forms that move in a manner suggesting 
intentionality (pretending, deceiving, etc.), and participants are simply tasked with 
discerning the intentional state of each shape. Both of these paradigms can be broadly 
categorised as movie- or film-based, as they are dynamic ‘motion picture’ tasks. 
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However, there are clear and obvious qualitative differences in the difficulty or cognitive 
demands of each task, where the MASC perhaps has a greater reliance on faculties of 
working memory and attention (to manage multiple characters, backstories, and needs) 
in comparison to the (potentially) less cognitively burdensome animated shapes tasks. 
This variability in task complexity, and therefore task demands, may in part explain the 
substantial heterogeneity between and within task types with respect to an effect of age 
in ToM. 
 
The Effect of Age, Sampling and Task Considerations 
In addition to effect variability being driven by inconsistencies in task complexity, there 
were also noticeable differences in the demographics (age and education) of OA 
samples across the included studies of this review. With respect to the average OA 
reported age, studies varied from around 65 in Zhang et al. (2018) to around 85 in Calso 
et al. (2020). This variability in age is an important consideration when examining the 
nature of an age-related difference in ToM abilities as studies have shown a general 
downward trajectory of SCF across the adult lifespan (Laillier et al., 2019). In line with 
this view, we found a substantially greater effect of age from our dichotomised age 
group analysis, where studies whose OA sample, were, on average, aged 75 and over, 
exhibited stronger age-related effects relative to studies whose OAs were aged 74 or 
less. 
There was also substantial variability in the years of education across OA 
samples; where some studies reported as little as 9.8 years of education (Calso et al., 
2019), others reported almost 16 years (Li et al., 2013). In a specific sub-group analysis, 
where we dichotomised level of education through a median-split, there was some 
85 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
differentiation in the effect of age between the two education categories: <14 years 
education and >14 years. It should be noted, however, this sub-group analysis did not 
reach statistical significance (p = .07), and any subsequent conclusions based on 
education from this analysis should be interpreted with this context in mind. Education 
did, however, interact with task domain and is discussed later in the Chapter. 
The variability in levels of education is an important consideration as education 
has been related to composite measures of intelligence (fluid and crystallised) in later 
life (see meta-analysis by Ritchie & Tucker-Drob, 2018). Relatedly, intelligence (in 
particular, fluid intelligence) has been found to partially explain individual differences in 
ToM abilities (Ibanez et al., 2013). While there has been no dedicated, objective 
investigation of the link between education and ToM abilities in later life, given the 
protective quality of higher levels of education on wide ranging measures of cognitive 
functioning, some of which are fundamental to an operational ToM, it is plausible to 
assume that the variability in OA education, coupled with particular task variations 
across studies, may in part explain the inconsistency of the overall age effect. 
We suspected that there might be an interplay between task domain and 
education as it is reasonable to assume that task difficulty/characteristics may interact 
with education/intelligence. It is worth noting, however, we did not perform an objective 
statistical interactive test to examine the potential modifying effect of one variable on 
the other. We simply combined the Task Domain and OA Education variables to create 
four distinct cells: Verbal <14 years, Verbal ≥ 14 years, Non-verbal <14 years, and Non-
verbal ≥ 14 years; and examined the difference in effect sizes between these new, 
composite classifications. As expected, we found that the effect of age varied according 
to domain and OA’ level of education, where the greatest age effect was seen in the 
Non-verbal, <14 years group (d = 1.19) and the smallest effect, which was also non-
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significant, in the Verbal ≥ 14 years group (d = .20). In our previous, individual sub-group 
analyses of Verbal vs. Non-verbal tasks and <14 years vs. ≥ 14 years of education, we 
showed that the effect of age was smallest in non-verbal tasks and when the OA 
samples were highly educated. Logically, the combination of these two classifications 
has led to the effect of age being abolished altogether. This again confirms our suspicion 
of the effect of age being contingent upon methodological intricacies, and that the 
classic ageing ToM literature may have perhaps inflated an effect of age by introducing 
task- and sample-related artefacts. 
 
Difficulties in Creating Task Taxonomies 
It is worth noting that while the taxonomies used in this study were based on previous 
reviews, some classifications were arbitrary and somewhat contrived. Many tasks 
straddled multiple classifications, including domain and even task type. Consider the 
MASC, for example. While the main component was presented in a film format, follow-up 
questions that probed participant understanding of mental states, and on which the 
outcome measures were based, were presented textually. While we in the current review 
classified investigations that used the MASC as Non-verbal, on the basis that the critical 
social ‘scene-setting’ is presented through the medium of film, it is equally arguable that 
the MASC could be categorised as ‘Verbal’, or at least ‘Mixed’ (a ‘Mixed’ classification 
has been used in previous ageing ToM meta-analyses, for example, see Henry et al., 
2013). Our quantitative analysis and subsequent discussion should be interpreted with 
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Heterogeneity 
 
In the overall effect of age, which meta-analysed the outcomes of 28 studies (with 35 
datasets, n = 2137), there was substantial and large heterogeneity both objectively and 
subjectively in terms of the nature of tasks deployed. While the effects became more 
homogenous in the sub-group analyses when studies were clustered according to 
domain, modality, and participant characteristics, there was still significant 
heterogeneity in the observed effects. No sub-group analyses yielded non-significant 
heterogeneity in effect size estimates. 
As we have discussed above, the effect of age seems to fluctuate depending on a 
range of methodological features. There was variability in the nature of tasks deployed, 
where some were presented in movie format, and others in static picture-based formats, 
some presented a single protagonist whereas others presented multiple, among other 
variabilities. Even within the same task taxonomy, there was variability in the cognitive or 
processing demand underlying ToM/social processing. While statistical heterogeneity in 
meta-analyses is not an indicator of study quality, the core takeaway here is that the 
reported effect of age varies substantially across the published ToM literature, and this 
effect inconsistency remains even after studies are sub-divided according to 
methodological and sampling likenesses.  
 
Limitations & Future Directions 
 
There are a few limitations in this study. First, the quantitative analysis only included 
data derived from the ToM (or mentalizing) component from each individual study. The 
current analysis did not take into consideration data from non-ToM control conditions. 
Accordingly, it is not possible to explore and identify whether the overall age effect 
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remains the same or if it is modified in a matched control condition. Henry et al. (2013) 
included both ToM and non-ToM matched control tasks in their meta-analysis and found 
that the magnitude of the age effect decreased in the non-ToM condition, which in their 
view, is again evidence of an age difference in ToM.  
Second, there was no objective account of executive function or fluid intelligence 
in the current analysis. Indeed, the majority of the included studies reported 
complementary measures of cognitive ability (e.g., working memory, inhibitory control, 
task switching, processing speed, etc.) and others adjusted the between-groups 
analyses to account for differences in these capabilities. There is a well-established 
effect of age on a range of cognitive domains and neurocognitive indices (see Salthouse, 
2010, for a review on cognitive ageing); and an operational ToM, especially in ageing, is 
thought to rely on intact executive functions (see Chapter 3). Therefore, future reviews 
should incorporate measures of cognitive function (beyond social cognition) to examine 
the interplay between EF, ToM, and ageing.   
In addition to incorporating measures of EF on a broader level, a more fine-
grained task analysis of ToM paradigms and their associated executive demands would 
be advantageous in furthering our understanding of the nature of age-related alteration 
of ToM. Conventional paradigms often confound ‘social’ and ‘non-social’ manipulations 
such that it is difficult to disentangle and delineate age-related social cognitive decline 
from the more domain-general, slowing that is common in advanced age. We know that 
executive abilities decline with age (Salthouse, 2019), and therefore conventional ToM 
protocols may inadvertently inflate age-related effects through non-social, incidental 
task demands. For a more nuanced view of an age effect and how it interacts with 
domain-general demands of ToM tasks, future meta-analyses should group tasks 
according to non-social cognitive demands to examine whether the reported effect of 
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age is maintained or modified according to cognitive load. Though, this is difficult given 
between- and within-task variability. 
Another consideration is inconsistent definition of ‘older adult’ or ‘ageing’ in the 
literature. As we have seen, there is great variability in the reported OA average age 
across studies, and where studies have created young-old and old-old age 
demarcations, there is again variability in the cut-offs used to separate these groupings. 
With the aim to create a more standardised and comparable ToM ageing literature, we 
propose that ageing is perhaps best thought of as starting at 60 years, and relatedly, 
young-old comprising 60 – 75 years, and old-old comprising 75+ years. It is hoped that 
with a more standardised grouping of age, general cognitive slowing in advanced age 
can be more carefully controlled and managed and a more refined account of age-
related effects on social cognitive function can be attained.  
Finally, the quality of the evidence was not evaluated in this review. This is an 
important consideration as quality assessment ensures that the individual studies 
included in the review are evaluated according to standardised criteria with respect to 
methodology and statistical approach, such as reducing/eliminating sampling bias, 
participant randomisation, condition randomisation, correcting for multiple comparisons 
and family-wise error, and so on. Without evaluating the quality of the evidence that 
feeds into the overall meta-analytic effect, the conclusions of the meta-analysis may not 
be as robust and hard-wearing. Though, it should be noted that previous quantitative 
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Conclusion 
 
Social-cognitive abilities, and in particular ToM, are important for everyday social 
interactions and interpersonal relationships. While the early literature on ageing ToM 
produced somewhat contradictory findings, contemporary work has suggested that there 
is a general deterioration of ToM in advanced age. In our review of the evidence, we 
found that ToM competence does indeed seem to diminish with age, but importantly, the 
magnitude of this decline is modified – and in some cases, abolished – depending on 
task and sample considerations. It is our view, then, due to the large statistical 
heterogeneity between the studies included in the analysis and in methodological 
designs of the tasks employed, with different types of tasks tapping separate and 
distinct executive demands, there is likely an overestimation of the age effect. Still, the 
results of this review have important implications for future investigations of ageing 
ToM, and we recommend that researchers carefully construct tasks in a way that 
minimizes (or at least controls for) cognitive load outside of what is ordinarily required to 
mentalize and reason about the beliefs of others.  
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Chapter Three: Sources of Conflict in Ageing ToM 
 





An amended version of this chapter has been accepted for publication at Psychological 
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Chapter précis and background 
In the meta-analysis in Chapter 2, we showed that the effect of age on ToM competence 
is highly heterogeneous, with the magnitude of an age effect varying according to both 
task and sampling considerations. In some instances, the effect of age was abolished. 
One particular reason for this heterogeneity is perhaps down to the qualitative 
differences in task difficulty, where some ToM paradigms have greater non-social 
cognitive loads than others. In typical false belief tasks, successful performance relies 
on both social and non-social (or executive, domain-general) processing. Non-social 
demands rely on intact executive functions, which are also known to decline with age. 
However, within the ageing false belief literature, this is yet to be disentangled; 
processing that is non-social in nature is often confounded with social cognitive 
function. To address this, we assessed how older (n=50, aged 60-79) versus younger 
healthy adults (n=50, aged 18-29) were affected by three theoretically relevant sources 
of conflict within ToM: competing Self-Other perspectives; competing cued locations, 
and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty 
with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when representing 
a belief incongruent with one’s own. Individual differences in attention and response 
speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through incompatible Self-Other 
perspectives. However, OAs were disproportionately affected by managing conflict 
between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for 
predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest 
that previous studies may have underestimated OA’s ToM proficiency by including 
unnecessary conflict in ToM tasks. 
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Introduction 
Previous studies of normal ageing and ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM), the ability to infer 
another person’s thoughts, beliefs and desires, have produced contradictory findings 
regarding whether ToM competence declines in older adulthood (Henry et al., 2013; 
Love, 2015; Phillips et al., 2011). Methodological limitations, however, through some 
tasks making excess demands on executive function (EF), may explain this disparity 
(Love, 2015). EF and processing speed typically deteriorate with healthy ageing 
(Salthouse, 1996; 2010; 2012), but cognitive conflict may also be embedded within 
representing other peoples’ cognitive perspectives (Austin, Groppe, & Elsner, 2014; 
Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004), making understanding age-related differences in 
ToM proficiency difficult. 
EF is important for an operational ToM (Austin, Groppe, & Elsner, 2014; Vetter et 
al., 2013). ToM often involves reasoning about others’ beliefs that may differ from our 
own. Sometimes there is more than one other person and our own knowledge of the 
right answer may vary in certainty. These factors are often confounded in the classic 
ToM literature. Working memory, attention, and inhibition have been suggested to 
support mental state representation through managing conflict (Austin, Groppe, & 
Elsner, 2014; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Such conflict could arise from 
competing cued information, where attentional resources must be disengaged from one 
information source to select another – a typical feature of false belief (FB) paradigms 
which are used to assess ToM. Likewise, knowledge of an event’s outcome may also 
interfere with an individual’s ability to reason, due to bias towards one’s own, salient 
self-knowledge – termed a ‘curse of knowledge’  (CofK; Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007; for a 
review, see Ghrear, Birch, & Bernstein, 2016). To make predictions based on an agent’s 
FB, one must inhibit one’s own perspective to adopt the other person’s. Indeed, in 
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healthy adults, false- versus true-belief reasoning is associated with slower, more error-
prone behavioural performance (Apperly et al., 2008; Apperly et al., 2011). Manipulation 
of core parameters within the FB task demonstrates additional processing associated 
with ‘self-perspective inhibition’, suggesting that incongruent Self-Other cognitive 
perspectives may create conflict that is distinct from other sources of conflict within 
ToM tasks (Hartwright et al., 2015; Samson et al., 2005; Samson et al., 2015). It is not, 
however, clear whether having a privileged knowledge of reality, or the mismatch in the 
cognitive perspectives of Self and Other, is the basis of competition in FB reasoning. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the source of competition may explain conflicting 
findings in healthy ageing.  
In this study, we examined which factors are responsible for variation in the 
difficulty of reasoning about the beliefs of others across age groups. We assessed three 
theoretically relevant potential sources of conflict in ToM: privileged outcome 
knowledge, congruence of Self-Other perspectives and competing cued locations. 
Research assessing the CofK suggests that one’s own, privileged knowledge can cause 
interference when judging what others know (Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007). Further, when 
that knowledge differs between Self and Other, the conflicting Self perspective must be 
inhibited (Hartwright et al., 2015; Samson et al., 2005; Samson et al., 2015). On this 
basis, we tested how a participant’s knowledge of reality, and incongruence between the 
participant’s “Self-perspective” and an agent’s “Other-perspective” contribute to 
processing difficulty. These two aspects are confounded in the classic object transfer FB 
task, consequently, the present study aims to disentangle these as candidate sources of 
conflict. Furthermore, giving the correct answer in FB paradigms often requires 
participants to shift attention between competing locations, typically cued by a 
participant’s representations of where the object is located and where the other person 
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thinks it is located (see Friedman & Leslie, 2005). This is a feature of many FB 
paradigms though, unlike differences between Self- and Other-perspectives, is not an 
essential feature of FB problems. In this study, we de-confounded this factor from 
effects of knowledge-of-reality in conditions where alternative locations corresponded to 
the beliefs of two different agents. Building on research suggesting that incongruent 
Self-Other Perspectives create conflict distinct from other sources of conflict within ToM 
(Hartwright et al., 2015; Samson et al., 2005; Samson et al., 2015), we hypothesised that 
there would be greater cognitive effort associated with holding in mind competing Self 
versus Other perspectives versus managing alternate cued locations.  
Furthermore, we aimed to understand how these three sources of conflict are 
relevant to ageing in ToM. When compared with younger adults, older adults 
demonstrate greater hindsight bias when informed with outcome knowledge (Bernstein 
et al., 2011), more difficulty with managing incongruence between beliefs, and larger 
biases towards cued locations in FB reasoning (Bernstein, Thornton, & Sommerville, 
2011). Older adults might therefore experience difficulty with self-perspective inhibition, 
attending and managing conflict from multiple cued locations, and handling 
incongruence between beliefs – all aspects pertinent to FB representation, but not all 
essential to ToM. Mental-state representation has consistently been shown to recruit 
different brain systems to non-mental representation (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & 
Powell, 2006), but those neural systems for ToM interact with systems for EF 
(Hartwright et al., 2012; 2013; 2016; Mars et al., 2012). Dwindling underlying baseline 
connectivity of brain regions typically associated with ToM – particularly the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) – only partially predicts poorer performance in older 
adults (Hughes et al., 2019). Given that prior research shows differentiation between 
younger and older adults in ToM as a function of EF demands (Bailey & Henry, 2008; 
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Bottiroli et al., 2016; German & Hehman, 2006), it is important to better understand how 
conflict affects ToM processing more broadly and in ageing. We therefore assess, is 
there a psychologically relevant age decline in managing competing Self-Other 
perspectives, or are older adults disproportionately affected by methodological 
confounds, like the CofK and the need to manage competing cued locations? By 
manipulating psychologically relevant parameters within a single ToM task, we evaluate 
which cognitive components associated with belief-reasoning explain age-specific 
deficits in performance. We also used standardised measures of EF to predict the 
magnitude of conflict elicited by our ToM manipulations, to further explore the 
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Materials and Methods 
Participants 
One hundred and two adults with no self-reported neuro-psychiatric history and normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision participated in the study. Two participants’ data were 
excluded: one younger adult (YA) due to a methodological issue and one older adult 
(OA) for scoring beyond the cut-off point in a dementia screening measure. Thus, the 
final sample comprised 100 participants; 50 YA (21 male; age range 18-29 years, mean 
age = 20.2) and 50 OA (18 male; age range 60-79 years, mean age = 67.9). To be 
consistent with the literature, we defined ‘young’ participants as individuals aged 18 – 
29, and ‘older’ as age 60 – 79. This is in keeping with previous ageing ToM studies. YA 
were recruited via the university’s research participation scheme, university 
noticeboards and email advertisements to staff; OA were recruited from the university’s 
research panel, local interest and hobby groups, university noticeboards and email 
advertisements to staff. YA were either compensated with course credits or a small 
honorarium and all OA received a small honorarium for their participation. All older 
adults were community-dwelling and 52% were educated to at least undergraduate 
degree-level. The study was approved by Aston University’s Life & Health Sciences 
Ethics Committee (Appendix C). All participants gave written informed consent prior to 
participation. 
The Power Analysis for General Anova designs tool (PANGEA; Westfall, 2015) 
was used to conduct a post-hoc sensitivity analysis. Given our sample size of 50 per 
group, with 18 replicates per observation in our primary task, we had ~90% power to 
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Design 
Theory of Mind Abilities: False Belief Task 
The current ToM paradigm was based on Apperly et al. (2011) and Hartwright et al. 
(2012) and was written in E-Prime (v2.0; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
The current task was non-inferential: participants are explicitly made aware of others’ 
belief states.  
The current ToM task consisted of a three-factor (2x2x2) design wherein each 
factor manipulated whether a theoretically-based potential source of conflict was high or 
low (indicated with a subscript 1 or 0 respectively); see Table 3.1 below. The first factor, 
termed ‘Knowledge of Reality’ (KoR), varied the presence of the participant’s explicit 
knowledge about reality, and was based on prior work suggesting one’s own self-
knowledge can cause interference when representing that of another. The KoR 
manipulation resulted in a ‘reality unknown’ (KoR0) and a ‘reality known’ (KoR1) 
condition. The second factor, termed ‘Other-Other Congruence’ (OOC), manipulated the 
congruence of two agents’ perspectives, resulting in a minimal conflict (congruent) and 
maximal conflict (incongruent) condition (OOC0 and OOC1 respectively). The third factor, 
termed ‘Self-Other Congruence’ (SOC), concerned the congruence of the participant’s 
and the target agent’s perspectives, where the presence of conflict between those 
perspectives was manipulated. As with the OOC condition, this resulted in a minimal 
(congruent) and maximal (incongruent) conflict condition (SOC0 and SOC1 respectively). 
These latter two factors were based on work suggesting that ToM reasoning is 
supported by executive selection to resolve competition between salient cues.  
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Table 3.1. 
   




Condition Factor descriptor lowa conflict higha conflict 
Knowledge of Reality 
(KoR) 
Manipulates whether the 
participant is given explicit 
knowledge about the true 








Manipulates the congruence 
of two agents’b beliefs about 









Manipulates the congruence 
of the participant's and the 
target agent'sb beliefs about 





Note. aThe deemed 'level' of conflict was theoretically driven. bThe agent(s) beliefs can be true or 
false as, unlike the participant, the agents have no knowledge of reality. 
 
The three-factor design was formulated into a computer-based task where 
participants were required to respond from a target agent’s perspective (ToM trial), or 
based on what they, themselves explicitly knew (an anti-strategy trial, herein termed a 
‘filler’). Each experimental trial outlined a game where a magician hid a ball in one of 
three cups and subsequently shuffled the cups away from view (see Figure 3.1 below). 
Participants were required to indicate either i) where a target agent believed the ball 
was hidden (ToM trial) or ii) where the participant themselves thought the ball was (filler 
trial). Each trial comprised a sequence where each of the two agents indicated where 
they thought the ball was hidden, plus a clue – which the agents were not privy to – 
regarding what was inside one of the three cups. For each trial, a response probe was 
presented which indicated which of the two agents was the target agent and the nature 
of the response the participant should give (ToM or filler). The fillers were developed to 
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confirm that participants were attending to the clue regarding where the ball really was, 
by responding with the true location of the ball as this clue permitted differentiation in 
beliefs between the participant and the agents. Note that the fillers can be solved 
without ToM reasoning and therefore were used only to identify and exclude participants 





Figure 3.1. Panel A: A single trial outline with event timings. *Order of events varied across trials. 
Panel B: Schematic of the three experimental factors and how these were achieved. KoR = 
Knowledge of Reality: reality unknown (KoR0), where an X was shown to indicate absence of the ball 
from that location; reality known (KoR1), where the ball was shown to highlight its true location. 
OOC = Other-Other Congruence: the two agents’ beliefs about the location of the ball were 
congruent (OOCo) or incongruent (OOC1) with one another. SOC = Self-Other Congruence: the target 
agent’s belief about the location of the ball was congruent (SOC0) or incongruent (SOC1) with the 
participant’s belief about the location of the ball.  
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Each trial comprised five static images, followed with a central fixation mark (see Figure 
3.1A). The first image always depicted a magician shuffling three cups. Three further 
images were then presented. The order of presentation of these three images was 
counterbalanced using a Latin square and randomised. One image showed the 
magician’s hands obscuring the contents of two of the three cups. In the unobscured 
cup, either a green ball or an X was shown to indicate the presence (green ball) or 
absence (green X) of the ball, respectively. The participant only ever knew the contents 
of one cup per trial, consequently, they either knew explicitly the true location of the ball 
(ball shown), or they had to infer that it was under one of the two obscured cups (X 
shown). Two further images depicted one of the agents in front of one of the three cups, 
indicating which cup that agent believed the ball was located in (both agents’ beliefs 
were indicated in every trial). Following presentation of the three images, a response 
probe was shown. This depicted either an image of one of the two agents, requiring the 
participant to respond with where that agent thought the ball was (ToM trials), or an 
image of a hand with a finger pointed toward the participant where – based on the 
earlier clue – the participants had to respond with where they themselves thought the 
ball was (filler trials). Participants used number keys 1, 2 and 3 on the number pad of 
the computer keyboard to indicate their selected cup (left to right, where cup one was 
coded as 1 on the number pad). The eight experimental conditions were created by 
manipulating whether the participant knew where the ball was (KoR1), or if the green X 
was shown, leaving the location unknown (KoR0); whether the two agents’ beliefs about 
the location of the ball were congruent (OOCo) or incongruent (OOC1); and whether the 
participant’s and target agent’s beliefs about the location of the ball were congruent 
(SOC0) or incongruent (SOC1), as outlined in Figure 1B. By varying KoR, OOC and SOC, 
eight conditions were created: KoR0OOC0SOC0; KoR1OOC0SOC0; KoR0OOC1SOC0; 
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KoR0OOC0SOC1; KoR1OOC1SOC0; KoR1OOC0SOC1; KoR0OOC1SOC1; KoR1OOC1SOC1, 
where each condition described the state of affairs in relation to the target agent, as 
indicated by the response probe. The study comprised 18 repetitions of each 
experimental condition for trials and 9 repetitions of each condition for fillers. This 
resulted in reaction-time and accuracy data for 144 trials of interest and 72 fillers. The 
number of repetitions of each condition, the location of the ball, and the target agent 
were counterbalanced across the experiment. Participants completed four 
counterbalanced experimental blocks, each containing 54 trials. Reaction-times were 
collected based on the time taken to respond following the onset of the response probe. 
Accuracy was treated as identifying the correct cup, as required by the response probe. 
Omissions were treated as errors. Overall, the ToM experiment comprised 216 trials, 
equally split across 4 blocks (54 per block; block duration = 9 mins; each trial = 10 s). 
Each block comprised 36 ToM trials and 18 fillers.  
Our novel ToM task was non-inferential. While there is some uncertainty in the 
literature about whether true ToM occurs in the absence of inference, it should be noted 
that ToM and the inference of others’ beliefs, though commonly referred to as 
interchangeably, are not indistinguishable. Certainly, in everyday social situations others 
might plainly proclaim what they think or feel, and holding these beliefs in mind while 
also resisting interference from one’s own (potentially) conflicting perspective is 
cognitively burdensome. Research has shown, for example, after being made aware of 
someone else’s beliefs, both children and adults are still prone to egocentric interference 
(Apperly, Back, Samson & France, 2008). Here, participants are not required to make 
inferences about what the other person thinks nor are they required to make inferences 
about behavioural consequences, yet one’s own perspective still seems to interfere 
when representing the other’s (overt) belief. Further, previous neuroimaging work from 
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Hartwright et al. (2012) has identified increased activation of the ToM network during 
representation of non-inferential mental states. In the same study, Hartwright and 
colleagues also employed the well-known ToM Localizer task (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003) 
where participants, in one condition, inferred protagonists’ mental states to resolve the 
task. Substantial overlap in the activation of the TPJ was found between the two tasks, 
Hartwright and colleagues’ non-inferential task and Saxe & Kanwisher’s inferential 
tasks. Taken together, these converging lines of evidence suggest that non-inferential 
and inferential mental state representation tap similar task demands and share 
equivalent patterns of neural activation. Accordingly, our novel design comprised a non-
inferential false belief task. 
 Furthermore, the current paradigm is justified as a measure of ToM—or more 
precisely, FB—as it satisfies two fundamental tests of belief inference. According to 
Quesque and Rossetti (2020), two criteria must be considered when evaluating ToM 
tasks: mentalizing (inference of belief) and a distinction in self-other mental states. 
Quesque and Rossetti note that tasks must require participants to hold in mind a belief 
or intentional state of an external agent, and that this mental state must be separate and 
distinct from the participant’s own beliefs. In the current task, participants were required 
to mentalize about the (explicit) belief states of one of two external agents, and these 
belief states were independent of the participant’s own—and sometimes, privileged—
knowledge of reality.  We therefore consider the current paradigm, and its iteration in 
Chapter 4, to be a faithful measure of ToM reasoning ability. 
 
Theory of Mind Abilities: Self-Reported Perspective Taking Capacity 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) comprises four self-report 
subscales: Perspective Taking (PT), Fantasy, Empathic Concern and Personal Distress. 
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Although we administered the full scale to ensure reliability of the measure, we were 
primarily interested in data from the PT subscale as this is said to be indicative of a 
participant’s (self-reported) proficiency with taking other people’s cognitive 
perspectives. This measure did not form part of any preregistered hypotheses but was 
used for exploratory analyses. 
 
Neuropsychological Testing 
Participants’ EF was evaluated using the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated 
Battery (CANTAB Eclipse v6; Cambridge Cognition Ltd). The test battery comprised the 
Motor Screening Task (MOT), used to familiarise participants with the CANTAB system; 
the Choice Reaction Time (CRT), a simple 2-choice RT measure encompassing 
uncertainty; the Stop Signal Task (SST), used to measure response inhibition; the 
Attention Switching Task (AST), used to assess attention and cognitive flexibility; and 
the Spatial Working Memory (SWM) task, which measures retention and manipulation of 
visuospatial information. Data from these tasks did not inform any preregistered 




All participants were administered the Autism Quotient (AQ-10; Allison, Auyeung & 
Baron-Cohen, 2012) to screen for suspected autism; where a cut-off score of seven was 
used to exclude participant data. In addition to the AQ-10, OA also completed a 
dementia screening using the Mini Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (M-ACE; Hsieh 
et al. 2014). Participants scoring 25 or less on the M-ACE were excluded from the final 
sample; this resulted in one OA being excluded from the final analysis. 
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Procedure 
First, participants completed a short training session (see below) followed by two 9-
minute blocks of the ToM task, with a self-paced break between each. After completing 
the second block, participants completed the IRI followed by a 15-minute enforced 
break. Next, EF was evaluated using the CANTAB. The order of CANTAB testing was as 
follows: MOT, SST, AST, SWM and CRT. The SST, AST and CRT required the use of a 
left/right response button box, while the MOT and SWM were completed using the 
CANTAB touch screen. After a further 15-minute enforced break, participants completed 
block 3 and 4 of the ToM task. Lastly, the AQ-10 was administered and then OA 
completed the M-ACE. The total duration of the session was approximately 3 hours, 
which allowed for numerous breaks. This time also permitted casual interaction and 
refreshments with participants to reduce fatigue and increase engagement (see Results 
for explicit tests showing no significant cross-group fatigue effects). 
The practice session comprised a self-paced document that contained a mock-up 
of the task, including two self-paced and one timed trial. These three practice trials 
included written feedback regarding what had just been shown and what the appropriate 
response should have been. After completing this, all further interactions with the ToM 
task were administered via E-Prime. The task started with a practice block consisting of 
10 trials which followed the precise timing of the full experiment. In these practice trials 
only, participants received auditory feedback indicating the accuracy of their responses. 
The ToM training and ToM task proper were administered on a 17-inch Lenovo monitor 
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Statistical Analysis 
All confirmatory analyses were conducted in SPSS (version 24) and JASP (version 
0.12.2). Our primary hypotheses were assessed by running a 4-way mixed ANOVA on the 
ToM task data. This comprised Age Group as a between-subjects factor and three 
within-subjects factors: KoR, OOC and SOC. Table 3.2 below outlines the preregistered 




Summaries of preregistered hypotheses, predictions, and associated tests. 
Hypothesis 
No. 
Hypothesis Predicted Direction of 
Costsa 
Test 
RH1 Explicit Knowledge of 
Reality will cause 
interference 
KoR1 > KoR0 ANOVA main effect of 
KOR 
RH2 Incongruent Self and Other 
knowledge states will be 
effortful 
SOC1 > SOC0 ANOVA main effect of SOC 
RH3 Knowledge of Reality will 
interfere when Self-Other 
perspectives are incongruent 
SOC1: KoR1 > KoR0 ANOVA interaction 
KoR*SOC 
RH4 Managing an incongruent 
Self-Other perspective (a 
FB; SOC1) will be more 
effortful than managing 
competing, alternate cued 
locations (OOC1) 
SOC1 (FB) > OOC1 t-test of two specific 
conditions (Fig. 3.3) 
RH5 Ageing will be associated 
with an overall reduction in 
performance 
Older > Younger ANOVA main effect of Age 
Group 
RH6 Ageing will be associated 
with reduced performance in 
aspects of conflict in ToM 
KoR1: Older > Younger 
SOC1: Older > Younger 
OOC1: Older > Younger 
ANOVA KoR * Age Group 
ANOVA SOC * Age Group 
ANOVA OOC * Age Group 
Note: Table presents a summary of statements taken from the original preregistration. KoR = 
Knowledge of Reality (0 = unknown; 1 = known). SOC = Self-Other Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = 
incongruent). OOC = Other-Other Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = incongruent). aProcessing costs are 
inferred on the basis of increased reaction-times and error-rates. RH = research hypothesis.  
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Results 
Sample Characteristics  
OAs showed poorer performance across all neuropsychological measures; however, 
there was no statistically significant difference in self-reported perspective taking (PT) 























Sample characteristics by group: perspective taking and EF 
 Age Group   
 YA                  OA  
 M  SD M SD t 
IRI PT 18.66 4.49 18.40 4.79 .280 
SST 162.23 46.75 196.74 38.27      4.039*** 
AST 42.43 35.97 69.56 58.05    2.809** 
SWM 30.10 6.49 35.76 4.26       5.155*** 
CRT 303.89 52.02 369.36 52.55       6.229*** 
 
Note. YA = Young Adults. OA = Older Adults. PT = Perspective Taking, self-report 
measure from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), max score 28 (higher score = 
higher perspective-taking proficiency). CANTAB measures: SST = Stop Signal Task, 
stop signal reaction time in ms. AST = Attention Switching Task, mean congruency 
cost; higher values indicate greater difficulty with managing attentional conflict. SWM 
= Spatial Working Memory, strategy score; higher scores represent poorer strategic 
performance. CRT = Choice Reaction Time, mean motor-response latency for correct 
responses in ms. Statistical significance based on independent t-tests comparing Age 
Group on each measure *p<.05.  **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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ToM Task Analyses 
False Belief Task Data Pre-Processing 
Prior to statistical analysis, the data were pre-processed as described in the study 
preregistration. No participants scored below chance in the ‘filler’ trials (< 31 based on a 
binomial probability distribution, p < .05), indicating that all participants were attending 
to the task and could therefore be included in the subsequent analyses. Next, only the 
ToM trials (not the ‘filler’ trials), where a correct response was given, were analysed. 
Trials with a response latency of ≤ 5ms were removed, which resulted in two trials being 
excluded (both OAs from the KoR1OOC0SOC0 condition). Finally, RTs that were beyond 2 
SDs from each participant’s condition mean were removed (322 for YAs, 309 for OAs; 
631 in total). Then, trials with incorrect responses – including null responses – were 
removed (387 for YA; 678 for OAs; total 1065 trials, 7.4% of overall dataset) from the RT 
analysis and analysed separately, as the amount of errors per condition. Altogether, 1698 
trials (11.8%) were removed prior to analysis; 709 for YAs and 989 for OAs.  
 
False Belief Task RT and Error-Rate Analyses 
Our primary hypotheses were tested using a series of factorial analyses conducted on 
the RT and accuracy data. The condition-mean RTs (Figure 3.2A) were entered into a 
four-way mixed ANOVA with Age (young versus older) as a between-subjects factor, and 
three within-subjects factors: KoR ((reality unknown (KoR0) versus known (KoR1)); OOC 
((agents’ beliefs congruent (OOC0) versus incongruent (OOC1)); SOC ((agent’s-
participant’s beliefs congruent (SOC0) versus incongruent (SOC1)). Similarly, a four-way 
mixed ANOVA was conducted on the error-rate data (Figure 3.2.B). To be consistent 
with our preregistered design and analysis protocol, we focus on the three repeated-
measures main effects (KoR, OOC, SOC), the interaction between KoR and SOC, and the 
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relationship between Age Group and our primary within-subjects manipulations. 
However, for transparency, all results are reported in Table 3.4 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Panel A: Mean condition latencies separated by Group. Panel B: Mean percentage 
incorrect (accuracy) separated by Group. Error bars: +/- 2 SE. Panel C: Summaries of experimental 
each factor and level. Dark grey bars represent older adults and light grey represent younger adults. 
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Which factors are responsible for variation in the difficulty of reasoning about the 
beliefs of others generally? 
Knowledge of Reality 
RH1: Based on the theory that own knowledge can cause interference – a Curse of 
Knowledge (CofK; Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007) – we predicted longer latencies and more 
errors when reality was known versus unknown. To assess this, we tested the within-
subjects (w/s) main effect of KoR (prediction: KoR1 > KoR0). As detailed in Table 3.4, 
the effect of KoR was statistically significant; however, contrary to our preregistered 
hypothesis, participants were slower when they did not know reality (effect: KoR1 < 
KoR0), although there was no statistically significant effect of KoR to accuracy. 
 
Incongruent Self-Other Perspectives 
RH2: Prior research suggests that, when Self-Other perspectives differ, own perspective 
may interfere, and would thus need to be inhibited (Hartwright et al., 2015; Samson et 
al., 2005; Samson et al., 2015). On this basis, we predicted that ToM reasoning would be 
more effortful when Self and Other knowledge-states were incongruent (prediction: 
SOC1 > SOC0; RH2). To assess this, we tested the w/s effect of SOC (prediction: SOC1 > 
SOC0). In line with our preregistered hypothesis, participants were slower and made 
more errors when Self-Other perspectives where incongruent (SOC1) versus congruent 
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Salient, Conflicting Knowledge 
RH3. Prior research shows that FB reasoning is more effortful than TB reasoning 
(Apperly et al., 2008; Apperly et al., 2011); though the basis of this competition is 
unclear: is it due to having a privileged knowledge of reality – a CofK – or the mismatch 
between Self-Other perspectives? We tested the prediction that own knowledge of 
reality would interfere when Self-Other perspectives differed, by assessing the two way 
interaction between SOC and KOR. We predicted that a main effect of SOC would be 
qualified by an interaction with KOR, where error-rates and response latencies would be 
increased when Self-Other knowledge states were incongruent and reality known 
(prediction: SOC1: KoR1 > KoR0). 
Contrary to the CofK theory, the expected two-way interaction was not supported 
in RT. There was, however, a significant interaction in accuracy between KoR and SOC 
(Table 3.4): when reality was unknown, participants were more error-prone representing 
an incongruent versus congruent belief (effect KOR0: SOC0 < SOC1), and when Self-
Other knowledge states were incongruent, errors increased when reality was unknown 
versus known (effect SOC1: KOR0 > KOR1). These two-way interactions were qualified by 
a three-way interaction between KOR, SOC and Age Group in RT and accuracy, which 
does lend support to the CofK, albeit in a more complex way. 
 
How does attentional cueing contribute to performance costs on false belief tasks? 
RH4. Responding correctly in a FB paradigm typically requires a participant to shift 
attention between competing locations, while remembering which outcome maps onto 
which location. This effortful shifting between competing cued locations is a typical 
feature of FB paradigms though, unlike incongruence between Self- and Other-
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perspectives, it is not an essential feature of FB problems. We therefore developed a 
condition which required the participant to keep in mind, and shift between, two 
locations, without the need to represent the target agent’s FB (OOC1). Based on the 
Selection-Processing theory of FB reasoning (Friedman & Leslie, 2005), and work 
showing that incongruent Self-Other Perspectives create conflict distinct from other 
sources of conflict within ToM tasks (Hartwright et al., 2015; Samson et al., 2005; 
Samson et al., 2015), we hypothesised that there would be greater cognitive effort 
associated with holding in mind a competing Self-Other perspective (a FB, SOC1), versus 
managing alternate cued locations (OOC1). To assess this hypothesis, we compared 
performance in these two specific conditions within our ToM task (see Figure 4.3 below). 
In line with our predictions, a paired t-test revealed that a greater RT cost, around 32 
ms, was observed when representing a FB (KoR1OOC0SOC1; ?̅? = 978.53 ms) – compared 
to conflict from managing alternate locations (KoR1OOC1SOC0; ?̅? = 946.88 ms), t(99) = 
2.61, p = .010, d = .083. However, almost 5% more errors were made when managing 
alternate locations (KoR1OOC1SOC0; ?̅? = 9.72%) versus managing a FB (KoR1OOC0SOC1; 
?̅? = 5.00%), t(99) = 4.23, p < .001, d = .415. 
 
Which factors are responsible for variation in the difficulty of reasoning about the 
beliefs in healthy ageing? 
Age-Related Differences in Response Speed & Accuracy 
RH5. We predicted that OA would generally have longer RTs and increased error rate 
than YA, which we tested via the between-subjects main effect of Age Group. This 
hypothesis was supported, with OA generally providing slower, less accurate responses 
than YA (Table 3.4).  
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Figure 3.3. Panel A: Schematic illustration of the key events in a false belief trial (KoR1OOC0SOC1) 
and a conflicting Other-Other perspectives trial (KoR1OOC1SOC0; Panel B). In the classic FB 
condition (SOC1; panel A), two locations are cued – where the ball really is, and where the agent 
falsely believes the ball is – creating incongruence in Self-Other perspectives. In the alternative 
condition (OOC1; panel B), two competing locations are cued by two agents with competing 
perspectives but, unlike the original FB, the target agent’s and participant’s beliefs are congruent. 
Each trial exemplar in Panels A and B is indicative of the events for each of the two trial types. A 
typical event sequence might proceed as: 1. Cups shuffled. 2. Reality status of one cup is indicated. 3. 
Red agent indicates their belief status regarding one cup. 4. Blue agent indicates their belief status 
regarding one cup. 5. Target for participant representation is indicated as the blue agent. *Note that 
the order of presentation of event IDs 2, 3 and 4 was counterbalanced and randomized across the full 
experiment. The grey shaded area highlights the critical components of a trial that are manipulated to 
generate either a false belief (panel A) or a conflicting Other-Other perspective (panel B). Panel C 
highlights which locations are cued in which aspect of the event sequence to illustrate the number of 
unique locations cued. . KoR = Knowledge of Reality (0 = unknown; 1 = known). SOC = Self-Other 
Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = incongruent). OOC = Other-Other Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = 
incongruent). 
 
How do different sources of conflict differentially affect OA performance in FB 
tasks? 
RH6. We predicted that OA would show greater difficulty than YA with self-perspective 
inhibition, handling incongruence between beliefs and managing conflict from multiple 
cued locations. These predictions were tested by assessing the two-way interactions 
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between Age Group and each of the w/s factors: KoR, SOC and OOC. Contrary to our 
expectations; however, there were no statistically significant two-way interactions 
between KoR and Age Group in RT or error-rate, or between SOC and Age Group in RT. 
Age did, nonetheless, interact with SOC in accuracy, and OOC in both RT and accuracy. 
As detailed in Table 3.4, simple effects analyses demonstrated that accuracy was 
affected in both groups by manipulating Other-Other perspectives. Notably, the effect 
was almost doubled in OA, suggesting greater cognitive burden of OOC on OA (OOC0/1: ?̅? 
difference YA = 3.81%; OA = 6.61%). Indeed, OA made 5.44% more errors than YA when 
responding to a conflicting OOC. Further, only OA showed an effect of Self-Other 
perspectives on accuracy (OA: SOC0 < SOC1; ?̅? difference = 4.33%), suggesting the main 
effect of SOC on accuracy is driven by OA performance. Just as with OOC, OA made 
more errors than YA when responding to incongruent perspectives (SOC1: YA < OA ?̅? 
difference YA = 6.03%). Regarding RT, both age groups slowed significantly to resolve a 
competing versus congruent Other-Other perspective (YA/OA: OOC0 < OOC1); although, 
contrary to accuracy, the effect of OOC on RT was more marked in YA than OA (OOC0/1 ?̅? 
difference YA = 71.61ms; OA = 24.83ms). 
There were several interaction effects with Age Group which we had not 
predicted and should therefore be considered exploratory. As detailed in Table 3.4, there 
was a significant three-way interaction between Age, OOC and SOC in RT. Two separate 
repeated-measures ANOVAs to evaluate this indicated that the interaction between OOC 
and SOC was statistically significant in YA (F(1, 49) = 41.38, p < .001, ηp2= .458) but 
not OA (F(1, 49) = 1.95, p = .169). In both groups, conflicting Self-Other perspectives 
(SOC1 > SOC0) and Other-Other perspectives (OOC1 > OOC0) were completed slowest. 
However, pairwise comparisons indicated that YAs RTs were more affected by SOC 
when two agents’ perspectives were congruent versus incongruent, and by the 
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congruency of Other-Other perspectives when Self-Other perspectives were aligned 
versus incongruent; see Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5. 
Pairwise comparisons of RT in YAs for OOC * SOC  
  ?̅?0 ?̅?1  𝑋 difference (0-1) SE Pbonf 
  SOC    
OOC0 634.511 780.653 -146.142 13.104 < .001*** 
OOC1 753.066 805.317 -52.251 7.749 < .001*** 
  OOC    
SOC0 634.511 753.066 -118.550 14.802 < .001*** 
SOC1 780.653 805.317 -24.664 6.807 0.001*** 
Note. *p<.05.  **p<.01. ***p<.001. SOC = Self-Other Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = incongruent). 
OOC = Other-Other Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = incongruent). 
 
There was also a three-way interaction between KOR, SOC and Age Group in RT and 
accuracy. These interactions were interrogated using a further four, two-way repeated-
measures ANOVAs and pairwise comparisons (Figure 3.4); one for each age group 
separated by RT and accuracy. The interaction between KoR on SOC in YAs was 
statistically significant in RT (F(1, 49) = 15.45, p < .001, ηp2= .240) but not in YAs 
accuracy (F(1, 49) = .04, p = .836, ηp2= .001). Conversely, the interaction between KoR 
and SOC was non-significant in OAs RTs (F(1, 49) = .00, p = .949, ηp2= .000), but 
significant in OAs accuracy (F(1, 49) = 9.07, p = .004, ηp2= .156). The interaction effect 
in YA adults’ RT was due to a more marked slowing when managing a CofK (SOC0/1 ?̅? 
difference KoR0 = 73.87ms; KoR1 = 124.52ms; Figure 3.4A). Interestingly, both age 
groups slowed to manage the CoFK (KOR1: SOC0/1; Figure 3.4A/B), and both maintain 
within-group accuracy levels between TB and FB when reality was known (KoR1: SOC0 ≈ 
117 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
SOC1; Figure 4C/D). However, specific to OA, a substantial cost to accuracy was 
associated with representing an incongruent- versus congruent belief when reality was 
unknown (KoR0: SOC0/1 ?̅? difference = 6.67%; Figure 3.4D), suggesting the two-way 
interaction between SOC and Age is driven by OAs poor performance in the reality 
unknown FB condition (KoR0SOC1). Indeed, both age groups take longest to resolve this 
reality unknown FB, indicating substantial cognitive demand.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Estimated marginal means for RT and accuracy across YA and OA. Statistically 
significant pairwise comparisons across SOC and KOR indicated, where *p<.05.  **p<.01. 





F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
Additional Exploratory Analyses 
Knowledge of Reality, FB Reasoning and the ‘Curse of Knowledge’ (CofK) 
The three-way interaction between KOR, SOC and Age Group suggested that our initial 
interpretation of a CofK should be revised. When knowing the ball’s location, participants 
were slower to respond if the agent held a false-, (SOC1) rather than a true-belief 
(SOC0), which is consistent with a CofK. However, as shown in Figure 3.4, participants 
were slowest and most error-prone overall when reasoning about an agent with a FB 
when reality was unknown (KOR0). Participants experienced greatest difficulty when 
representing an agent who falsely believed the ball was at a location it was clearly not, 
which seems counterintuitive to the CofK hypothesis. To further explore this, we 
theorised that belief representation in the reality unknown condition (KoR0) could pose 
additional difficulty because the empty location – the cup labelled with an X – should be 
avoided, which would require additional selection and control processes. Leslie and 
colleagues proposed that, in the classic object transfer FB task, it is implicit that the 
target agent wants to find the object (Leslie et al., 2005). With the present task, 
regardless that the target agent had no awareness of the contents of any of the three 
locations – as in a typical FB task – here too it was implicit that the target agent would 
want to avoid the empty location. Knowing that the ball is not in a particular location 
bestowed the participant with privileged knowledge of where the ball definitely was not. 
With the current paradigm, we therefore effectively had two false belief conditions: the 
classic FB, as seen in the original object transfer task (KoR1OOC0SOC1), and a novel, 
reality unknown FB, because the target agent thought that the ball was somewhere the 
participant knew for certain it was not (KoR0OOC0SOC1). Should the participant need to 
inhibit their knowledge of the location to be avoided, it would be reasonable to expect 
greater cognitive costs associated with the novel, reality unknown FB (KoR0OOC0SOC1) 
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versus the classic FB (KoR1OOC0SOC1) condition. To test this, two further paired t-tests 
were performed, taking the data from all participants. Our assertion was supported in 
RTs (classic FB ?̅? = 978.53 ms; novel FB ?̅? = 1033.99 ms;  ?̅? difference = 55.46 ms), 
t(99) = 5.20, p < .001, d = .141 and, though not statistically significant in accuracy, the 
direction was consistent with the RT data, ruling out a speed-accuracy trade-off (classic 
FB ?̅? = 5.00% errors; novel FB ?̅? = 6.45% errors;  ?̅? difference = 1.45%), t(99) = 1.83, p = 
.070. We propose that this pattern could be indicative of a cognitively effortful ‘double 
inhibition’ (Leslie, German and Pollizi, 2005). 
 
ToM, Ageing, and EF 
Correlation analyses (for correlation matrix of all FB task and EF measures, see Fig. 3.7) 
suggested that RTs in all conditions were significantly positively correlated with 
individual differences in two-choice motor-response time (CANTAB CRT; r=.619 to .682), 
inhibitory control (CANTAB SST; r=.354 to .395) and spatial working memory (CANTAB 
SWM; r=.325-.417). No RTs were significantly correlated with attentional capacity 
(CANTAB AST; r=.113 to .168) or self-reported ToM (IRI PT; r=-.067 to -.148). For error-
rate, only motor-response time was significantly correlated with all conditions (CANTAB 
CRT; r=.243 to .434).. 
To assess which aspects of EF explain the magnitude of conflict introduced 
within each experimental factor, we derived a ‘cost-factor’ (cf) for each of the three 
factors, KOR, OOC, and SOC. We collapsed across task conditions (KoR/SOC/OOC) and 
subtracted those conditions within each factor with pre-supposed high levels of conflict 
(KoR1/OOC1/SOC1) from those with lower levels of conflict (KoR0/OOC0/SOC0):  
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KoRcf = (KoR1OOC0SOC0 + KoR1OOC1SOC0 + KoR1OOC0SOC1 + KoR1OOC1SOC1) – (KoR0OOC0SOC0 + 
KoR0OOC1SOC0 + KoR0OOC0SOC1 + KoR0OOC1SOC1) 
 
OOCcf = (KoR0OOC1SOC0 + KoR1OOC1SOC0 + KoR0OOC1SOC1 + KoR1OOC1SOC1) – (KoR0OOC0SOC0 + 
KoR1OOC0SOC0 + KoR0OOC0SOC1 + KoR1OOC0SOC1) 
 
SOCcf = (KoR0OOC0SOC1 + KoR1OOC0SOC1 + KoR0OOC1SOC1 + KoR1OOC1SOC1) – (KoR0OOC0SOC0 + 
KoR1OOC0SOC0 + KoR0OOC1SOC0 + KoR1OOC1SOC0)  
 
This was done separately for RT and for accuracy giving 6 CFs per participant. We ran 
six separate stepwise multiple regression analyses to predict each of the CFs. The data 
met the assumptions for multicollinearity, homoscedasticity and linearity, independence 
of errors (based on Durbin Watson ~2) and that the error terms were normally 
distributed. The OAs demonstrated more extreme CF values; however, all data were 
included: all participants had passed screenings for dementia and autism, all included 
ToM data had met performance criteria specified in the pre-registration, and the CF 
measures reflect a summary of an individual’s repeated, consistent behavioural 
performance over numerous trials. Consequently, we considered all CF values were 
representative of typical task performance within a continuum of variability. Each 
regression analysis included six predictors: Age Group, the self-reported perspective 
taking (PT) measure from the IRI, plus the four neuropsychological measures from the 
CANTAB: SST, AST, SWM, and CRT (see Table 3.6).  All six predictors were entered into 
the step-wise regression analysis and the models which explained the most variance 
with the fewest statistically significant variables—i.e. the most parsimonious models—
were retained. 
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Table 3.6. 
Multiple regression results for reaction time and error rate cost factors 











coef t Sig.   df 
df 







coef t Sig. 
KOR -           ns                     ns       
                                            
OOC 1 97 8.453 .005** .080 .071 
Age 
Group -.283 -2.907 .005**   1 96 6.554 .002** .120 .102 SWM  .264 2.761 .007** 
                                    IRI PT -.231 -2.413 .018* 
                                            
SOC 1 97 5.217 .025* .051 .041 AST  .226 2.284 .025*   1 96 9.023 <.001*** .158 .141 CRT  .308 3.276 .001*** 
                                    IRI PT -.222 -2.363 .020* 
Note: Table presents results from most predictive model, based on R2, from six separate stepwise multiple regression analyses (RT and error-rate for each CF). Age Group was coded as a 
dichotomous categorical variable. PT = Perspective Taking, self-report measure from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). CANTAB measures: SST = Stop Signal Task, stop signal reaction time in 
ms. AST = Attention Switching Task, mean congruency cost; higher values indicate greater difficulty with managing attentional conflict. SWM = Spatial Working Memory, strategy score; higher 
scores represent poorer strategic performance. CRT = Choice Reaction Time, mean latency for correct responses in ms. KoR = Knowledge of Reality (0 = unknown; 1 = known). SOC = Self-Other 
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Table 3.6 shows that there were no significant predictors of KoRCF in either RT or 1 
accuracy. Consistent with the earlier analyses, Age Group was identified as a significant 2 
predictor of OOCcf RT, explaining 7% of the variation, where higher costs to RT were 3 
associated with lower age. Further, reduced self-reported ToM (IRI PT) and less efficient 4 
use of SWM (spatial working memory) explained around 10% of variation in OOCcf error-5 
rate. 4% of the increased cost introduced to SOCcf RT was associated with greater 6 
difficulty managing attentional conflict (AST). Moreover, longer baseline RT (CRT) and 7 
poorer ToM proficiency could explain 14% of the increased error-rate associated with 8 
varying Self-Other perspectives. 9 
 10 
Practice/fatigue effects 11 
As the testing session was relatively lengthy (> 3 hours), we examined whether there 12 
was a disproportionate effect of learning or fatigue between the two age groups. A mixed 13 
ANOVA with task block (1, 2, 3, & 4) as a repeated-measures factor and Age Group 14 
(young vs older) as a between-subjects factor, revealed no significant interaction with 15 
either RT or error-rate (both p’s > .05) suggesting that there was no significant 16 
difference in any potential effects of learning or fatigue between the two groups.  17 
 18 
Relationship between ToM performance, EF, and perspective-taking 19 
Finally, correlational analyses were performed with RT, accuracy, EFs, and self-report 20 
perspective-taking. To this effect, correlation matrices are presented below, see Figure 21 
3.5. Our core analyses were driven via our pre-registered analysis plan, which did not 22 
include examination of correlations between individual task conditions and EF measures; 23 
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thus these correlations are not interpreted further here, but are presented in Figure 3.5 1 
for reference.2 
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Figure 3.5. Relationship between RT (Panel A) and error-rate (Panel B) for each of the experimental conditions with EF and IRI PT; each value reflects 
correlation coefficients (rPearson’s) across these. PT = Perspective Taking, self-report measure from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), max score 28 
(higher score = higher ToM proficiency). CANTAB measures: SST = Stop Signal Task, stop signal reaction time in ms. AST = Attention Switching Task, 
mean congruency cost; higher values indicate greater difficulty with managing attentional conflict. SWM = Spatial Working Memory, strategy score; higher 
scores represent poorer strategic performance. CRT = Choice Reaction Time, mean motor-response latency for correct responses in ms. KoR = Knowledge of 
Reality (0 = unknown; 1 = known). SOC = Self-Other Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = incongruent). OOC = Other-Other Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = 
incongruent). Figure produced using JASP v0.12.2., https://jasp-stats.org/ *p<.05.  **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Discussion 
Prior research has produced conflicting findings regarding whether ToM declines in 
healthy ageing (Henry et al., 2013; Love, 2015; Phillips et al., 2011). To unpick this, the 
present study assessed the role of three theoretically derived sources of conflict: 
privileged outcome knowledge (KoR), congruence of Self-Other perspectives (SOC), and 
competing cued locations (OOC). By assessing a series of preregistered hypotheses, this 
study highlights two important findings. 
 
Competing Self-Other perspectives and competing cued locations tap different 
cognitive mechanisms, which affect YA and OA differently 
We predicted that conflicting perspectives would be effortful (Apperly et al., 2008; 2011), 
particularly for OA (Bottiroli et al., 2016; German and Hehman, 2006), and that managing 
incongruent Self-Other perspectives would be more effortful than competing cued 
locations (Hartwright et al., 2015; Samson et al., 2005; 2015). Our data partially support 
these predictions, but the findings were more nuanced than expected. Unexpectedly, 
both groups showed similar slowing to resolve a competing Self-Other perspective, and 
both show comparable error-patterns when resolving the classic FB scenario. 
Conversely, though faster overall, YA slowed more than OA to manage invalid cueing, 
resulting in them committing substantially fewer errors than OA. This might first appear 
to reflect a speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT); however, as these behaviours differ through 
the type of conflict, the data are more consistent with meaningful processing differences 
between groups. Such SAT differences have been shown to have a neurological, rather 
than a strategic, basis (Forstmann et al., 2011). Indeed, further to divergent behavioural 
profiles, the cognitive systems co-opted to resolve each source of conflict were condition 
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specific: managing competing Self-Other perspectives was supported by attentional 
systems, whereas invalid cueing drew from spatial working memory. Considering this 
pattern of differences, our work suggests that different mechanisms manage these two 
sources of conflict. This is consistent with neuroimaging data showing that representing 
a FB is functionally distinct from attentional demands due to cueing behaviourally 
relevant spatial locations (Mars et al., 2012; Scholz et al., 2009; Young, Dodell-Feder & 
Saxe, 2010). Our work uniquely shows, however, that because of these different 
mechanisms, the nature of conflict in ToM differentially affects speed-accuracy 
response behaviours across age groups. This can explain the appearance of poorer ToM 
in OA. Conflicting perspectives were resolved similarly, whereas OA were less reactive to 
invalid cueing, resulting in proportionately more mistakes. Our data indicates that 
individual differences in attentional capacity best explain RT performance when 
managing competing Self-Other perspectives, and that errors better reflect limitations in 
EF and motor-response speed, rather than an age-related decline in ToM proficiency per 
se. Our work highlights that OA were more susceptible than YA to irrelevant cues in a FB 
context, and that unnecessary demands on working memory, through the cueing of 
invalid locations, disproportionately affected OA performance. Given the association 
identified between age, cueing and working memory, limits on processing speed, which 
declines with age, may explain this pattern of behaviour (Brown et al., 2012; German & 
Hehman, 2006; Salthouse, 1996). Critically, therefore, prior reviews and meta-analyses 
of ToM performance in ageing should be carefully interpreted: studies where such 
cueing occurs may inflate age-related changes in ToM capacity, due to incidental task 
demands which disadvantage OAs. 
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Interference from Knowledge of Reality is not affected by age, but by the perceived 
higher order intentions of Other  
We hypothesised that KoR could interfere with one’s ability to reason, due to bias 
towards own self-perspective – a CofK (Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007), and that OA would 
be disproportionately affected by KoR, as prior work suggests that the CofK is more 
pronounced in later life (Bernstein et al., 2011). However, these predictions were not 
realised: participants were faster when they knew where the ball was and both age 
groups performed comparably, regardless of KoR. To explore these unexpected findings, 
we considered studies of belief-desire reasoning, where the target agent may wish to 
avoid the given target object. Increased difficulty is associated with processing false- 
versus true-beliefs and avoid- versus approach-desires, where a FB combined with an 
avoidance desire attracts maximal processing costs (see Apperly et al., 2011; German 
and Hehman, 2006; Hartwright et al., 2012; Leslie et al., 2005). Mentalizing about an 
agent with a FB regarding an empty location would be doubly effortful, as participants 
must inhibit their knowledge that the agent must avoid the location they (falsely) believe 
to be true (Leslie et al., 2005). Our exploratory analysis supported this assertion: 
participants took longer to resolve a reality unknown FB compared with the classic FB, 
suggesting that KoR itself is not the cause of the CofK. Instead, participants’ initial 
internal reference towards the agent’s desire created conflict, in our case, resulting in 
re-direction away from the empty cup. This finding is consistent with work showing that 
we automatically anticipate others’ behaviour will fulfil, rather than conflict, their desires 
(Ferguson and Breheny, 2011), which suggests that the CofK is mediated by a 
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Limitations and future directions 
There are a number of limitations to consider for the current study. First, as we have 
seen from the meta-analysis in Chapter 2, education can potentially modify ToM ability 
in ageing. We previously showed that older adults who had greater levels of education 
(i.e., >14 years) fared significantly better than their less educated counterparts (<14 
years). In the two empirical investigations presented in this thesis, greater than 50% the 
OA samples were educated to at least undergraduate degree-level, which suggests that 
the education level in our sample was greater than what is prevalent in the wider 
population within this demographic. That we did not statistically adjust for education is a 
limitation of our findings and future work would benefit from measuring and carefully 
controlling for the influence of education.  
 The current design used dichotomous groups comprising young and older adults, 
where young was defined as 18-29 years old and older was defined as 60-79. Previous 
ageing-ToM studies using a lifespan approach have used more constrained age 
categories and have included more than two groups—e.g., young, young-old, old-old 
(e.g., Laillier et al., 2019). The advantage of this approach is that it allows for a more 
fine-grained analysis of ToM modification across the ages, which subsequently leads to 
a greater understanding of what the trajectory of ToM capacities look like at multiple 
stages of the developmental journey, from childhood and adolescence to old age. In the 
current study, we were only able to compare young vs old, without being able to discern 
changes to social cognitive function in, for example, middle to middle-to-late adulthood. 
While such a design would require a large number of participants to reach statistical 
feasibility, future studies should look to adopt a lifespan approach to bring greater 
understanding of when ToM ‘peaks’ and precisely how it degrades through the years. 
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Conclusion 
The present study suggests that FB reasoning is effortful for OA beyond the non-social 
cognitive demands of classic ToM investigations. Performance in each of our ToM 
scenarios paralleled individual differences in inhibitory control and spatial working 
memory. However, the magnitude of conflict experienced and the cognitive systems co-
opted to resolve this were condition specific: managing competing cognitive perspectives 
was supported by attentional systems whereas invalid cueing appeared to draw on 
spatial working memory. Further, OA were particularly disadvantaged by invalid cueing. 
This indicates that prior studies may overestimate the effects of ageing on ToM and 
highlights the need for carefully managing conflict in future studies of ageing and ToM. 
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Chapter Four:  Neural basis of interference in theory of mind reasoning 
in health ageing 
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Chapter précis and background 
In the current chapter, we investigated the neurocognitive profile of ageing ToM by 
administering fMRI to both young (YA) and older adult (OA) participants while they 
responded to our novel false belief paradigm and an established ToM functional 
localizer. We adapted our false belief task - originally employed in our behavioural study 
(Chapter 3) – to only include two factors: Knowledge of Reality (KOR) and Self-Other 
Congruence (SOC). The KOR factor manipulated whether the participant had a privileged 
knowledge of reality (reality unknown vs. reality known) and the SOC manipulation 
systematically varied the congruence between Self and Other beliefs (congruent vs. 
incongruent). These factors were conceptually identical to Chapter 3. We investigated 
the effect of each of these mechanisms in the context of reasoning about a false belief, 
and examined whether the interference arising from these factors differentially affected 
older (compared to young) adults.  
On a behavioural level, we found a main effect of KOR, where overall, participants 
were faster in resolving the false belief problem when reality was known (compared to 
reality unknown). This is a replication of our previous finding from Chapter 3. The KOR 
effect was driven by a KOR x Age interaction where the observed benefit of knowing 
reality was only present in OA. We did not find an effect of SOC, nor an interaction 
between SOC and KOR, or SOC and Age. From the neuroimaging data, we were able to 
show differentiation in the neural response to reality known (vs reality unknown), in a 
direction consistent with our behavioural findings. While we were unable to show an 
overall effect of SOC, we did observe an interaction in KOR x SOC where we examined 
participant brain responses to incongruence in self-other beliefs (vs congruence) when 
reality was unknown. The cortical regions highlighted within both of these tests generally 
fell within the well-established mentalizing network: primarily, bilateral temporoparietal 
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junction, precuneus, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex. We 
did not find an interaction with age based on either of the two above contrasts on a 
neural level, however, we were able to show emerging age-related differences in the 
recruitment of predefined cortical regions, as informed by a ToM functional localizer.  
Overall, in this chapter, we showed knowledge of reality to be a potentially 
important factor in false belief tasks, where participants – and in particular, OA – showed 
poorer performance when they did not have a knowledge of reality. We also identified 
discrete nodes of the mentalizing network based on our theorised sources of 
interference in belief reasoning, and showed emerging between-group differences within 
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Introduction 
Central to human social functioning is the capacity to reason about the subjective 
mental states of others, which involves inferring others’ goals, intentions, desires, and 
knowledge states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This ability – known as ‘theory of mind’ 
(ToM) – typically develops early on in the lifespan, usually around pre-school age and 
before the age of 4-5 in neurotypical children (see Scott & Baillargeon, 2017, for a review 
on early mental-state understanding). Beyond childhood, one’s ability to mentalize or 
mindread others’ mental states remains relatively intact until advanced age; where 
healthy, non-pathological ageing seems to have a deleterious effect on one’s ToM (for 
reviews, see Henry et al., 2013; Moran, 2013). 
There are, however, inconsistencies in the literature with respect to age-related 
decline in ToM. One of the earliest demonstrations of age-related changes in adult ToM 
was conducted by Happé, Winner, Brownell (1998), on two groups of participants, with 
mean age 21 and 73, respectively. Participants were given ToM (double-bluffs, faux pas, 
and white lies) and non-ToM stories to read and then answered questions based on 
their memories of the stories. Overall, while the older group was slower in responding to 
both ToM and non-ToM stories, older adults generally answered more questions 
correctly in the ToM condition compared to their younger counterparts. There was no 
difference in performance between the two groups in the non-ToM control condition. 
Happé and colleagues concluded that the increased accuracy observed in older adults is 
perhaps reflective of better or improved ToM abilities in advanced age. 
In response to Happé and colleagues, Maylor et al. (2002) tested young and older 
participants with Happé et al’s ‘Strange Stories’ design. Crucially, Maylor and colleagues 
matched the two age groups in terms of education and also systematically varied the 
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need to rely on memory to answer the questions; in one condition, the story was 
presented alongside the questions such that the participants could refer back to the 
narrative, should they wish – eliminating the memory load present in Happé et al (1998). 
Across two experiments, Maylor et al. found that the young group outperformed the 
older group for ToM stories with a memory load. Performance between the two groups 
did not differ in a non-ToM, control condition. Overall, Maylor et al.’s findings were the 
first to experimentally evidence an age-related decline in ToM between young and older 
adults. 
Subsequent and contemporary literature has generally converged on a consensus 
that ToM abilities seem to decay with healthy ageing (Bottiroli et al., 2016; Hughes et al., 
2019; Phillips et al., 2011; Reiter et al., 2017). For example, German and Hehman (2006) 
tested young and older adults across two ToM experimental manipulations: false (FB) vs 
true belief (TB) conditions. Successfully resolving a FB problem requires an appreciation 
that social actions are sometimes based on beliefs and intentions (as opposed to 
reality), even when those beliefs are evidently false (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). A 
TB, on the other hand, can usually be resolved based on one’s own true (and sometimes 
privileged) knowledge of reality, and is therefore typically operationalised as a non-
social, non-ToM control condition in FB investigations. In light of this, German and 
Hehman (2006) found that, while there was a universal cost associated with resolving a 
false (versus true) belief, the cost was disproportionately larger in the older adult group.  
More recently, Laillier and colleagues (2019) tested 60 healthy adults aged 20-75 
using the MASC (Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; see Dziobek et al., 
2006). The MASC is a 15-minute video-based ToM paradigm where participants watch a 
film about four characters at a dinner party. The film is paused 46 times and, on each 
pause, participants are asked about the characters’ thoughts, intentions, and desires. 
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The use of a continuous and dynamic film-based paradigm is purported to have greater 
ecological validity, which better mimics real-life social interactions compared to static 
cartoon-based tasks (Dziobek et al., 2006). Accordingly, Laillier et al. reported an age-
related decay of ToM across the adult lifespan, and while cognitive measures 
(processing speed and episodic memory) partially predicted mindreading ability, they did 
not mediate the overall effect of age on ToM competence.  
The extent of the ToM age effect, however, is not uniform (see meta-analysis, 
Chapter 2). There is substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude of the age effect 
depending on features of the task design and/or demographic make-up of the OA group 
(e.g., education, age, sex ratio, etc.). Indeed, some studies have reported no age 
differences at all after controlling for variability in global cognition and/or executive 
function (EF; see Chapter 2). Further, the degree to which EFs are recruited differ 
greatly across tasks, and even within the same modality of tasks the demand on 
executive resources varies. Often, these demands are conflated or masked behind social 
manipulations of a task, and are therefore difficult to disentangle. There is also 
heterogeneity in the neuroimaging literature in terms of the activated networks during 
different ToM tasks, presumably due to the variability in EF and social demands. In their 
meta-analysis of the most common ToM tasks, Schurz et al. (2014) reported significant 
inconsistencies in the recruited networks, and found convergence across tasks only in 
the posterior TPJ and dorsal mPFC. 
As such, from the extant literature, it is unclear as to what the precise 
neurocognitive mechanisms are that are responsible for variation in performance, in 
young versus older adults. What processes involved in reasoning about others’ mental 
states pose greater difficulty for older adults?  
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Manipulating the (in)congruence between self and other beliefs, and adjusting 
the salience of one’s own belief, has highlighted key neurocognitive mechanisms 
involved in the inference of mental states (e.g., see Hartwright, Apperly, & Hansen, 2014, 
2015). Resolving a FB problem requires the disengagement or inhibition of a self-evident 
truth (or knowledge of reality) in order to represent the FB of the other. Conflict arising 
from competing self-other beliefs and a knowledge of the true state of affairs taps 
working memory, attention, and inhibition, to support mental state representation 
(Austin, Groppe, & Elsner, 2014; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Leslie, Friedman, & 
German, 2004). Most pertinent in resolving FB problems is the processing resource of 
conflict inhibition or inhibitory control. In a typical FB task, to effectively attribute and 
represent the belief of a third party, the participant must hold in mind an erroneous 
belief while simultaneously disregarding salient knowledge of an evidently TB. The TB 
selection is the more salient candidate in this scenario – due to an egocentric bias, see 
below – but through the application of inhibitory control the salient TB is disregarded in 
favour of the FB (see Friedman & Leslie, 2004). Recent EEG work suggests that we may 
initially anchor to our own, informed knowledge of the world before representing others’ 
perspectives; thus, we must overcome this initial egocentric bias to assume someone 
else’s belief (Bradford, Brundson, & Ferguson, 2020). Indeed, a range of studies have 
found inhibitory control to be a predictor of FB performance – though, these findings 
have mostly come from paediatric samples (Flynn, O’Malley, & Wood, 2004; Mutter, 
Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002). When reality is known – i.e., when 
one has privileged knowledge of an event’s outcome – ToM performance tends to be 
compromised due to greater egocentric bias, a common fallacy in belief reasoning known 
as the curse of knowledge (see Birch, 2005; Birch & Bloom, 2007) or reality bias 
(Mitchell et al., 1996). Inhibiting this salient self-perspective to represent the other’s FB 
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recruits additional processing, and there is evidence to suggest that ‘self-perspective 
inhibition’ can be broadly dissociated from wider executive functions (Hartwright et al., 
2015; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005; Samson, Houthuys, & 
Humphreys, 2015).  
Conflict arising from inconsistent Self-Other beliefs can be further demonstrated 
in studies of perspective-taking. Ferguson, Apperly, and Cane (2017) administered a 
Level 1 perspective-taking task where participants were required to confirm the number 
of discs in a visual scene. Participants resolved the task through either their own 
(egocentric) or via an avatar’s (altercentric) perspective, where the two perspectives 
were either consistent or inconsistent. Ferguson and colleagues revealed differential 
performance based on consistency, with higher accuracy rates when participant and 
avatar shared the same perspective. 
In our own work (Rahman et al., 2021; Chapter 3), we previously manipulated the 
salience of self-knowledge and congruence of self-other perspectives in studying the 
source of interference in FB reasoning, and examined how the nature of these 
interferences may interact with ageing. We found that resolving incongruence (vs. 
congruence) between self-other perspectives was universally difficult, however, the cost 
of incongruence was disproportionately larger for older adults. We further found that this 
overall cost – incongruence in self-other beliefs – was predicted by performance on an 
attention switching task. 
However, the neural bases of the effect of an explicit knowledge of reality and 
incompatibility in self-other beliefs, and how these sources of interference in FB 
reasoning interact with age, is still not fully understood. More precisely, whether young 
and older participants show differential recruitment of neural regions in managing these 
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sources of competition is largely underexplored. In the current experiment therefore, 
using a modified version of the original FB task, we first attempted to replicate the 
findings our behavioural study (Chapter 3). Second, we investigated differential neural 
responses to the sources of interference highlighted previously. Importantly, we 
examined whether these effects interacted with age and whether there were between-
group differences in the activation of circumscribed regions of the brain, as informed by 
an extensively-published ToM functional localizer (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). 
 
The ToM Network 
While there is a general consensus on a theoretical definition of ToM (i.e., imputing 
mental states to self and others; Apperly, 2012), there lacks a specificity on what ToM 
paradigms actually measure (see Quesque & Rosetti, 2020). There is generally a large 
heterogeneity in the tasks employed in the pursuit of estimating ToM and the tasks 
themselves vary as to whether they require mental state representation. Indeed, some 
purported ToM tasks require no mental state representation at all (Quesque & Rosetti, 
2020). Even when the imputation of others’ mental and knowledge states is required, 
there is again variation in the modality of tasks employed (e.g., verbal or non-verbal, 
static vs. dynamic, etc.); with each measure potentially tapping separate and distinct 
executive resources. Despite this practical difficulty in pinpointing and operationalising 
ToM into a specific, homogenous concept, imaging research on the neural basis of ToM 
generally points towards a core ‘mentalizing’ network (see Table 4.1; Abu-Akel & 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Schurz et al., 2014). 
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Table 4.1 
Theory of mind brain regions (from Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; reproduced with 
permission) 
Brain region Brodmann’s area 
Posterior regions  
Temporo-parietal junction (incl. Inferior parietal lobe) (IPL/pSTS or TPJ) 39/40 
Posterior cingulate/precuneus (PCC/PCun) 31/7 
Superior temporal sulcus (STS) 21/22 
Limbic-paralimbic regions  
Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 11/12/47 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 10/32 
Anterior cingulate/paracingulate cortex (ACC/PrCC) 24/32 
Temporal pole (TP) 38 
Amygdala Subcortical 
Striatum Subcortical 
Frontal regions  
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) 8/9 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 9/46 
Inferior lateral frontal cortex (ILFC) 44/45/47 
 
In their review of the neuro-chemical mapping of ToM, Abu-Akel and Shamay-
Tsoory (2011) note that the core cognitive ToM network comprises the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsal striatum; see also 
Figure 4.1 below. More particularly, within the ‘mentalizing network’, Self-Other 
representation is supported by dorsal and ventral attention/selection systems at the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Similarly, 
Carrington and Bailey (2009), in their review of social cognition neuroimaging studies, 
140 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
reported that the MPFC and OFC regions were recruited in over 90% of studies, followed 
by the TPJ in 58% of studies, ACC in 55%, and STS in 50% of studies. 
It should be noted, however, that Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory’s neural mapping 
of ToM, and indeed Carrington and Bailey’s (2009), is largely based on data from healthy 
young adults, and thus there is uncertainty as to whether the regions and networks 
identified in these reviews is precisely applicable to older adults. This point is important, 
given that there is a well-documented age-related shift in functional connectivity across 
pre-frontal, temporal and sub-cortical regions (for a review, see Eyler et al., 2011), all of 










Figure 4.1. Mapping of different aspects of social cognition within the medial frontal cortex. 
Reproduced with permission from Amodio & Frith (2006). 
 
In differentiating the neural mechanisms involved in modelling the mental states of 
others versus representing one’s own true belief, Vogeley et al. (2001) found that while 
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self-perspective increased activity in the right TPJ and ACC, representing others’ mental 
states increased activity in the ACC and left temporopolar cortex. Building on this, Saxe 
and Kanwisher (2003) performed fMRI during a ToM task that comprised two conditions: 
False Belief and False Photo. In each condition, participants read a vignette and were 
then required to answer a fill-in-the-blank question. In the Belief condition, the vignette 
and follow-up question pertained to a character’s mental or knowledge state, whereas in 
the Photo condition participants responded to stories on non-human objects or stories 
that described people in physical detail (as opposed to a description of their mental 
states). Critically, both conditions require participants to reflect on a situation 
comprising outdated (false) information, but only the FB condition requires 
representation of a mental-state. Saxe and Kanwisher found that activation of the TPJ – 
while present in representing a FB – did not extend to false ‘Photo’ representations in 
non-social or control scenarios. Further, greater bilateral blood-oxygen-level dependent 
(BOLD) activity was found in the TPJ during stories that described characters’ mental 
states compared to stories that described characters in physical detail. This suggests 
that the TPJ may respond preferentially to mental-state content and not ‘falseness’ more 
broadly. 
Since their original publication, Saxe and Kanwisher’s (2003) ToM experiment 
has been employed numerous times in the social cognition literature and has been 
shown to reliably recruit distinct, circumscribed neural regions with robust effect sizes. 
As a result, this task has been widely used as a functional localizer to locate and identify 
discrete nodes of a core mentalizing network. Broadly, functional localizers are used to 
constrain analyses of fMRI data to pre-established functionally specialised brain regions 
(e.g., the TPJ for mentalizing or fusiform face area in the case of face perception; see 
Friston et al., 2006 for detailed overview of functional localizers). Within these localizer-
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informed, specialised regions, additional and separate analyses of individual task 
conditions can be scrutinised to examine potential differentiation in recruitment of these 
areas. Where there is differentiation in these pre-defined regions based on a specific 
task demand, this can generally be interpreted as the task theoretically conforming (at 
least on a neural level) to the established patterns and networks of activation within the 
given cognitive phenomenon. On this basis, Saxe and Kanwisher’s (2003) ToM protocol 
has been used as a functional localizer in a large number of subsequent ToM studies 
(citation count of original publication, at time of writing > 2000). For recent examples, 
see Boccadoro et al. (2019), Hughes et al. (2019), and Prochazkova et al. (2018).  
As previously noted, the evidence suggests that inhibition of the self-perspective 
(in order represent the other’s FB) might be dissociable from wider EFs and non-social 
representations. For example, Hartwright et al. (2015) manipulated the salience (high vs. 
low) of the self-perspective in both mental and non-mental state representation. 
Differences in activation of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) was only found 
between high and low salience when representing mental state content; there was no 
vlPFC differentiation for non-mental representation. The implications of this are twofold: 
firstly, the vlPFC’s activity was only modulated by varying mental- and not non- mental 
state content and second, the effect of the self-perspective in FB reasoning could be 
differentiated according to its salience. Thus, Hartwright and colleagues’ findings 
particularly highlight prefrontal regions when managing a reality known/unknown 
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The ageing brain 
Literature on the neurophysiology of ageing generally converges into a single, dispirited 
verdict: that the human brain deteriorates with ageing, even in the absence of pathology. 
The extent to which ageing has a deleterious effect can be studied and understood 
through structural and/or functional methods, and how these approaches map on to 
changes in cognitive abilities and behaviour in ageing. A structural account of the 
senescent brain focuses on age-associated neuroanatomical changes primarily through 
alteration in grey and white matter structures. For example, Persson et al. (2006) 
conducted a longitudinal analysis on 40 healthy older adults and found significant 
reduction in hippocampal volume in addition to compromised white matter integrity in 
the corpus callosum. These age-related changes were also associated with general 
cognitive decline, in particular, in episodic memory. More globally, numerous MRI studies 
have shown atrophy (shrinkage) of the cortical ribbon and reduction in cortical thickness 
in advanced age (Gomori & Melamed, 1985; Madan & Kensinger, 2016; Resnick et al., 
2000). 
 With particular reference to EF, Leong et al. (2017) performed an eight-year 
longitudinal analysis of structural MRI and neuropsychological measures in 111 healthy 
older adults with mean age of 67 at baseline. Age-related modification of structural 
volume was found, with an average of 0.56% total cerebral atrophy and a 3.56% 
ventricular expansion per year. Importantly, hippocampal atrophy and ventricular 
expansion was associated with declining EF, as measured through Trail Making, digit 
span, verbal fluency, and verbal memory tests.  
 A particular method of indexing structural changes in the ageing brain is through 
voxel-based morphometry (VBM; see Ashburner & Friston, 2000), which measures 
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differences in neural tissue concentrations based on structural MRI images on a voxel-
by-voxel basis. In their seminal study, Good et al. (2001) examined age-related effects 
on grey and white matter and cerebrospinal fluid through VBM in 465 healthy adults. 
They reported that global grey – but not white – matter volume declined with age, with 
the insula, superior parietal gyri, central sulci, and cingulate sulci being most severely 
affected. There was, however, also a sex difference in the degree of tissue loss in these 
areas, with males showing significantly greater reductions compared to females. 
 Functional approaches, on the other hand, look at the temporal synchrony of 
brain activity within particular defined regions, usually through fMRI. In ageing, 
compared to healthy younger adults, an increase or reduction of brain activity in older 
adults is typically interpreted in two ways: compensation or dedifferentiation, 
respectively (see Grady, 2012 for a general review of compensation and dedifferentiation 
in cognitive ageing). The recruitment of increased regional activity (or ‘hyperactivity’) in 
older adults, compared with younger adults on a given task, is thought to compensate for 
functional deficits elsewhere in the brain. More precisely, older adults tend to exhibit 
greater bilateral activity in frontal regions (i.e., in the PFC) during cognitive tasks in 
which younger adults show unilateral frontal activation (Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008). 
Greater PFC recruitment is thought to compensate for under- or reduced activity in 
visual processing areas in older adults (also known as the ‘posterior-anterior shift in 
ageing’ or PASA; see Davis et al., 2008). In contrast, a general failure to recruit or a 
reduction of activity in older adults may be indicative of poorer functional specificity in 
relevant task-related regions (Carp et al., 2011; Park et al., 2004). Diminished laterality 
and more diffuse patterns of activity have been shown in ageing, with less selective 
responses to a range of tasks, especially those tapping executive function (for a recent 
review, see Koen & Rugg, 2019). The reduction in specificity is supportive of the 
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dedifferentiation hypothesis of ageing. A more comprehensive account of neurocognitive 
ageing is provided in the General Introduction of this thesis (see Chapter 1). 
 
Neural Underpinnings of ToM in Ageing 
Though the literature is relatively sparse, evidence for an age-related difference in ToM on a 
neural level can be seen in structural and functional imaging investigations. Castelli et al. 
(2010) submitted young and older adults to fMRI while performing the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Task (RMET); a test requiring participants to infer mental states by viewing only the 
eye region of photographed faces (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001; 











Figure 4.2. Illustration of Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. From Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). A = 
illustration of male stimulus. Participants chose from the following options: serious (correct 
response), ashamed, alarmed, and bewildered. B = illustration of female stimulus. Participants chose 
from reflective (correct response), aghast, irritated, and impatient. 
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Castelli and colleagues found no differences in behavioural performance but reported 
greater activation of frontal regions, especially inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), in older 
adults. This was contrasted with greater ACC and right frontal gyrus activation in young 
adults. The RMET was also administered more recently by Cabinio et al. (2015), who 
measured age-related changes in structural connectivity and its potential association 
with socio-cognitive abilities in 36 healthy participants. Cabinio and colleagues found 
that the brain regions susceptible to age-related reduction in white matter connectivity – 
IFG and superior temporal gyrus – were also the regions most closely associated with 
mindreading competency as measured with the RMET.  
The two previous investigations (Cabinio et al., 2015; Castelli 2010), however, 
may be somewhat limited in advancing our understanding of age-related changes in 
cognitive ToM. At the time of writing, fewer than four publications have adopted the 
RMET paradigm when investigating the neural bases of age-related ToM differences. 
Though there is a more substantial evidence base of the RMET with respect to 
behavioural differences between young and old (see Kynast et al., 2020 for a recent 
example), the veracity of the RMET as a ‘pure’ measure of cognitive ToM has been 
recently called into question. Oakley et al. (2016) investigated performance on the RMET 
and an alternative test of ToM – the MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006) – with ASD and 
alexithymia-matched controls. Alexithymia can be broadly described as the subclinical 
inability to recognise and articulate one’s own and others’ emotions – i.e., a general 
impairment in emotional awareness (for a neuro-coordinate-based meta-analysis of 
alexithymia, see van der Velde et al., 2013). Oakley and colleagues found that while ASD 
and alexithymia-matched control participants showed no difference on the RMET, ASD 
participants showed weakened performance on the MASC. In addition, alexithymia, but 
not ASD, predicted RMET performance but did not affect MASC performance. Taken 
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together, Oakley et al.’s findings suggest that the RMET may be a better measure of 
emotion recognition/perception rather than cognitive ToM (see also Quesque & Rossetti 
(2020) for a more comprehensive discussion and task analysis of cognitive and affective 
ToM tasks).  
Elsewhere, Charlton et al. (2009) studied the association between age-related 
ToM decline and whole brain volume, white matter hyper-intensities, and white matter 
integrity, through structural and diffusion tensor imaging. From a sample of 106 older 
adults aged 50-90, Charlton and colleagues reported that socio-cognitive abilities 
generally declined with age and this age-related decay was significantly associated with 
white matter integrity (but not whole-brain volume or white matter hyper-intensities). 
Finally, Moran, Jolly, and Mitchell (2012) fMRI scanned 31 young and 17 older adults 
during a variant of Saxe and Kanwisher’s (2003) ToM localizer paradigm, in addition to 
other socio-cognitive tasks. Older adults were marginally more error-prone and slower 
than younger adults when reasoning about a FB; however, the differences were not 
statistically significant. This pattern of performance was accompanied by an age-related 
decline in BOLD signal in one primary region: the DMPFC. More precisely, whereas 
young adults exhibited significant recruitment of the DMPFC in social (vs. non-social) 
conditions, older adults showed no differentiation in this region between social and non-
social task types, and a lower DMPFC response overall.  
More recently, Hughes et al. (2019) examined baseline intrinsic functional 
connectivity within the core mentalizing network (as described previously) in young and 
older adults during Saxe and Kanwiser’s (2003) ToM localizer task. Overall, Hughes and 
colleagues reported poorer behavioural performance in the older group, but importantly, 
weaker connectivity between right TPJ and right temporal pole explained the poorer OA 
behavioural performance. In summary, there seems to be differentiation in neural 
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activation and connectivity between young and old in ToM in circumscribed, discrete 
regions. OA show reduced activation of the DMPFC and no differentiation in this region 
between false vs. true belief conditions, and exhibit weakened connectivity in the TPJ 
that has been directly associated with poorer behavioural ToM performance. 
Accordingly, in the current investigation, there are two main candidate regions of focus: 
the DMPFC and TPJ. 
 
Frontal lobe dysfunction and its relation to ToM in ageing 
Volumetric and functional studies of the ageing brain have highlighted frontal regions as 
being the most susceptible to deterioration from healthy, non-pathological ageing. For 
example, MR volumetry studies have shown quite clearly a disproportionate reduction in 
relative cortical volume in frontal areas compared to other regions (Raz et al., 2010; see 
review by Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004). Further, there is evidence to suggest that there may 
be a disproportionately greater reduction in regional metabolism in frontal areas: 38% 
reduction in whole-brain metabolism compared with 42% reduction in the frontal lobe 
(Tumeh et al., 2007). The accelerated relative degeneration of frontal areas in ageing 
may in part explain the neural underpinnings of age-related ToM decline, since core 
cortical nodes implicated in belief reasoning are situated within the frontal lobe (e.g., 
vmPFC, dlPFC, etc., see Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  
However, while we are beginning to understand age-related differences in 
mental-state reasoning on a neural level, the functional imaging literature to date has 
seldom factored in age-related changes in neurovascular integrity. Lack of correction for 
neurovascular variation in young and old may compromise our ability to draw meaningful 
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conclusions about the brain regions involved in the age-related decay of mental-state 
representation. 
 
The BOLD fMRI signal and neurovascular ageing 
The BOLD signal measured by fMRI is a consequence of both neuronal and vascular 
responses, the latter of which is affected by physiological ageing. The signal itself is an 
index of the changing concentrations of deoxyhaemoglobin – haemoglobin devoid of 
oxygen – following neural activity. This activity, which is made up of local synaptic 
activity and neuronal firing, consumes energy which is replenished or served by 
increased cerebral blood flow and volume (CBF and CBV, respectively). Broadly, the 
resultant effect of increased neuronal firing is a transient upsurge in oxygenated 
haemoglobin which in turn decreases the concentration of deoxyhaemoglobin. As 
deoxyhaemoglobin and oxyhaemoglobin have differing magnetic properties, fluctuations 
in their concentration drive BOLD signal variability. Finally, fluxes in the BOLD signal 
form the basis of the distinctive temporal outline of fMRI: the canonical haemodynamic 
response function (HRF; for a detailed account of the HRF, see Friston et al., 1998).   
More recently, we are beginning to understand that the relationship between 
neural-vascular coupling and BOLD signal changes with age (Abdelkarim et al., 2019). 
For example, cerebrovascular reactivity (CVR), a measure of how well intracranial blood 
vessels control CBF, should be considered an important factor in fMRI analysis, 
particularly in ageing studies (Tsvetanov et al., 2015). CVR determines the rate of 
constriction or dilation of local blood vessels in the brain which in turn results in reduced 
or increased regional CBF, respectively. Fluctuations in regional CBF, for reasons 
outlined in the previous paragraph, ultimately drive variations in the fMRI BOLD signal. 
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The integrity of the neurovascular architecture that ‘props up’ the CVR, and indeed CVR 
itself, has been found to vary as a function of healthy, non-pathological ageing. For 
example, Miller et al. (2019) scanned young and older adults using 4D flow MRI (which 
computes intracranial angiographic and quantitative blood flow) to investigate age-
related differences in CVR. Overall, Miller and colleagues reported lower global CVR in 
older adults. Further evidence of CVR decline with age can be seen in Flück et al. (2014), 
where the authors used a transcranial Doppler ultrasound technique; additionally, similar 
age-related effects were also reported through a phase contrast imaging method in 
Geurts et al. (2018). Together, these lines of evidence suggest that ageing compromises 
the vascular response in meeting metabolic – or neuronal – demands. For these reasons, 
an interpretation of a straightforward BOLD signal discrepancy between young and older 
adults – without considering neurovascular integrity – may erroneously inflate any 
potential brain-based effects of ageing. For a detailed explanation of the dissociation of 
vascular and neuronal components in BOLD-fMRI, see Tsvetanov, Henson, and Rowe 
(2021).   
Consequently, one must exercise reasonable caution when interpreting the 
outcomes of the reviewed ageing-ToM literature earlier in this chapter. The imaging ToM 
work cited thus far has not taken steps to practically correct for or factor in young-old 
neurovascular changes. To the authors’ knowledge, no fMRI study in ageing-ToM to date 
has sought to correct for age differences in neurovascular integrity. One such method of 
adjusting the conventional BOLD response in accounting for age-related differences in 
vascular integrity is by scaling the fMRI signal with the Resting-State Fluctuation 
Amplitude (RSFA; see Tsvetanov, 2015). The RSFA method uses fMRI data acquired 
from participants during a ‘resting-state’. Resting-state imaging is the capture of fMRI 
during a period of rest, where the participant is not performing any particular tasks. The 
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BOLD signal that arises from resting-state scans is interpreted as the brain’s default – or 
baseline – state, as it indexes intrinsic and spontaneous fluctuation of brain activity in 
the absence of an external stimulus (see Biswal et al., 1995). Practically, during resting-
state sequences, participants are therefore typically instructed to ‘clear’ their minds and 
either focus on a blank screen with a central fixation or keep their eyes closed.  
 Broadly, RSFA is an index of vascular reactivity and variability that is captured 
during resting-state fMRI. As such, though not interchangeable, RSFA can be loosely 
described as resting-state fMRI variability. Since this index is captured in a task-free 
state, RSFA is therefore more sensitive to vascular rather than neuronal components, 
and thus is an ideal measure via which task-induced BOLD signal can be scaled to 
account for neurovascular variability between young and old. 
 
Current Study 
In the present study, we built on prior behavioural work (Chapter 3) by manipulating two 
psychologically relevant parameters within a FB task. We systematically manipulated 
knowledge of reality (KOR; reality known vs reality unknown) and the congruence of 
self-other perspectives (SOC; congruent vs incongruent) within a single object-
displacement paradigm. In doing so, we separated competition from managing self-
knowledge from representing incompatible self-other mental states. In addition to our 
own ToM paradigm, we employed an extensively-published ToM functional localizer task 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In the current investigation, as mentioned, our FB task comprises two factors: KOR and 
SOC. The KOR factor manipulates the presence/absence of knowing the true state of 
affairs. This factor is essentially non-social. KOR (conceptually identical to the ‘KoR’ 
factor in Chapter 3) recreates a common feature of the classic FB task where the 
participant is informed about the status of a key object that is of interest to the target 
agent. The SOC manipulation (identical to ‘SOC’ in Chapter 3), conversely, is social in 
nature as it systematically varies compatibility in self-other beliefs, where a third-party 
agent’s knowledge state can either be congruent or incongruent with one’s own belief. 
As mentioned previously, classical and contemporary investigations of ageing ToM have 
produced mixed results due to large methodological heterogeneity in task design, where 
some paradigms are more or less ‘social’ than others. Likewise, there is also significant 
heterogeneity in non-social or executive demands in previous ageing ToM experiments. 
To examine the potential sources of interference in reasoning or mentalizing about the 
beliefs of others in older age, we have incorporated these two factors within a single 
ToM paradigm to clarify the contribution of each in explaining the oft reported age-
related decline in ToM. By manipulating these two factors, we could emulate some core 
task demands seen in FB reasoning and, in doing so, systematically modulate relevant 
non-social and social brain regions. This would allow us to look at specific patterns of 
difference in younger versus older adults, in both relevant non-social and social 
components of FB reasoning. 
 As such, we expected the previously explained social brain networks to be 
involved when mentalizing about another agent (SOC), and expected that regions 
involved in wider domain-general EF processes to be involved in KOR. More precisely, 
building on from Mars et al.’s (2012) parcellation of the TPJ, where the anterior region 
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was shown to be involved in attentional control mechanisms (see Krall et al., 2015), and 
the posterior TPJ involved in social cognitive function, we expected that KOR will be 
associated with greater activation in the anterior TPJ and SOC linked to greater 
recruitment of the posterior TPJ. In line with the ToM literature, we also expected 
greater activation of the DMPFC in our SOC (or ToM) condition. 
 We expected that there would be an age effect in these regions whereby there is 
a differentiation of patterns of activity between young and old in the TPJ and DMPFC, in 
line with our theorised social/non-social manipulations. To control for variability in 
vascular integrity between young and old, we scaled our effects of interest with a 
measure of neurovascular coupling. We utilised both GLM-based and non-parametric 
approaches, and performed an unbiased whole-brain analysis which was then followed 
up with a ToM functional localizer-based region of interest (ROI) assessment.   
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Adjustment to participant recruitment and data analysis due to COVID-19 disruption 
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its resultant restrictions, data collection for this 
study was prematurely terminated. Originally, the anticipated sample for the study was 
90 participants – 45 young (YA) and 45 older adults (OA). This was based on a power 
analysis of 90% statistical power, α = .05, and an effect size based on existing open 
ToM fMRI data from Moran et al. (2012). Sample size estimates were computed using a 
specialised, web-based fMRI power calculator: NeuroPower (www.neuropowertools.org). 
However, due to the aforementioned disruption, a total of only 72 participants were 
recruited – 50 YA and 22 OA. Of the 22 OA, only 19 had complete and usable data (both 
behavioural and fMRI). Thus, a matched sub-set from the YA data was used in the final 
analysis, to allow for reasonable between-groups analyses. Matching of the two age 
groups was performed through two variables: sex and BAPQ scores (explained later in 
Methods). As such, data from only 38 participants (19 YA, 19 OA) are reported in this 
chapter. Upon resumption of testing and scanning participants, COVID-19 permitting, 
the full dataset will be re-analysed and written up separately for publication. It is 
important to note therefore our anticipated analysis plan was greatly hindered due to low 
statistical power, and that the findings reported in this chapter should be interpreted 
with such a context in mind. 
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Methods 
Participants 
The study comprised self-declared healthy adult volunteers. Prospective volunteers were 
asked not to participate if they had any contraindications to MRI, or if they had been 
diagnosed with any psychiatric, neurological, developmental, or vascular disorder. Thirty-
eight (28 female) neurologically healthy participants3 took part in this study: 19 YA (M 
age = 21.11 years, SD = 3.59) and 19 OA (M = 69.32 years, SD = 4.37). All participants 
were right-handed (confirmed using the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory Short Form 
[EHI]; Veale, 2013) and fluent speakers of English, with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. OA were recruited from an institutional participant database and from local 
community groups. YA were recruited via a student participant pool. Participants were 
compensated with either course credits (YA) or a payment of cash and gift vouchers 
totalling 20.00 GBP (OA). The study adhered to the Declaration of Helsinki and was 




Suspected Autism – AQ-10 
Socio-communicative impairment is characteristic of autistic spectrum disorders, with 
marked deficiencies in social reasoning. As such, all participants were administered the 
Autism Quotient-10 (Allison, Auyeung and Baron-Cohen, 2012) to screen for suspected 
autism. As per Allison e al. (2012), scores of > 6 warrant a referral for further 
                                                          
3 As previously discussed, the sample size and subsequent analyses of this study were amended following 
disruptions due to COVID-19.  
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investigation; thus, participants who scored > 6 were excluded from the analysis. No 
participants were excluded on this basis. 
 
Dementia – M-ACE 
All OAs were screened for dementia using the mini Addenbrooke’s Cognitive 
Examination (M-ACE; Hsieh et al., 2015). The M-ACE has a lower cut-off at 21 (/30) 
which may be indicative of dementia. Consequently, OAs scoring < 21 were excluded 
from the data analysis. One older participant was excluded for scoring below 21 on the 
M-ACE. 
 
Contraindication to MR imaging 
All participants were screened for suitability of MRI scanning through an institutional 
MRI safety questionnaire (Appendix E), performed by the on-duty research radiographer. 
Participants who showed contraindications (to health and safety and/or data quality) 
were excluded and were not permitted to continue with the study. No participants were 
excluded on this basis. 
 
Incidental findings 
The current study adhered to an institutional protocol for the detection and reporting of 
incidental findings. Where incidental findings were confirmed by a physician as clinically 
relevant, such participants were excluded from the final analyses. All images were 
initially screened for suspected incidental findings by the on-duty research radiographer. 
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Design 
False belief task 
The ToM paradigm was an iteration of our previous behavioural work (Chapter Three). 
The task was a two-factor (2 x 2) design wherein each factor manipulated a potential 
source of conflict or interference; see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3.  
Table 4.2. 
   




Condition Factor descriptor 0 1 
Knowledge of Reality 
(KOR) 
Manipulates whether the 
participant is given explicit 
knowledge about the true 







Manipulates the congruence 
of the participant's and the 
target agent's beliefs about 









Figure 4.3. Factor structure. Each quadrant represents a single experimental condition.  
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The first factor, termed ‘Knowledge of Reality’ (KOR), systematically varied the 
participant’s explicit knowledge of the true state of affairs, informed by previous work 
suggesting that one’s own true, self-knowledge may interfere with belief reasoning when 
representing a false belief; for example, refer to Birch & Bloom’s (2004; 2007) ‘curse of 
knowledge’ hypothesis. Thus, the KOR factor comprised two levels: reality unknown 
(KoR0) and reality known (KoR1). The second factor, ‘Self-Other Congruence’ (SOC), 
manipulated the congruence in belief states between participant and agent. We have 
previously shown that a mismatch in self-other belief states is a source of interference 
in ToM reasoning, and this interference seemed to disproportionately affect older adults 
(Chapter Three). The SOC factor therefore also comprised two levels: self-other 
congruent (SOC0; compatible self-other beliefs) and self-other incongruent (SOC1; 
incompatible self-other beliefs). Overall, the task consisted of four experimental 
conditions (see Figure 4.3). Each experimental trial depicted a computerised ‘game’ 
wherein the participant was presented with two cups, one of which contained a target (a 
red ball) and the other was empty. Simultaneously, the participant saw an on-screen 
character (herein known as the ‘agent’) who also played game. The agent indicated the 
cup they believed to contain the ball by resting their finger above the relevant cup. 
Critically, the participant received a clue – which the agent was not privy to – by way of a 
single cup being revealed. The revealed cup was either empty or contained the target 
ball. Finally, a probe was presented which required the participant to either resolve the 
trial via the representation of a belief state or from the participants own true belief. The 
probe alternated between THINK, REALLY, and EMPTY. The THINK probe required the 
participant to respond with where the agent believed the ball was (ToM trial); the 
REALLY probe required the participant to respond with which cup actually contained the 
ball (non-ToM trial); and finally the EMPTY probe required the participant to respond 
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with which cup was empty (non-ToM trial). The latter two variants were non-ToM trials 
in that they could be resolved from the participant’s own true belief, without the need of 
representing – or mentalizing – the agent’s mental state. This manipulation between 
ToM and non-ToM trials permitted differentiation between true and false beliefs, and 
further confirmed whether participants were attending to the clue and appropriately 
engaging with the task.  
Each trial comprised seven images with the first image always depicting the 
agent and two occluded cups. The final image of the sequence always presented the 
response probe, with the three aforementioned cues (i.e., THINK, REALLY & EMPTY). 
The intermediate images comprised a clue – where one cup was revealed – and a 
depiction of the agent’s belief of the location of the target; to increase engagement and 
understanding of the task there were also textual prompts in-between the critical events 
(see Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4. Task outline and timings. Panel A: Time course and events of a typical trial. Panel B: Variants of experimental events. The order of all events, 
save the opening fixation cross and the end probe, varied from trial to trial, counterbalanced both within and across experimental blocks.* Agent varied across 
trials – counterbalanced across experiment to include young/old male/female; see Panel B for images of all agents. ** Probe varied across trials – see Panel B 
for three possible variants. The THINK probe required the participant to respond with where the on-screen agent thought the ball was, the REALLY probe 
required the participant to respond with the ball actually was, using their own self-knowledge, and finally the EMPTY probe asked participants to indicate 
which of the two cups was empty (or did not contain the target ball). 
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The agent (Figure 4.4, Panel B) in the task varied between male and female, and young 
and old; and there were therefore four possible agents: young male, young female, older 
male, and older female. The presentation of agents was counterbalanced across 
conditions, which meant that there were equal presentations of young/old male/female 
agents in each of the four experimental conditions. An important consideration here is 
potential unintended interference from the avatars themselves (i.e., due to age-
incongruent agents). For example, Ferguson, Brunsdon, and Bradford (2018) reported 
differential altercentric bias from age-in/congruent avatars in a visual perspective-taking 
context; where, overall, there seems to be increased processing or cost of mentalizing 
for own-age others. In light of this, we attempted to reduce any potential interference 
from age-in/congruent avatars in the current design by exposing all participants (young 
and old) equally to ostensibly young and older avatars (or agents).  
The original task on which this current iteration is based, had three factors, which 
included an Other-Other Congruence manipulation based on dis-/agreement in beliefs of 
two third-party agents. This factor highlighted a particular confound with respect to the 
cuing and subsequent processing of multiple locations that is a typical feature in many 
false belief paradigms. The cuing of these multiple and often competing locations 
tapped executive resources – particularly spatial working memory – that were typically 
decayed in older adults; thus confounding any actual socio-cognitive differences. We 
showed, however, from a precise experimental manipulation where the number of cued 
locations was kept the same and the only difference between the conditions was 
resolving a false (vs. true) belief, that reasoning about a false belief was effortful above 
and beyond processing multiple cued locations. For this reason, we did not include the 
Other-Other Congruence manipulation in the current design. 
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Theory of mind localizer 
A variation of Saxe and Kanwisher’s (2003) ToM functional localizer was used to identify 
discrete nodes of the mentalizing network to inform analyses of our novel false belief 
paradigm. For a detailed task analysis and breakdown of the ToM localizer, see Dodell-
Feder et al. (2011). The stimuli consisted of 32 stories equally split into two conditions: 
1) Belief, and 2) Photo. Both conditions required participants to represent and respond 
to false or outdated content, the essential difference between the two conditions was 
the content being represented: beliefs or photographs/maps. The Belief condition 
required participants to mentalize about a protagonist’s belief state whereas the Photo 
condition could be resolved using physical or mechanical inferences. The stories were 
then proceeded by a true or false question. An example of a Belief trial is as follows: 
Anne made lasagne in the blue dish. After Anne left, Ian came home and ate the lasagne. 
Then he filled the blue dish with spaghetti and replaced it in the fridge; with the 
subsequent follow-up: Anne thinks the blue dish contains spaghetti (participants then 
asked to respond with ‘True’ or ‘False’). An example of a Photo trial is as follows: A 
photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree branch. The film took half an hour 
to develop. In the meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground; followed-up 
with: The developed photograph shows the apple on the ground: True or False.  
Participant response-time (RT) and accuracy data were recorded. Each condition 
was represented equally (16 Belief, 16 Photo trials) across two experimental blocks, with 
conditions counterbalanced across runs. 
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Questionnaire Measures 
Broad autism phenotypes 
The Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ; Hurley et al., 2007) was 
administered to examine participants’ phenotypic expression of autism. The BAPQ 
comprises three subscales: social aloofness, rigid personality, and pragmatic language – 
and is designed to survey sub-clinical autism traits in non-autistic adults (Hurley et al., 
2007). The psychometric properties of the BAPQ have been reported to be moderately-
high to high, with the following internal consistency scores (Cronbach α): Social 
aloofness = .92, Rigid personality = .86, and Pragmatic language = .80 (Sasson et al., 
2013).  
Reading competency 
Participants’ word reading ability was measured using reading component of the Wide 




Questionnaire measures and practice session prior to fMRI 
After informed consent (and prior to the MRI scanning session), participants completed 
the questionnaire and screening measures in the following fixed order: AQ-10, EHI, 
BAPQ, WRAT-3, and M-ACE (OA only). After completion of these self-report measures, 
participants underwent a ~30-minute training session which comprised a self-paced 
Microsoft PowerPoint presentation that outlined the nature of the novel ToM task and 
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the localizer task. After the PowerPoint, participants had the opportunity to practice the 
tasks via two pre-programmed PsychoPy (Peirce et al., 2019) experiments – one for each 
task. While the content of the trials differed in the practice sessions to that of the actual 
study experiment, the technical parameters of the trials – e.g., timings, frequency of 
conditions presented, stimuli dimensions, etc. – remained the same. Participants were 
allowed to repeat the PowerPoint presentation and/or the practice experiments as many 
times as they wished – though, in practice, no participant required more than two 
practice runs. Completion of the questionnaires and practice session typically took 
around one hour and then participants were moved to the MRI facility to begin scanning. 
 
f/MRI Procedure 
Participant brain data was recorded in the following order: T1 anatomical, fMRI false 
belief, fMRI ToM localizer, and an eyes-open resting state; see Figure 4.5 for typical 
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Figure 4.5. Typical order of sequences and their respective scanning parameters. EPI = Echo Planar 
Imaging. BOLD = Blood-oxygenated-level-dependent. FB = False Belief.  ToM Loc = Theory of 
mind localizer. TR = Repetition time. TE = Echo time.  
 
fMRI tasks. All fMRI tasks were presented using E-Prime (v 2.0.10, Psychology 
Software Tools). The stimuli were projected from a Lenovo Intel i7 Windows 10 Pro 
ThinkCentre stimulus computer outside of the MR scanner room. The stimuli were 
projected from a rear-projection screen and the participant was able to view these 
stimuli via a mirror mounted on the head coil. Responses to stimuli, if required, were 
captured using a Cedrus Lumina MR-compatible left/right button response box placed in 
the participant’s right hand (all participants were right handed).  
False belief task. Each experimental trial comprised seven events, beginning with 
a 1000 ms presentation of an opener (a slide depicting one of the four possible agents 
sitting behind a desk; see Figure 4.4). The four subsequent events, all presented for 
1250 ms, provided textual prompts to the participant, displayed the content of a single 
cup, and indicated the agent’s belief with respect to their chosen cup. Following on from 
this, a 1000 ms probe (Think, Really, Empty) was presented to the participant. Trials 
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ended with a variable – or jittered – inter-trial-interval (ITI) that ranged 7000 – 15000 ms, 
increasing in 1000 ms increments (mean ITI across all trials = 11000 ms). ITI iterations 
were counterbalanced across conditions and runs. Participants responded by pressing 
the appropriate left/right button as depicted from their perspective (thus; a left response 
corresponded to the left cup) Participant responses were captured from the onset of the 
probe slide until the end of the ITI; participant responses did not prematurely terminate 
the ITI. Thus, on average, a trial lasted 18 s (critical events = 7000 ms, mean ITI = 11000 
ms).  
In total, there were 128 trials split into four blocks, each block comprising a single 
fMRI run. Each block therefore contained 32 trials – 16 ToM (THINK) trials and 16 non-
ToM (REALLY / EMPTY) trials. Experimental condition, ToM/non-ToM trials, 
presence/absence of target ball in each cup, task agents, ‘correct’ left/right response, 
and duration of jittered ITI were counterbalanced within and across fMRI/experimental 
blocks. Each block lasted 9 min and 36 s (576 s), and the whole task, not including self-
timed breaks in between blocks, lasted approximately 38 min and 24 s (2304 s).  
Theory of mind localizer. Trial design and timing of events for Saxe and Kanwisher’s 
(2003) ToM localizer task were taken from Dodell-Feder et al. (2011). Each trial began 
with a 6 s presentation of a story, immediately followed by a 4 s question wherein 
participants were required to make a True or False response (left/right on button-box). 
Finally, a 10 s ITI was presented (where button responses were still allowable). Thus, a 
single trial lasted 20 s. The task comprised 32 trials in total split into two 16-trial blocks, 
each block comprising a separate fMRI run. Each block therefore lasted 5 min and 20 s, 
and the total experiment – excluding self-timed breaks – took around 10 min and 40 s. 
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Resting state. Participants underwent an eyes-open resting state sequence where they 
were instructed to concentrate on a central white fixation cross projected onto a black 
background. Participants were instructed to keep their eyes open, avoid falling asleep 
and to ‘clear their mind’. The resting state sequence lasted 7 min and 30 s.  
Timing of overall study. The entire scanning session – an anatomical scan, two task 
fMRIs, and a resting state scan – took approximately 65 – 70 min. Depending on length 
of comfort and self-timed breaks, the entire study (pre-scan questionnaire and practice 
period combined with imaging session) took around 130-150 min.  
 
Image acquisition 
Acquisition and pre-processing parameters are reported according to the Organization of 
Human Brain Mapping’s Committee on Best Practice in Data Analysis and Sharing 
(COBIDAS) guidance (see Nichols et al., 2016).  
A 3T Trio (Prisma) Siemens scanner at the Aston Brain Centre, Birmingham, UK 
was used to obtain structural and functional data. All images were obtained with a 32-
channel (Siemens Head 32, Siemens Corp) head coil. High-resolution anatomical scans 
were obtained via a 1 mm isotropic T1-weighted sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 3.37 ms, 
flip angle = 8º; 1 mm slice thickness, no gap) while participants were looking at a blank, 
black screen. Single-shot echo-planar imaging (EPI) procedures were used to capture 
BOLD signal during both task and resting state scans. The imaging parameters for each 
task/sequence were as follows. False belief: TR = 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 83º, 
3 mm slice thickness, FOV = 250 mm, and bandwidth = 1130 Hz/Px. ToM localizer: TR = 
2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90º, 3 mm slice thickness, FOV = 240 mm, and 
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bandwidth = 1078 Hz/Px. Resting state: TR = 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 80º, 3 
mm slice thickness, FOV = 240 mm, and bandwidth = 1078 Hz/Px. Functional images 
were acquired in an interleaved slice order with a voxel size of 3 x 3 x 3 mm. Partial brain 
coverage was achieved in the functional scans (to increase spatial resolution/hasten 
acquisition time) by omitting the brainstem and lower half of cerebellum.  
 
Data pre-processing and analysis set-up 
Behavioural data  
RT and accuracy data (recorded in the scanner via E-Prime) were first merged using the 
E-Merge application (Psychology Software Tools Inc, PA, USA); merged data were then 
transferred into an Excel spreadsheet. From Excel, the behavioural data were imported 
into various statistical packages, including JASP, SPSS, and R. 
 
Neuroimaging data 
Processing and cleaning of neuroimaging data was performed via FSL (v. 6.0.1; Oxford 
Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain, University of Oxford) and MATLAB (v. R2020a; 
MathWorks, USA). For a brief overview of FSL tools and neuroimaging applications used 
in the current pre-processing and analysis pipeline, see Table 4.3.  
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Table 4.3. 
Tools and imaging applications used in pre-processing, visualising, and analysing fMRI data 
 
Tool Purpose 
BET/BET2 Extraction of brain from non-brain tissue (FSL) 
FLIRT Linear brain image registration (FSL) 
MCFLIRT Extension to FLIRT; motion correct tool for fMRI time series (FSL) 
FEAT Model-based analysis of fMRI data (FSL) 
MELODIC Independent Components Analysis to decompose fMRI data into ‘real’ 
task-related signal or artefactual components (FSL) 
SOCK Software toolbox used to identify artefact components following ICA 
(MATLAB) 
Randomise Non-parametric, permutation-based inference/thresholding of fMRI 
statistical maps (FSL) 
Source: https://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki; https://www.nitrc.org/projects/sock/  
 
First, brain extraction was performed using the BET utility in FSL with a common 
centre-of-gravity used for all participants, and a default fractional intensity threshold of 
0.5. A manual visual examination of both the resulting extraction and registration (i.e., 
high-resolution anatomical and functional images) was performed to assess accuracy of 
these processes. Slice timing correction was performed with the regular up option and 
data were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter (full-width half maximum = 5 mm). 
A default high-pass filter was applied. The standard approach to motion correction was 
undertaken in MCFLIRT, which revealed that no participant exceeded 1 mm of mean 
relative displacement, for either the FB or localizer tasks. In terms of registration, the 
middle volume of each participant’s functional scan was registered to their respective 
high-resolution T1 anatomical image; the anatomical image was then registered to a 
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common brain space (MNI template, Montreal Neurological Institute). We further 
examined artefactual signals by performing an independent components analysis (ICA) 
in MELODIC to identify signal related to residual head motion and physiological noise 
(e.g., heart rate, respiration, white matter, cerebrospinal fluid). These artefactual 
components were identified using SOCK (Spatially Organized Component Klassifikator, 
see Bhaganagarapu, Jackson, and Abbott, 2013) - an automated classifier that separates 
artefact-related signals from those that are likely to be of neuronal origin. Finally, these 
artefuactual components were removed (i.e., regressed out) from the functional time 
series. 
Analysis set-up. Analysis was undertaken in FSL FEAT, where explanatory 
variables (EVs) were created each representing a single task condition; for the FB task, 
there were four EVs (K0S0, K0S1, K1S0, K1S1), and two EVs for the ToM localizer 
(Belief, Photo). Each EV was convolved with the standard double-gamma HRF within a 
GLM framework. For both tasks, modelling of participant brain responses comprised the 
duration between the onset of the experimental protocol (trial) and the participant 
button-response. Second and third level modelling comprised the aggregation of session 
data per task, per participant, and then the data were aggregated across participants 
using a random effects model.  
The modelling of the contrasts in the FB task was guided by our previous 
behavioural findings (i.e., Chapter Three). See Table 4.4 for details of each contrast.  
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Table 4.4. 
Overview of contrasts in the analysis of task-fMRI data 
Contrast Note 
Main Effects  
KOR 0 > KOR 1 Main effect of Knowledge of Reality 




SOC 0: KOR 0 > KOR 1 Effect of Knowledge of Reality in the SOC Congruent 
(SOC0) condition 
KOR 1: SOC 1 > SOC 0 Effect of Self-Other Congruence in the KOR ‘Reality 
Known’ (KOR1) condition  
ToM Localizer  
Belief > Photo (B > P) Effect of the mentalizing condition (Belief) over non-
social condition (Photo) 
KoR = Knowledge of Reality (0 = unknown; 1 = known). SOC = Self-Other Congruence (0 = 
congruent; 1 = incongruent). OOC = Other-Other Congruence (0 = congruent; 1 = incongruent). 
 
The KOR 0 > KOR 1 contrast was modelled as such to reflect our previous finding 
that a knowledge of reality (i.e., KOR 1) enhanced false belief performance, while the 
SOC 1 > SOC 0 reflects findings that indicate an incongruence in self-other beliefs (SOC 
1) hinders or interferes with false belief reasoning (Chapter Three). Each of these 
contrasts were then further scrutinised on a between-groups (YA vs. OA) basis. GLM-
based random-effect analyses were performed to examine potential group-level effects 
based on our proposed contrasts. Parametric maps resulting from the GLM analyses 
were then corrected for multiple comparisons with non-parametric permutation testing. 
A default of 5000 permutations were run for each non-parametric test.  
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Region-of-interest analyses. ROI analyses were based on the ToM localizer. ROI 
masks comprised spheres of 10 mm radius centred on group-level peak voxels 
highlighted in the Belief > Photo contrast. Only clusters with a peak Z value of > 4 were 
considered and this resulted in the extraction of six ROIs/clusters. Within these clusters, 
mean COPE values for each predefined FB contrast was extracted using the Featquery 
tool in FSL. COPE images/values are calculated by subtracting the parameter estimate 
for EV 1 (explanatory variable, e.g., ‘KOR 0’) from EV 2 (e.g., ‘KOR 1’). Thus, the larger 
the difference between the two EVs the larger the magnitude of the effect or contrast 
within this given test. Where there are many EVs, a contrast is created by modelling 
each input as 1, -1, or 0, depending on the variables of interest, where inputs coded as 
‘0’ remain constant across all levels of the other variables. Extracted COPE values were 
then analysed through a series of four – one per contrast – mixed ANOVAs in JASP, 
where Age was entered as a between-subjects factor and regions (as highlighted by 
ToM localizer) as within-subjects.  
 
Calculation of RSFA index. Calculation of RSFA was based on Tsvetanov et al. 
(2015). RSFA was calculated by computing the standard deviation of each brain voxel 
over the course of the resting-state scan, within a standard grey matter mask. This 
resulted in an individual three-dimensional RSFA map for each participant. These maps 
were then scaled (or normed) by dividing each voxel value by the sample maximum. 
These values were then used to scale the resulting contrast images from the GLM 
analysis, on a participant-by-participant basis. Only data from the FB task was scaled 
with RSFA; ToM localizer data was not scaled in order to recruit ROIs consistent with the 
prior literature. To our knowledge, no studies to date have scaled ToM localizer 
functional data with RSFA when comparing young vs. older adults. However, this is an 
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area of interest which will be pursued when data collection can be completed (which will 
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Results 
Behavioural analysis 
Overall, the two age groups were well-matched on sex ratio, highest level of education, 
and self-reported BAPQ scores (see Table 4.5). As is consistent with the ageing 




Sample characteristics by group, including inferential test statistics 
 
  YA (N = 19) OA (N = 19) Test statistic  
(t / X2) 
Age, years M (SD), range 21.11 (3.59) 
18 – 29 
69.32 (4.37) 
62 – 77 
t = 37.15*** 
Sex Male : Female 5 : 14 
(26% : 74%) 
5 : 14 
(26% : 74%) 
X2 = 0.00 
Highest 
Education 
Compulsory/FE 11 (58%) 7 (37%) X2 = 1.69 
 First/Higher Degree 8 (42%) 12 (63%)  
WRAT-3, total M (SD), range 50.26 (5.09) 
38 – 55 
54.32 (2.81) 
48 – 57 
t = 3.04** 
BAPQ, total M (SD), range 85.58 (11.64) 
71 – 116 
85.16 (17.37) 
48 – 122 
t = .09 
Note: YA = Young Adults. OA = Older Adults. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05.  
FE (Education) = Further Education. WRAT = Wide Ranging Achievement Test (Reading Component).  




Data screening, processing, and cleaning 
Prior to performing confirmatory statistical analysis of the behavioural data, the data 
were pre-processed. First, to test whether participants were effectively engaging with 
the task, ‘filler’ (‘Empty’ and ‘Really’) trials were examined to highlight participants who 
had scored below chance (< 32 based on a binomial probability distribution, p < .05). All 
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participants scored above chance and were therefore included in the confirmatory 
analysis. Subsequently, only ToM (‘Think’) trials, where a correct response was given, 
were analysed. For behavioural analyses, incorrect responses on ToM trials, including 
null responses, were omitted – this resulted in 189 trials being removed (86 and 103 in 
YA and OA groups, respectively; see Table 4.6 below) prior to analysis. For the functional 
imaging analysis, incorrect and null responses were modelled as zero and the variability 
from these trials was not considered.   
Table 4.6. 
Trials removed per condition as a function of age group, due to incorrect 
responses or omissions.  
K0S0 K0S1 K1S0 K1S1 Total 
YA 27 24 18 17 86 
OA 19 36 17 31 103 
Total 46 60 35 48 189 
YA = Younger adult. OA = Older adult. 
 
False belief (Magic Cups) task RT and error-rate 
The structure of the current analyses for the behavioural (and indeed fMRI) data was 
modelled on the hypotheses and findings from Chapter 3. Primarily, the behavioural 
hypotheses were examined using a series of factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
on both accuracy (error rate) and RT data. Mean accuracy/RT data were entered into 
mixed ANOVAs where the experimental conditions served as within-subjects factors and 
age group was the sole between-subjects factor. To check for similarity in variance in 
accuracy and RT across both age cohorts, a series of Levene’s tests were computed. 
These showed that the two groups shared comparable levels of variation across all 
experimental conditions, in accuracy and RT (all Levene’s p’s > .05).   
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Accuracy data. First, accuracy data were examined. A three-way (2 x 2 x 2) mixed 
ANOVA, with KOR (reality unknown vs. reality known) and SOC (congruent vs. 
incongruent) as within-subjects factors and Age Group (YA vs. OA) as a between-
subjects factor, was first performed on the accuracy data. See Figure 4.6 for breakdown 
of mean error-rates and RTs across the four conditions.  
 
 
Figure 4.6. Mean error-rates and RTs across experimental conditions, separated by age group. Error 
bars represent standard error. K0 = Reality Unknown. K1 = Reality Known. S0 = Congruent self-
other beliefs. S1 = Incongruent self-other beliefs. Grey bars represent young adults and orange bars 
represent older adults. 
 
The analysis revealed no main effect of Age Group on accuracy. Similarly, there were no 
effects of KOR and/or SOC. Also, there were no significant interactions between the 
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Table 4.7. 
Results of mixed ANOVA on accuracy data 
Effect df F p Partial np2 
Between-Subjects     
Age 1, 36 .114 .737 .003 
     
Within-Subjects     
KOR 1, 36 3.506 .069 .089 
SOC 1, 36 1.160 .289 .031 
     
Interaction Effects     
Age x KOR 1, 36 .537 .468 .015 
Age x SOC 1, 36 1.949 .171 .051 
KOR x SOC 1, 36 .007 .935 .000 
Note: KOR = Knowledge of Reality. SOC = Self-Other Congruence. 
 
Response-time data. Next, RT data were entered into a mixed ANOVA as described 
above. As expected, there was an overall main effect of Age Group where, on average, 
YA were ~287 ms faster compared to OA, F(1, 36) = 10.373, p = .003, np2 = .224. The 
analysis also revealed a main effect of KOR, where knowing reality (vs. not 
knowing/reality unknown) enhanced performance by around 75 ms, F(1, 36) = 11.061, p 
= .002, np2 = .235. This facilitatory effect of knowing reality – that a knowledge of reality 
is associated with faster response times – is a replication of a previous finding in 
Chapter 3. See Table 4.8 below for full analysis of variance results. 
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Table 4.8. 
Results of mixed ANOVA on RT data 
Effect df F p Partial np2 
Between-Subjects     
Age  1, 36 10.373 .003 .224 
     
Within-Subjects     
KOR 1, 36 11.061 .002 .235 
SOC 1, 36 1.996 .166 .053 
     
Interaction Effects     
Age x KOR 1, 36 4.154 .049 .103 
Age x SOC 1, 36 1.217 .277 .033 
KOR x SOC 1, 36 .038 .847 .001 
Note: KOR = Knowledge of Reality. SOC = Self-Other Congruence. 
 
There was a statistically significant interaction between Age Group and KOR, F(1, 
36) = 4.154, p = .049, np2 = .103. To further scrutinise this interaction, follow-up 
pairwise comparisons were performed and Bonferroni corrections were applied to 
address increased family-wise error. Figure 4.7 below illustrates the interaction between 
Age and KOR. 
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Figure 4.7. Interaction between Age Group and KOR. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
In YA, there was no difference between the two levels of KOR (Mdifference = 29.223), 
p = .369; see Table 4.9 for full results of pairwise comparisons. However, there was a 
significant difference between the two levels of KOR in the OA group (Mdifference = 
121.714), p = .001. Accordingly, the main effect of KOR was largely driven by the older 
cohort, where OA were significantly slower when reality was unknown versus known. 
Further, when examining the effect of age on each level of KOR, both comparisons 
returned statistically significant effects (both p’s < .01). 
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Table 4.9. 
Pairwise comparisons comparing each level of KOR with Age, and Age with KOR.   
 M RT M RT MDifference p 95% CI for 
Difference 
 KOR 0 KOR 1    
Young 747.54 718.31 29.22 .369 -35.86 – 94.31 
Older 1080.17 958.45 121.72 .001 56.63 – 186.80 
      
 Young Older    
KOR 0 747.54 1080.17 -332.63 .003 -542.03 – -123.23 
KOR 1 718.31 958.45 -240.14 .004 -399.60 – -80.68 
Note: KOR 0 = Knowledge of Reality, Reality Unknown. KOR 1 = Knowledge of Reality, 
Reality Known.  
 
Finally, correlational analyses between questionnaire data (WRAT and BAPQ sub-
scales) and experimental conditions (RT and accuracy) were run. See Tables 4.10 and 
4.11 for output of correlation analysis. As the WRAT and BAPQ data did not correlate 
with any of the experimental manipulations, no further statistical investigations were 
performed with these two questionnaire measures.  
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Table 4.10. 
Correlation of experimental conditions (RT) and questionnaire measures. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. WRAT   --               
2. BAPQ_Aloof  0.022 --             
3.BAPQ_PragLang  0.243 0.116 --           
4. BAPQ_Rigid  -0.137 .402* 0.085 --         
5. K0S0  -0.067 -0.094 -0.023 -0.249 --       
6. K0S1  -0.034 -0.158 -0.006 -0.264 .734** --     
7. K1S0  -0.094 -0.154 -0.039 -.344* .924** .678** --   
8. K1S1  -0.060 -0.061 -0.014 -0.196 .888** .822** .807** -- 
Note: WRAT = Wide Range Achievement Test (only Reading component administered). BAPQ = 
Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire, comprising three subscales; Aloofness, Pragmatic 
language, and Rigidity. Pearson’s correlation. *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ‘K’ represents Knowledge of 
Reality factor, and ‘S’ represents Self-Other Congruence. ‘0’ represents low conflict manipulation 
and ‘1’ represents high conflict.  
 
Table 4.11. 
Correlations of experimental conditions (accuracy) and questionnaire measures. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. WRAT --               
2. BAPQ_aloof 0.022 --             
3. BAPQ_pragLang 0.243 0.116 --           
4. BAPQ_rigid -0.137 .402* 0.085 --         
5. K0S0 -.244 -0.020 -0.044 0.059 --       
6. K0S1 -0.199 -0.105 -0.101 0.017 .643** --     
7. K1S0 -0.206 0.034 -0.007 0.157 .818** .735** --   
8. K1S1 -0.006 -0.020 0.057 0.094 .576** .832** .675** -- 
Note: WRAT = Wide Range Achievement Test (only Reading component administered). 
BAPQ = Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire, comprising three subscales; Aloofness, 
Pragmatic language, and Rigidity. Pearson’s correlation. *. Correlation is significant at the 
0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ‘K’ represents 
Knowledge of Reality factor, and ‘S’ represents Self-Other Congruence. ‘0’ represents low 
conflict manipulation and ‘1’ represents high conflict.  
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Practice/fatigue effects 
Due to the length of the false belief task, additional analyses were performed to examine 
if there were disproportionate effects of learning or fatigue between the two cohorts. 
Thus, two (for accuracy and RT, separately) further 4 x 2 mixed ANOVAs with 
Experimental Block (1, 2, 3, and 4) and Age Group (young vs. older), were performed. 
The analyses revealed no significant interaction between Experimental Block and Age 
Group, for either accuracy or RT data, (both p’s > .05); which suggested that there were 
no significant effects of learning/fatigue between the two groups. 
 
ToM Localizer 
To examine the behavioural ToM localizer data, two separate mixed ANVOAs were 
performed, on accuracy and RT, respectively. Accordingly, age was entered as a 
between-groups factor and Condition (Belief vs. Photo) was entered as a within-
subjects factor in the analysis. Mean condition error-rate and RT, as a function of Age 
Group, can be seen in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8. Accuracy (error-rate, %; Panel A) and RT (Panel B) means as a function of Age Group 
across both experimental conditions. Error bars represent standard error (x 2). Grey bars represent 
False Belief condition and orange bars represent False Photo condition. 
 
First, with respect to accuracy data, there was no effect of Condition, F(1, 36) = 
.097, p = .757, np2 = .003;  nor an interaction behind Condition and Age Group (F(1, 36) 
= .004, p = .951, np2 = .000). Finally, there was also no effect of age on accuracy, F(1, 
36) = .002, p = .968, np2 = .000.  
Next, in terms of response-time data, there was no effect of Condition on RT, F(1, 
36) = 1.052, p = .312, np2 = .028. Likewise, there was no interaction of Condition on Age 
Group, F(1, 36) = .217, p = .644, np2 = .006. However, there was an overall effect of Age 
Group, F(1, 36) = 7.808, p = .008, np2 = .178. On average, OA (M = 3070.924, SD = 
478.608) were ~540 ms slower compared to their younger counterparts (M = 2531.866, 
SD = 710.400).  
Neuroimaging results 
The analyses of brain data was largely modelled on the results of our behavioural 
findings. Namely, we examined potential contrasts between levels of each of the two 
factors in our current FB task. More precisely, to examine the neural consequence of 
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KOR, we modelled a reality unknown > reality known (i.e., KOR 0 > KOR 1) contrast, and 
for SOC, we modelled incongruence > congruence (SOC 1 > SOC 0). Further, as there 
was a KOR x Age interaction in the behavioural RT data, we also performed a series of 
additional contrasts to scrutinise any potential interactive effects on a neural level. 
These contrasts were then compared on a between-groups basis (young ≠ older) via a 
series of two-sample t-tests, using both GLM and non-parametric permutation-based 
models.  
 
Knowledge of Reality  
A comparison of the BOLD expression in KOR 0 > KOR 1, on a whole-brain level, 
revealed increased recruitment of the fusiform gyrus, bilateral TPJ, posterior cingulate 
gyrus, in addition to visual areas such as the calcarine sulcus. Overall, not having a 
knowledge of reality, where the location of the ball was unknown, resulted in greater 
activation in these areas compared to having an explicit knowledge of reality. See 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 for illustrations of the results, and Table 4.12 for details. 
 
185 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
 
Figure 4.9. Selected axial slices illustrating significant clusters of differential BOLD response to the 
KOR 0 > KOR 1 contrast, after thresholding (p< 0.05) with non-parametric permutation 
bootstrapping. Parametric t-maps resulting from GLM analyses, thresholded by non-parametric 
permutations, are shown overlaid onto a common high-resolution brain template, within MNI space.  
 
 
Figure 4.10. Panel A: Three-dimensional reconstruction of the BOLD expression in KOR 0 > KOR 1. 
Panel B: Single sagittal slice (X = -5, Y = 0, Z = 0) representing KOR 0 > KOR 1 contrast. Parametric 
t-maps resulting from GLM analyses, thresholded by non-parametric permutations (p < .05), are 
shown overlaid onto a common high-resolution brain template, within MNI space.  
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Table 4.12         
Regions associated the KOR 0 > KOR 1 contrast 





















Fusiform gyrus 18545 5.83 26 -66 -9 -0.356 -69.9 1.8 
r TPJ* 1424 3.77 30 -80 25 26.6 -78 22.3 
Cingulate gyrus 
(posterior) 
372 4.12 19 -42 0 19.6 -43.9 1.26 
Calcarine sulcus 109 3.55 -16 -74 9 -16.2 -74.5 11.5 
Note: *TPJ was recruited significantly bilaterally, however, for clarity, only clusters with a t > 3 
(thresholded at p < .05) are shown in the table. rTPJ = right temporoparietal junction. COG = centre 
of gravity. 
 
We predicted that KOR would tap non-social executive (frontal) regions and also the 
anterior TPJ. We found that the KOR effect bilaterally recruited the TPJ, but the effect 
was strongest in the right hemisphere. To investigate the KOR-TPJ overlap more closely, 
the KOR effect was examined with Mars et al.’s (2012) connectivity-based, probabilistic 
parcellation. This parcellation subdivides the TPJ into anterior and posterior sub-regions, 
each region of the TPJ supporting attention and social-cognitive function, respectively. 
We found that the effect of KOR had a 62% overlap with the TPJa and only a 25% overlap 
with TPJp, in line with our expectations. In order to visualise the overlap, we segmented 
Mars’ original mask into TPJa and TPJp composite masks and then registered these 
composites separately onto a standard MNI template brain space. These were then 
binarised individually to create discrete anterior and posterior sub-regions and added 
together in one single image. Figure 4.11 below illustrates the two discrete sub-regions, 
with TPJp coloured in yellow and TPJa in orange, and the overlap with the effect of KOR 
in white. It should be noted, however, the maps only show the right TPJ as Mars et al.’s 
parcellation only focused on the right hemisphere. This is complementary to our own 
analysis as our KOR effect was shown to be stronger in the right TPJ relative to the left 
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TPJ, where in fact KOR activation in the left TPJ did not yield a sufficiently large cluster 
to meet our t threshold (i.e., > 3).  
 
 
Figure 4.11. Illustration of overlap of KOR effect with posterior and anterior TPJ.  Yellow indicates 
TPJp and orange indicates TPJa, and white highlights the KOR effect situated within the parcellated 
TPJ map. Mars et al.’s (2012) probabilistic map showed that there is a 62% overlap of the KOR effect 
with the TPJa, and a 25% overlap with TPJp. Panel A: Three-dimensional rendering of KOR-TPJ 
overlap, showing only the right hemisphere. Panel B: Axial view of KOR effect (white) visualised 
superimposed onto the anterior and posterior TPJ, orange and yellow, respectively. 
 
Self-Other Congruence 
As with our behavioural results, we did not find a significant effect associated with an 
incongruence > congruence contrast for our SOC factor, either with conventional GLM 
analyses or with non-parametric permutation testing. However, this effect (along with all 
other predicted FB effects) were scrutinised through an ROI approach – as informed by 
the ToM localizer (presented later in Chapter).  
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Self-Other Congruence x Knowledge of Reality interaction  
To investigate any potential interactive effect of KOR and SOC, two further contrasts 
were run. First, we looked at K0S0 > K0S1 – where ‘K’ represents the KOR factor and ‘S’ 
represents Self-Other Congruence. The values ‘0’ and ‘1’ depict the theoretical 
presence/absence of interference in belief reasoning within that specific factor. As such, 
‘0’ refers to reality unknown and congruence, respectively, and ‘1’ refers to reality known 
and incongruence, respectively. Thus, a K0S0 > K0S1 contrast specifically examines the 
effect or cost of SOC (congruence vs. incongruence) when reality is not known to the 
participant (i.e., KOR 0).  
A whole-brain analysis of the K0S0 > K0S1 contrast, after non-parametric 
permutation thresholding at p < .05, revealed significant BOLD expression primarily in the 
precuneus and left TPJ, and to a lesser extent, the right STS and anterior cerebellum 
(vermis). See Figures 4.12 and 4.13 for illustration of results, and Table 4.13 for details. 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Selected axial slices illustrating significant clusters of differential BOLD response to the 
K0S0 > K0S1 contrast. Parametric t-maps resulting from GLM analyses, thresholded by non-
parametric permutations (p < .05), are shown overlaid onto a common high-resolution brain template, 
within MNI space.  
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Table 4.13. 




(no. of voxels) 













Precuneus 12829 4.87 -2 -64 21 5.81 -69.8 13.9 
L TPJ 6284 5.49 -41 -70 5 -32.2 -68.4 -2.83 
R STS 2385 4.38 20 -79 25 24.1 -77.3 24.5 
Cerebellum 
(anterior lobe) 
1267 4.06 -4 -64 -11 -3.65 -65.6 -15.1 




Figure 4.13. Note: Panel A: Three-dimensional reconstruction of the BOLD expression in K0S0 > 
K0S1. Panel B: Single sagittal slice (X = 7, Y = 0, Z = 0) representing K0S0 > K0S1 contrast. 
Parametric t-maps resulting from GLM analyses, thresholded by non-parametric permutations (p < 
.05), are shown overlaid onto a common high-resolution brain template, within MNI space.  
 
A second contrast was performed to delineate further the interaction between 
KOR and SOC: K1S1 > K1S0. Here, we tested the cost of self-other congruence 
(congruent vs. incongruent) when participants had an explicit knowledge of reality (i.e., 
KOR 1). This condition is analogous to a classic false vs. true belief effect, in that the 
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participant is explicitly aware of reality and must represent a belief state which is either 
congruous (true belief) or incongruous (false belief) with the agent’s. 
 No significant regions or clusters were identified through this contrast – either 
through GLM or permutation-based models – and therefore we have not reported these 
here. However, as previously mentioned, all contrasts were modelled and are reported in 
our ROI analyses (later in chapter). We likewise did not see any age-related effects 
based on our proposed contrasts; though, these are explored through ROI analyses later 
in the chapter.  
 
ToM localizer 
Briefly, as previously discussed, the theory of mind localizer task (Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003) comprises two conditions: Belief and Photo. While the Belief condition requires 
participants to mentalize and reason about others’ mental states, the Photo condition 
can be resolved through non-social inferences. Therefore, in line with Saxe and 
Kanwisher (2003), we modelled a Belief > Photo (‘B > P’ henceforth) contrast to 
delineate between these processes and expected to see greater recruitment of areas 
within the classic mentalizing network (Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). More 
importantly, regions highlighted within this analysis were used to inform a subsequent 
ROI analysis of the proposed effects in our FB task. 
First, the B > P contrast showed that the Belief condition – collapsed across both 
age groups – led to greater recruitment of bilateral TPJ, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
precuneus, inferior occipital gyrus, and the left DLPFC. The regions highlighted here are 
broadly similar to that of the original authors (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Dodell-Feder et 
al., 2011). See Figures 4.14 and 4.15 for illustration of results, and Table 4.14 for details. 
191 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Axial layout view highlighting the significant clusters associated with a Belief > Photo. 
Parametric t-maps resulting from GLM analyses, thresholded by non-parametric permutations (p < 




Figure 4.15. Left/right three-dimensional rendering of the expression of Belief > Photo contrast from 
ToM localizer task. Note the particular recruitment of both the left and right TPJ. Parametric t-maps 
resulting from GLM analyses, thresholded by non-parametric permutations (p < .05), are shown 
overlaid onto a common high-resolution brain template, within MNI space.  
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Table 4.14. 
























L TPJ 4426 7.07 -52 -60 30 -52.7 -35.6 7.4 
mPFC 4374 4.99 -4 12 68 9.49 30.5 43 
R TPJ 3859 6.1 60 -50 28 54 -37.3 10.1 
Precuneus 3523 7.26 -6 -52 42 0.19 -55.2 36.2 
InferiorOcc 2029 4.94 16 -86 -16 -1.05 -78.1 -13.3 
L DLPFC 706 4.77 -50 0 52 -37 10.8 48.5 
Note: L/R = Left, Right. TPJ = Temporoparietal junction. mPFC = Medial prefrontal cortex. 
InferiorOcc = Inferior occipital gyrus. DLPFC = Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
 
When comparing young vs. older adults, we did not find significant differences in 
activations maps in the ToM localizer data. 
 
ROI analyses 
Next, we scrutinised all four of our a priori hypotheses/contrasts from the FB task – and 
their differentiation as a function of age – within each node of the mentalizing network 
engaged during the localizer task. Spheres of 10 mm radius were created centred on the 
voxel which maximally expressed the B > P contrast within each highlighted region (see 
Table 4.14). This led to the creation of six spheres: left TPJ, right TPJ, precuneus, mPFC, 
inferior occipital gyrus, and the left DLPFC. Within each of these spheres/clusters, we 
examined our four original a priori contrasts between the two age groups: 1) KOR 0 > 
KOR 1, 2) SOC 1 > SOC 0, 3) K0S0 > K0S1, and 4) K1S1 > K1S0. The first two contrasts 
represent the main effects of Knowledge Of Reality and Self-Other Congruence, 
respectively, whereas the latter two contrasts reflect interactions behind these two 
effects. The last contrast, K1S1 > K1S0, as discussed, is a classic false versus true 
belief contrast in that it compares, when reality is known, incongruence (false belief) vs. 
congruence (true belief) between self and other.  
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This ROI approach was useful here to examine the extent to which there was a 
differentiation between age groups in the expression of these contrasts within 
circumscribed, localizer-informed regions of the brain. While we previously did not find 
age-related differences on a whole-brain level – we suspect, largely due to low statistical 
power – scrutiny of these select regions allowed us to examine age effects within 
established nodes of the mentalizing network. To this end, we examined mean COPE 
(contrast of parameter estimates) values of each contrast within the predefined regions, 
as a function of age.  
Four separate 2 (Age: YA vs. OA) X 6 (Regions: L TPJ, mPFC, R TPJ, Precuneus, 
Inferior Occ, L DLPFC) mixed ANOVAs (one for each contrast) were run to examine 
between-group differences in activation maps within localizer-defined regions – see 
Figure 4.16.  
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Figure 4.16. Mean parameter estimates of each FB contrast within localizer-informed ROIs, as a function of age. KOR 0 > KOR 1: reality unknown > reality known. SOC 1 > 
SOC 0: self-other incongruent > self-other congruent. K0S1 > K0S0 (interaction effect): reality unknown, self-other incongruent > reality unknown, self-other congruent. 
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The analysis did not reveal significant between-group differences in any of the four 
contrasts. 
As can be seen from Figure 4.16, scrutiny of each contrast on a region-by-region 
basis as a function of age highlights emerging (though non-significant) differential 
recruitment of certain cortical areas. In terms of interpretation of the mean COPE values, 
a positive (greater than zero) value indicates an effect in the direction consistent with 
the proposed contrast. In the KOR 0 > KOR 1 contrast, therefore, younger adults 
exhibited (emerging) greater recruitment of the left and right TPJ, left DLPFC, and 
mPFC.  
 While the cost of incongruence in self-other beliefs (SOC 1 > SOC 0) did not 
emerge as a main effect in the whole-brain or ROI analyses, there was noticeable 
qualitative differentiation between the age groups when examining the contrast within 
the predefined ROIs. The difference in regional activation was particularly evident in the 
left DLPFC and precuneus – though in the left DLPFC, while the effect for YA was 
directionally consistent with the proposed contrast, the effect for OA opposed the 
planned contrast. For the two interactions, there was some evidence of differentiation 
between age groups, particularly in the left TPJ.  
 It should be noted, however, these differentiations were not substantiated 
statistically. Linked to this, due to the previously-described disruption to our study 
protocol, our current design does not possess adequate power to detect such 
differences. However, these data nevertheless highlight emerging patterns of differential 
recruitment of circumscribed brain regions between YA and OA groups that will be 
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Discussion 
In this study, using fMRI, we set out to delineate known sources of interference in belief 
reasoning and examine if these sources of interference differentially affected 
performance as a function of age. Unlike prior fMRI studies of ToM, our work includes an 
important adjustment within our fMRI analysis for individual differences in neurovascular 
integrity, which is particularly relevant when considering age (Tsvetanov et al., 2015; 
2021). Unfortunately, we were somewhat curtailed due to COVID-19-related disruption. 
This affected planned participant recruitment and subsequent data analysis. Thus, this 
work should be considered as preliminary.  
On a behavioural level, we were broadly able to replicate our original findings – 
especially with respect to our experimental manipulation of knowledge of reality; all 
participants were slower to respond when the location of the object was unknown.  We 
did not, however, replicate our findings with regards to the effect of SOC. Previously, we 
had found that all participants were slower and more error-prone when responding to an 
agent with an incongruent belief. The present data did not show these effects, although 
the direction of findings were consistent with this. On a neural level, the localizer task 
recruited similar regions as to what have been previously published. We showed 
differential brain responses based on our theorised, relevant sources of social and non-
social interference. However, we were unable to show age effects in the neuroimaging 
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Knowledge of Reality 
We experimentally manipulated the presence/absence of a knowledge of reality in our 
novel FB paradigm and found that participants were faster when they were explicitly 
made aware of the true state of affairs. However, classic literature on the sources of 
interference in FB reasoning has suggested that due to an egocentric bias or a ‘curse of 
knowledge’ (see Birch and Bloom, 2003, 2007), a prominent knowledge of reality 
compromises one’s ability to reason about other people’s false beliefs. Birch and Bloom 
(2007) reported that, from their study using a Sally-Anne-like displacement task, adults 
who had privileged knowledge of the specific outcome of a displacement event were 
better able to reconcile a FB problem, compared to adults who were naïve. Similarly, 
Mitchell and colleagues (1996) note that a privileged knowledge of the truth 
‘contaminates’ belief processing in adults by a phenomenon known as realist bias. 
Contrary to this, we found that reasoning about a FB is less difficult when knowledge of 
the true state of affairs is revealed; in other words, not knowing reality led to poorer 
performance. This finding is a replication our previous result in Chapter 3. However, the 
effect of  knowing reality evidenced in the current study and the classic curse of 
knowledge hypothesis are not necessarily in discord when understood in the context of 
belief-desire reasoning, based on the target agent’s intentions (see Friedman & Leslie, 
2004; Leslie & German, 2005).  The interference from content knowledge may not be 
from the actual unveiling of privileged information, but perhaps based on additional 
processing that is required to manage third-party intentionality. More precisely, the 
additional interference from the reality unknown condition could reflect an avoidance-
desire mechanism, whereby the participant additionally processes the agent’s implied 
desire to avoid an empty location. This interpretation is consistent with Leslie’s ‘double 
inhibition’ model (Friedman & Leslie, 2005; Leslie et al., 2004; Leslie et al., 2005) where 
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participants process two inhibitions to successfully resolve the task: first, the participant 
inhibits their privileged knowledge of reality (to represent a false belief), and second, the 
participant processes and inhibits the empty location in line with the agent’s desire or 
implied intention to avoid the vacant site. This additional processing could, at least in 
part, explain faster responses in the reality known condition (compared to reality 
unknown). In line with this interpretation, studies examining the time-course of 
representing others’ perspectives have shown that there is a bias toward seeking to 
fulfil, not conflict, the desires of others, where participants may anticipate intention or 
preference-compatible – in the present case, the agent seeking the ball – outcomes (e.g., 
see Ferguson & Breheny, 2011).  
On a neural level, for the effect of KOR, we expected to see significant clusters of 
activation within regions classically associated with EF (i.e., frontal areas) in addition to 
areas involved in attention, including a specific region of the TPJ. Studies investigating 
the structural and functional connectivity of the TPJ have shown that the area can be 
subdivided into discrete sub-regions, serving both attentional (anterior) and social 
cognitive (posterior TPJ) functions (see reviews by Krall et al., 2015; Mars et al., 2012). 
In the present study, as our KOR factor was theorised to rely on wider domain-general 
executive (non-social) processes, we expected to see recruitment of the anterior TPJ 
when resolving reality known vs. reality unknown conditions due to its association with 
attentional control (see Geng & Vossel, 2013 for a review on the TPJ and its role in 
attention). Accordingly, and as expected, we found greater activation of the anterior TPJ 
supporting our hypothesis that managing conflict from a knowledge of reality 
manipulation within the context of ToM reasoning is perhaps more reliant on non-social, 
cognitive mechanisms such as attention or attentional control.  This result indicates that 
activation of the TPJ in fMRI studies involving FB comparisons may not entirely reflect 
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social cognitive processes. Therefore, activation of the TPJ cannot be used to infer that a 
task is tapping social processes without careful mapping of this activation. Indeed, the 
term ‘TPJ’ is used to describe a relatively large area of the cortex; however, as outlined 
earlier in this chapter, there is growing evidence of functional differentiation within this 
region. Thus, future work should ensure that studies are carefully designed to ensure 
focus is on the relevant neuroanatomical region of interest. This could be achieved 
through carefully designed functional, within-subject comparisons or through the use of 
a localizer task, for example. 
Overall, we found a behavioural effect of KOR where responses were faster in the 
reality known condition, a finding that we initial observed in Chapter 3. However, this 
main effect was driven largely by the OA group, where an Age x KOR interaction showed 
that there was only a significant reduction in response-times in reality known vs. 
unknown in the older group. In the fMRI data we found significant activation, among 
other regions, in the TPJ and we were able to show specificity of this effect particularly 
within the anterior TPJ, in line with expectations. With a fully powered study, we would 
be able to look with greater confidence as to whether differential recruitment of the 
anterior TPJ might explain these differences.   
 
Self-Other Congruence 
We expected to see differential behavioural performance according to congruence in 
Self-Other beliefs. By manipulating congruence, we were able to test specifically a true 
vs. false belief condition, where, in line with previous literature, we expected greater 
interference from the Self-Other incongruent condition. In comparison to congruent Self-
Other (true) beliefs, we hypothesised that responses would be slower and less accurate 
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when participants resolve Self-Other incongruent (false) beliefs, and that this cost would 
be proportionately greater in OA. Prior work has shown that inhibiting the self-
perspective, which is a precondition of representing and reasoning about false beliefs, 
introduces additional processing and is dissociable from wider EFs (e.g., Hartwright et 
al., 2015; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005); and has been 
shown to pose particular difficulty in advanced age (e.g., German and Hehman, 2006). 
Further, we hypothesised that SOC would drive significant recruitment of regions or 
nodes within the classic mentalizing network, chief among which is the (posterior) TPJ. 
In line with this, Schurz et al. (2014) identified the medial PFC and bilateral posterior TPJ 
as core networks when reasoning about false beliefs, irrespective of task and stimulus 
formats. However, we did not find an effect of SOC in the behavioural or functional 
neuroimaging analysis. This contrast was also further scrutinised in a follow-up ROI 
analysis. Again, we should be cautious until the full study is completed. However, given 
that prior research suggests that cross-subject variation in fronto-parietal networks 
increases with age (see Li et al., 2017), it is probable that the lack of findings reflect lack 
of power. This might seem counterintuitive, given that we were able to identify an effect 
for KOR; however, it is possible that there is greater functional variability in how domain-
general processes, like attention, are managed when compared with social processes, 
like ToM. Moreover, it is also not possible to determine at this point whether prior 
findings are affected by age-related differences in neurovasculature, which we control 
for in our analysis of the novel ToM task (but do not in the localizer to permit wider 
comparability). Still, what is notable from the ROI analysis (which was derived from the 
localizer) is that there were qualitative differences between age groups in how the brain 
responded when managing conflicting self-other perspectives. We will assess this 
quantitatively once we are able to finalise the research.    
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Knowledge of Reality, Self-Other Congruence, and the effect of Age 
We previously reported a KOR x SOC interaction in our behavioural FB investigation 
(Chapter 3), where, when reality was unknown (KOR 0), responses were more accurate 
in the SOC congruent (SOC 0) relative to SOC incongruent (SOC 1). There was 
previously also an effect of KOR in the SOC congruent condition, where participants 
responded more accurately in the reality unknown (KOR 0) condition relative to the 
reality known (KOR 1) condition. With the current data, however, there was no 
interaction behind the KOR and SOC manipulations, either in the RT or accuracy 
behavioural data.  
 On a neural level, we found a significant interaction between KOR and SOC 
where in reality unknown condition an incongruence in self-other beliefs highlighted 
several regions within the core mentalizing network, namely, the left TPJ in addition to 
the precuneus and right STS. 
Behaviourally, we observed an interaction in the effect of knowledge of reality 
with age. Overall, a privileged knowledge of reality reduced response-times, as noted 
above, however, this benefit (of knowing vs. not knowing reality) was only observed in 
OA – the KOR manipulation had no effect on YA. This finding diverges from our initial 
behavioural study (Chapter 3) as previously we found no interaction with the KOR 
manipulation with age.  
 While we did not find statistically-relevant age effects in the functional data, it is 
worth considering the emerging group differences in the ROI analyses. We employed 
Saxe and Kanwisher’s (2003) ToM functional localizer to highlight regions of interest, 
within which we focused our investigation of age differences in the context of our FB 
paradigm. We observed incipient age-related effects, across all four of our planned 
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contrasts, in regions relevant to the mentalizing network (see Abu-Akel & Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011). For example, for the contrast of reality unknown > reality known (KOR 0 
> KOR 1), there was differentiation within the TPJ (bilateral), left DLPFC, and mPFC. 
While age-related differences in the recruitment of these areas did not survive statistical 
thresholding, it is plausible that with sufficient statistical power such differences would 
reliably show.  
Further, the incongruent > congruent contrast in self-other beliefs did not 
produce statistically relevant neurobehavioural results, as a standalone main effect or an 
interaction with age. However, an inspection of the mean contrast parameters shows 
that there was noticeable between-groups differentiation in the recruitment of localizer-
informed regions, chiefly within bilateral TPJ and left DLPFC, regions that have been 
implicated extensively in the prior belief-reasoning literature. To our knowledge, the 
functional neuroimaging literature is yet to show a self-other beliefs distinction in the 
context of ageing. However, there is an emerging literature base which highlights key 
regions – particularly the TPJ – in the distinction between Self and Other in a range of 
different socio-cognitive operations, including mental state representation, social 
imitation/mimicry, and empathy (Quesque & Brass, 2019).  
 
Contribution of current findings to wider cognitive ageing literature 
The current work complements and extends the literature on general cognitive ageing. 
As has been shown in the literature, we report poorer performance in OA in abilities 
related to memory, processing speed, attention, and inhibition, and found that these 
measures, to varying degrees, are associated with age-related decline in ToM 
performance. From both the quantitative review and behavioural investigation, we 
 
203 
F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
showed that age-related decline in domain-general functions is highly variable, with 
higher EF capacities predicting superior ToM performance in older age. Further, in our 
neuroimaging investigation, we again found that OA were more varied in both their 
behavioural and neural response in comparison to their younger counterparts. Increased 
variability in advanced age is thought to derive, in part, from modifiable lifestyle factors 
including education, physical/cardiovascular health, individual differences in frailty and 
mobility, size of social networks, socio-economic status, and more (Tucker-Drob & 
Salthouse, 2011). However, it is difficult to draw a definitive, causal account of what 
leads to ToM decline in old age, though it is clear that declining EF plays a significant 
role. No investigations to date have factored in and explored how background lifestyle 
and environmental factors interact with cognitive ageing in its relationship with SCF. The 
cognitive ageing and ToM literature would benefit from such a study, where flexible 
social factors (such as SES, education, social participation, etc.) are considered when 
delineating the link between diminishing cognition and ageing ToM. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
There are limitations that should be considered in the context of this study. First, while 
the study employed a measure of reading ability through the WRAT-3, the current design 
did not include a measure of executive function. Previous research has shown that age-
related decay of socio-cognitive aptitude may in part be explained by changes in 
domain-general abilities (e.g., Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 2012). Indeed, in our 
own work (Chapter 3) we have shown that the cognitive mechanisms underlying FB 
reasoning may in part be explained by variability in attention switching and inhibitory 
control.  That being said, it should be noted that, at the time of writing, there is a 
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significant dearth in the functional imaging literature associating executive function with 
age-related changes in ToM. What is more, participants’ highest level of education – 
which has been widely linked with variability in EF – was roughly equivalent between the 
two cohorts. Overall, to further clarify the role of EF in ageing ToM in the context of 
neuroimaging designs, future investigations should encompass EF measures (in 
particular, inhibition) to delineate on a neural level the contribution of cognitive control 
when resolving problems of false belief. 
Another limitation of the current study is the sex imbalance in the overall sample, 
which was due to COVID restrictions preventing full data collection. While the 
male:female proportion was equivalent across both age groups, within each group the 
sample was still roughly 75% female. An imbalance in males and females in the sample 
is potentially a noteworthy concern as previous studies have found sex differences in 
adult mindreading abilities (e.g., see Krach et al., 2009). Therefore, it is feasible that an 
omission of sex from the current design may have veiled underlying behavioural and 
neural effects and that the addition of sex as a factor could reveal meaningful 
interactions with the other experimental manipulations in our task. However, in a 
supererogatory analysis where sex was included as a factor, there was no interaction 
with either KOR or SOC and/or Age (all p’s > .05). While this shows that sex was 
perhaps not a statistically influential factor in our results, it is again worth caveating this 
discussion with the issue of low statistical power due to our curtailed sample size.  
In the current study, the inclusion criteria with respect to age was 18-29 for 
young participants and 60-79 for older participants. With respect to our older cohort, the 
difference between the youngest and oldest participant (62 and 77, respectively) was 15 
years. We did not further differentiate on the basis of age within the older adult group, 
despite the seemingly large age range. Indeed, previous investigations of ageing ToM 
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have commonly demarcated older participants into young-old and old-old categories 
(typically, 60-70 and 70>, respectively) and have reported behavioural group differences 
in mentalizing abilities (e.g., Baksh et al., 2018; refer to Chapter 3 for a review of ageing 
ToM studies). Thus, by grouping all older adults into a single category we perhaps may 
have masked variability in both ToM performance and the subsequent neural 
consequence in this group. It is worth noting, however, low statistical power precluded 
any sub-group analyses of our older adult data. Thus, for a more granular 
neurobehavioural account of socio-cognitive abilities in ageing populations, and how 
these abilities may vary within ageing, future ToM neuroimaging investigations should 
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Conclusion 
Through our novel false belief paradigm, we tested young and older adults to delineate 
the neurocognitive mechanisms involved in reasoning about others’ beliefs. On both a 
behavioural and neural level, we differentiated between possessing (vs. not possessing) 
a privileged knowledge of reality and found this to improve performance, and highlighted 
distinct (and, in some cases, unexpected) cortical regions – namely, the right TPJ and 
fusiform and cingulate gyri – involved in this process. We were also able to show 
specificity of the knowledge of reality effect within the anterior TPJ, a region thought to 
be associated with wider attention mechanisms. We further observed an interaction 
between knowledge of reality and self-other congruence, again both on a behavioural 
and neural level, with classic mentalizing nodes emerging as significant clusters, 
including the precuneus, TPJ, and STS involved in resolving incongruence in self-other 
beliefs when participants did not possess a privileged of reality. However, we did not 
observe differences based on a core manipulation of self-other congruence 
([in]compatibility in self-other beliefs), either in the behavioural or neuroimaging data. 
While we showed emerging group differences in certain cortical regions, as informed by 
a ToM localizer, we did not observe statistically relevant effects or contrasts between 
young and old in the neuroimaging data. Thus, this work provides a foundation for 
understanding the mechanisms involved in representing others’ mental states and the 
neural consequence of each of these effects, and provides a localized basis on which 
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Chapter Five: General Discussion 
Two broad aims were the focus of this thesis. First, the nature and magnitude of age-
related differences in ToM reasoning were investigated, with the aim of conveying 
greater clarity and specificity with respect to the classically reported effect of age on 
socio-cognitive function. Next, the process of reasoning about others’ mental states was 
decomposed to investigate the precise neurocognitive sources of difficulty and 
interference when engaging ToM, and how these sources of interference may 
differentially affect young and older healthy adults. The first aim was addressed 
primarily through a meta-analysis of behavioural ToM-ageing data in Chapter 2. The 
second aim was addressed through two empirical investigations in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 3 sought to disentangle processes thought to be important in the context of FB 
reasoning, which are often confounded in the literature. Further, the Chapter highlighted 
social and non-social cognitive processes which differentially affect the performance of 
older adults relative their younger counterparts. Chapter 4 extends the findings of 
Chapter 3 through an fMRI study using a modified version of our novel FB paradigm. 
After correcting for age-related differences in neurovascular coupling, which in itself is a 
novel addition to the literature, we explored the neurocognitive bases that underlie FB 
processing in ageing through both whole-brain and localised approaches.  
In this General Discussion I will discuss the wider theoretical and methodological 
implications of the findings presented in this thesis, in addition to highlighting limitations 
and future directions, before ending with a Conclusion. First, however, I will summarise 
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Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 2. There is substantial heterogeneity in the literature in both the theoretical 
account of what ToM actually constitutes and in the design and implementation of tasks 
and protocols. This non-standardised approach has led to qualitative differences in task 
difficulty, which may at least in part explain the mixed nature of an age effect when 
comparing young vs. older adults. Tasks that pose more difficulty by way of introducing 
supplementary (non-social) cognitive demands, may amplify an effect of age not 
necessarily because of poorer socio-cognitive function in OA but because fronto-
executive abilities fade in advanced age. Previous meta-analyses have found that the 
magnitude of an age effect varies depending on task and sampling considerations, and 
significant statistical heterogeneity exists among the ageing-ToM data, even when 
looking at paradigms that are purportedly similar in design. To address this issue, the 
nature and magnitude of an age effect was further examined through a meta-analysis of 
behavioural ToM-ageing data. In addition to examining an overall effect of age, we 
performed a series of theoretically-driven sub-group analyses to highlight the conceptual 
and methodological considerations that drive variability in ageing ToM. Specifically, we 
examined the effect of age as a function of task modality and domain and the 
demographic make-up of OA samples – i.e., age and education.  
While a strong effect of age emerged overall, there was again significant 
heterogeneity in effects. In a small number of sub-group analyses, the effect of age was 
abolished completely, suggesting that the magnitude (and indeed presence) of age 
differences is at least in part contingent on methodological factors. Namely, we reported 
that the effect of age varied as a function of task characteristics: task domain (verbal vs. 
non-verbal) and task type (movies, static cartoon-comic, immersive VR, and vignettes). 
The difference in young vs. older ToM was more pronounced in non-verbal tasks and the 
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greatest age difference was seen in the movies paradigms. The effect of age also varied 
according to sampling characteristics where greater age differences were seen in 
studies where OA were less well-educated. Also, as expected, a greater difference was 
shown when OA were greater in age – i.e., ≥ 75. Overall, in our review of the evidence, 
we found that ToM competence may indeed diminish with age, but importantly, the 
magnitude of this decline is modified – and in some cases, abolished – depending on 
task and sampling considerations. 
Chapter 3. In the meta-analysis in Chapter 2, we showed that the effect of age is highly 
heterogeneous, varying according to both task and sampling considerations. One 
particular reason for this heterogeneity is perhaps down to the qualitative differences in 
task difficulty, where some ToM paradigms have greater non-social cognitive loads than 
others. In typical FB tasks, successful performance relies on both social and non-social 
(or executive, domain-general) processing. Non-social demands rely on intact EFs, 
which are also known to decline with age. However, within the ageing FB literature, this 
is yet to be disentangled; processing that is non-social in nature is often confounded 
with social cognitive function. We addressed this by testing how older versus younger 
healthy adults were affected by three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within 
ToM: competing Self-Other perspectives; competing cued locations, and outcome 
knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty with ToM. We 
also collected a battery of EF measures, including inhibitory control, attentional shifting, 
working memory, and processing speed. Our data showed similarity between age groups 
when representing a belief incongruent with one’s own. Performance in attention and 
response speed tests best explained the degree of conflict experienced through 
incompatible Self-Other perspectives. However, OAs were disproportionately affected by 
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managing conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most 
relevant for predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations.  
Overall, FB reasoning was found to be effortful for OA beyond the non-social 
cognitive demands of classic ToM investigations. Performance in each of the ToM 
scenarios was related to individual differences in inhibitory control and spatial working 
memory. However, the magnitude of conflict experienced and the cognitive systems 
recruited to resolve this were condition specific: managing competing cognitive 
perspectives was supported by attentional resources whereas invalid cueing seemed to 
rely on spatial working memory. Further, OA were largely disadvantaged by invalid 
cueing. Altogether, our findings suggest that prior studies may have inflated the effects 
of ageing on ToM by including excessive conflict in ToM tasks. 
Chapter 4. In Chapter 3, we investigated the sources of interference in FB reasoning and 
how they differentially affect older and younger participants. In Chapter 4, we extended 
these findings and studied the neurocognitive profile of ageing ToM by administering 
fMRI to both young and older adult participants while they responded to a revised 
version of our false belief paradigm and an established ToM functional localizer. Unlike 
prior fMRI studies of social cognition in ageing, our work includes an important 
adjustment of the fMRI data to account for individual differences in neurovascular 
integrity, which is particularly relevant when considering age differences.  
On a behavioural level, we were broadly able to replicate our original findings in 
Chapter 3, particularly with respect to our experimental manipulation of KOR (or 
outcome knowledge) where participants were slower to respond when the location of the 
object was unknown. We did not, however, replicate our findings with regards to the 
effect of SOC. Previously, we had found that both groups of participants were slower and 
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more error-prone when responding to an agent with an incongruent belief. Our data did 
not show these effects, although the direction of findings were consistent with this. On a 
neural level, the localizer task recruited similar regions as to what have been previously 
published. We showed differential brain responses based on our theorised, relevant 
sources of social and non-social interference. However, while we showed emerging 
group differences in regions informed by the ToM localizer, we were unable to show 
statistically significant age effects in the neuroimaging data.  
It is important to note that the results of this study should be interpreted with 
caution due to low statistical power, especially with respect to between-group 
comparisons, and that no firm conclusions can be drawn based on these findings. 
Participant recruitment and testing was substantially curtailed due to COVID-19 social 
restrictions. At the time of writing, participant testing has resumed and once data 
collection has concluded, these data will be re-analysed in line with our original research 
questions and written up for publication. Therefore, while the core research questions 
and predictions will remain unchanged, it is possible that the findings presented within 
this Chapter may not be entirely consistent with our eventual write-up upon completion 
of the fMRI study. 
 
Implications 
Defining theory of mind 
Although there is a general acceptance that ToM refers to a specialised set of socio-
cognitive skills that facilitates the representation of others’ mental states, the concept 
has been formally ill-defined. There are a multitude of different sub-components and 
processes that are characterised as ToM, even when such concepts ostensibly fail to 
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satisfy the basic tenets of ToM functioning. Quesque and Rossetti (2020) argue that 
both vocabulary and measures lack specificity. For example, terms such as mentalizing, 
mindreading, perspective-taking, (cognitive) empathy, and mental state attribution, 
among others, all loosely refer to abilities commonly understood to mean theory of mind. 
The heterogeneity in terminology perhaps in part reflects the often confused 
conceptualisation, where cognitive and affective abilities are confounded. For instance, 
in its original publication, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1997) is referred to as an “advanced measure of mentalizing”, and even though 
stimuli presented in the task require the attribution and recognition of both cognitive and 
affective states, the authors fail to distinguish between these processes. Baron-Cohen 
and colleagues simply entangle both processes as mental state attribution. Though 
commonly used as a measure of individual differences in ToM, a recent psychometric 
assessment of the RMET demonstrated that this task better reflects emotion processing, 
rather than mentalizing per se (see Kittel, Olderbak, & Wilhelm, 2021; Oakley et al., 
2016). In addition to non-specific vocabulary, there is a considerable number of different 
measures and protocols in the literature. In their systematic review of ToM measures for 
young children, Beaudoin et al. (2020) assessed 830 studies that included 220 measures 
of ToM. More specifically, they identified seven categories of mental and social 
understanding: emotions, desires, intentions, precepts, knowledge, beliefs, and 
mentalistic understanding of non-literal communication; and these categories 
themselves contained a total of 39 ToM sub-abilities. Beaudoin and colleagues also 
considered the psychometric properties (internal consistency, inter-rater and test-retest 
reliability) of the reviewed tasks and noted that the majority of measures have 
insufficient empirically-validated psychometry, including poor replicability. The authors 
note that the great variety of ToM measures results in poor comparability across studies 
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and adversely affects the dependability of the results. For instance, successful 
performance on FB paradigms may differ as a function of seemingly uncritical features 
of the experiment, such as how characters are presented (e.g., VR, line drawings, 
cartoons, text-based, etc.) and minute variations in the language used to present stimuli 
and/or instruct participants. The lack of standardisation and the resulting variability in 
effects concurs with the findings of the meta-analysis presented in Chapter 2, where 
substantial heterogeneity – even with studies employing the same paradigm – was found 
when examining the classically reported effect of age. To address heterogeneity and in 
the interest of bringing about greater standardisation of ToM protocols, Beaudoin et al. 
(2020) proposed the ATOMS (Abilities in Theory of Mind Space; Figure 5.1) framework 
which visually and logically categorises mental state and social understanding abilities.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. The ATOMS framework (Abilities in Theory of Mind Space):  a visual representation of 
TOM categories and sub-abilities. Theory of mind space is represented as a large area that includes 
seven TOM categories of mental states and social situations understanding: Intentions, Desires, 
Emotions, Knowledge, Percepts, Beliefs, and mentalistic understanding of non-literal communication. 
Thirty-nine specific TOM sub-abilities (white circles) gravitate around the TOM category to which 
they pertain. Reproduced with permission from Beaudoin, Leblanc, Gagner, and Beauchamp (2020; 
Front. Psychol. 10:2905).  
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While a criticism of the framework is that some paradigms straddle multiple 
classifications and therefore do not fit neatly into the circumscribed “spaces”, the 
framework is nevertheless a good starting point from which standardisation in 
terminology can be brought about. In the effort to bring about greater standardisation, 
recent work by Quesque and Rossetti (2020) is also important to consider. In their 
examination of the most commonly-used tests, Quesque and Rossetti reported that the 
majority of the reviewed ToM tasks do not require the representation of another’s 
mental state and others fail to make the distinction between self and other processes. 
These two principles (mentalizing and self-other distinction or the non-merging 
principle), Quesque and Rossetti argue, are fundamental and only paradigms that satisfy 
these precepts should be classified as genuine tests of ToM. Our own novel FB tasks 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 satisfy these two principles in that participants were 
required to infer (i.e., mentalize) about the agent’s belief regarding the location of the 
target ball, and we manipulated compatibility between the participant’s and agent’s 
beliefs (i.e., SOK) which brought about a self-other distinction.  
In addition to Beaudoin et al’s ATOMS framework, Quesque and Rossetti’s two 
criteria – termed mentalizing criterion and non-merging criterion – provide a foundation 
on which a clearer conceptualisation of ToM and its sub-abilities can be drawn. The 
framework and two criteria are helpful in providing both a terminological and theoretical 
(construct) clarification, and help define a limit or boundary as to what ToM actually 
means and as to what ToM tasks actually measure.  It is our view, then, in integrating 
the work presented in this thesis with the recommendations by Beaudoin et al. (2020) 
and Quesque and Rossetti (2020), researchers should adhere to these principles both in 
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Defining cognitive ageing 
Normal cognitive ageing has been traditionally defined as changes that occur in 
individuals later in life that are free of overt disease and ill-health (Dumas, 2015). While 
a definition of cognitive ageing is relatively straightforward, what is less clear is when 
ageing begins. Many studies from the field of developmental psychology have shown 
that age-related changes occur across all stages of life, and that deterioration in some 
cognitive abilities can be detected in individuals in their mid-to-late twenties and 
prominent modifications in processing speed are observed from age 45 (Hoyer et al., 
2004). Depending on the precise cognitive ability, age-related decay is evident far earlier 
than what is traditionally conceptualised as ‘ageing’. In studies of ageing populations, 
there is great variation in what authors consider advanced age. This is an important 
consideration as the effect of age is greatly dependent on the average age of the older 
adult cohort, as we have seen in the meta-analysis presented in Chapter 2. Studies that 
employ older older adult samples (e.g., aged ≥ 80) may arbitrarily benefit from greater 
effect sizes (due to larger between-group differences) relative to studies that employ 
younger (e.g., aged 50-60) older adult samples. While both of these fictitious examples 
would be categorised as studies of ageing, a direct, uncorrected comparison of their 
results could lead to misleading interpretations. As we have seen in the meta-analysis in 
Chapter 2, studies of ageing ToM have employed a wide range of ages in their OA 
samples, and we have shown that variability in the age of the OA sample can modify the 
overall effect of age. What is more, some studies do not to distinguish between young-
old and old-old; for example, an individual aged 61 may be classified in the same 
banding as another individual aged 81. Such studies are perhaps failing to detect 
nuanced and subtle alterations in cognition that occur across the entire lifespan, 
including within ageing. For these reasons, we suggest a definition of ageing as 
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individuals aged 60 and above. Further, we suggest that studies make distinctions between 
young-old and old-old using the following convention: Young-Old for individuals aged 60-69, 
and Old-Old for individuals aged 70+. Through these conventions it is hoped that greater 
standardisation is achieved which may lead to more robust and replicable conclusions in the 
context of studies of healthy ageing. 
 However, it should be noted that the recommendations above should not be viewed 
as a fixed or static principle, and that these definitions may evolve over time. For example, 
there is currently a rapidly increasing percentage of senior citizens in the global population, 
and predictions suggest that the proportion of older adults relative to the wider population is 
set to increase (see Figure 5.2). Additionally, life expectancy has been steadily increasing 
globally for a number of decades, meaning that a greater proportion of the population will 
reach old (or, very old) age. In light of these trends, it is reasonable to suggest that our 
current conceptualisation of when ageing begins may need to shift to better reflect the 
underlying demographic changes in the global population.  
 
Figure 5.2. Percentage of the population aged 60 years or over by region, from 1980 to 2050. From 
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Non-social interference 
We have shown that reasoning about FBs is difficult for OA beyond the non-social 
cognitive burdens of typical ToM studies. However, relative to their younger 
counterparts, we found that OA were particularly hindered by invalid cueing – a common 
feature of FB tasks. We also found that spatial working memory, a component of EF 
which in itself has been shown to decay with age (e.g., see Kumar & Priyadarshi, 2013), 
partially explained the cost associated with invalid (vs. valid) cueing. This is an important 
methodological consideration for past and present FB paradigms. Tasks that present 
multiple positions and agents require the processing of several different locations and 
their contents simultaneously and thus performance on these tasks may show age 
effects not exclusively because of impaired social cognitive function but perhaps also 
because of weakening EFs. A further but related issue is that the degree of difficulty – 
resulting from the above-mentioned non-social demands – is not uniform across tasks. 
This in part is driven by the somewhat amorphous nature of the concept of theory of 
mind, where no absolute or conclusive definition exists in the literature (see Quesque 
and Rossetti, 2020). Accordingly, as mentioned previously, traditionally, there have been 
no agreed upon boundaries or limits as to what the concept encompasses, and therefore 
there is substantial heterogeneity in paradigms and experimental protocols. 
Inconsistencies in task difficulty are found even within the same task type. Contrast 
Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) classic object-location paradigm with Bernstein, Thornton, 
and Sommerville’s (2011) sandbox task, where participants are asked to manually point 
to a location within a physical sandpit where a protagonist – holding a now invalid belief 
– is likely to search upon her return. The physical distance between the ‘correct’ location 
and the participant’s indicated position, measured in centimetres, is the index by which 
ToM performance is determined. Superficially, both the classic object-location and the 
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sandbox tasks examine FB understanding. However, it is doubtful that non-social 
processing demands are identical between these tasks, given that there are greater 
visuo-spatial and motor demands in visually orienting and estimating a psychical – as is 
the case in the Sandbox paradigm. Taken together, it is therefore plausible that the 
classically reported age effect in ToM has been somewhat inflated due to 
methodological confounds. i.e., additional processing demands that are supplementary 
to reasoning about others’ minds. Therefore, this work has potentially far-reaching 
consequences as it raises questions as to how much of the classically reported age 
effect is indeed attributable to age-related changes in social cognitive function and how 
much is down to general age-related cognitive slowing. 
 
Two-systems account of theory of mind 
A key consideration in the interpretation of the current data is the two-system account 
of ToM (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). The two-system hypothesis posits that the 
computational nature of ToM processing can be either implicit (early-developing, 
automatic, rapid, and effortless) or explicit (late-developing, deliberate, slow, and 
effortful; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). The two systems are not 
mutually exclusive; indeed, many everyday activities require the simultaneous 
computation of both overt and covert mental states.  However, the extent to which each 
of these two systems is employed in childhood, adulthood, and old age, and how the 
systems evolve over time, in addition to how they interact with individual differences in 
executive function and its decline in healthy ageing, is not yet fully understood 
(Schneider, Slaughter, & Dux, 2017). Indeed, the very presence of an implicit system is 
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contested, as Kulke et al. (2018) recently showed in a systematic replication study where 
the authors concluded: 
 
[T]here is a strong need for systematic, large-scale, collaborative, and 
preregistered multilab replication and validation studies to explore more 
systematically whether implicit theory of mind is a real and robust phenomenon 
and under which conditions and in which age groups it can be measured. (Kulke 
et al., 2018, p. 11) 
 
The experimental tasks employed in the two empirical investigations of this 
thesis rely on explicit and effortful mental state processing. The beliefs of the agents in 
the task are openly declared and the participant is required to hold in mind and reason 
about an overt belief state, and, therefore, according to the two-system theory, the 
current tasks require an explicit form of mentalizing. At the time of writing, no work 
currently exists comparing implicit vs explicit ToM reasoning in ageing, and so it is 
difficult to theorise on what effect—if any—ageing may have on implicit forms of mental 
state reasoning. In younger adults, research has shown that participants track the 
mental states of others even when they are not instructed to do so, and this tracking 
tends to rely less on EFs compared to explicit or effortful belief reasoning (Schneider, 
Nott, & Dux, 2014). Nevertheless, more work is needed to elucidate the relationship 
between implicit and explicit ToM in healthy ageing.  
 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to highlight in this study. Both empirical investigations 
presented in this thesis drew OA from an institutional database of participants aged 
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60+. The database, as is common with university participant pools, comprises largely a 
homogeneous sample. For example, in our study, OA disproportionately self-identified as 
ethnically white and over 50% were educated to at least under-graduate degree level – a 
rate that is higher than the general OA population in the United Kingdom. Due to the 
protective nature of education on certain cognitive functions, as we have seen in the 
meta-analysis in Chapter 2, variability in the levels of education in OA may potentially 
modify the magnitude age-related differences in ToM. For example, it is possible that 
greater age differences might have appeared with less well-educated OA samples. Still, 
we reported age differences in our behavioural data even with a highly-educated cohort 
of OAs and the level of education is comparable to other studies of ageing ToM (e.g., see 
Cho & Cohen, 2019). Nonetheless, greater efforts should be made to include more 
diverse and representative samples in ageing research.  
Next, we originally planned to recruit and test 90 participants (45 young and 45 
older) in total for the fMRI experiment reported in Chapter 4. The sample size calculation 
was based on a power analysis using Moran’s (2013) ageing ToM data, where we aimed 
to achieve 90% statistical power in our design. However, as a result of the COVID-19 
outbreak and its subsequent social restrictions, our recruitment was somewhat curtailed 
and only 72 participants were recruited: 50 YA and 22 OA. Of the 22 OA, only 19 had 
complete and usable data. A matched sub-set from the YA data was used in the final 
analysis, to allow for between-groups analyses. The final sample therefore comprised 38 
participants, 19 young and 19 older adults. While we were able to replicate some of our 
initial behavioural findings and provide meaningful insights of the neural underpinnings 
of FB reasoning, our fMRI findings should be interpreted with caution due to low 
statistical power. It is of course possible that some of the reported null results may 
achieve statistical significance with a reasonably powered sample. An a posteriori power 
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analysis to determine the actual achieved power was not performed as such post-hoc 
calculations have been shown to be logically invalid and practically misleading (Dziak, 
Dierker, & Abar, 2020).  
Functional imaging, which was the basis of Chapter 4, has a number of 
methodological caveats. First, there are the classic limitations often associated with 
neuroimaging work, including the assumption of participant homogeneity and the 
subsequent processes involved cross-subject averaging. Also, as is traditional within the 
neuroimaging literature, we only recruited right-handed participants to combat potential 
effects arising from laterality. Further, due to the expansive exclusion criteria associated 
with MRI (e.g., cardiac implantable electronic devices, metallic foreign bodies, drug 
diffusion pumps, cochlear implants, etc.), only individuals who are generally fit and 
healthy are eligible to take part in f/MRI studies. As disease and general ill-health can 
potentially limit one’s social experience, and by extension one’s social and cognitive 
function, individuals who had poor general health (cardiovascular complaints, for 
example) were not included as to avoid confounds or systematic biases in the data. 
While one cannot say for certain that these results are generalisable to groups not 
included in this study, the sampling make-up is nonetheless reflective of the wider 
population, most of whom are ‘neurotypical’ and right-handed.  On a more theoretical 
level, there are also limitations regarding causality and reverse inference with respect to 
fMRI, which is the tendency to theorise backwards from patterns of activity to deduce 
specific mental processes (e.g., see Poldrack, 2006). Other methods, such as virtual 
lesion approaches (e.g., transcranial magnetic stimulation [TMS]), offer the explanatory 
power of causality and allow researchers to test the direct, unbroken consequence of 
neuromodulation (cause) on mental processes (effect). On this basis, future 
investigations might employ neuromodulation approaches to investigate causally the role 
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of the TPJ, for example, in supporting different features of FB reasoning (e.g., inhibiting 
the self-perspective), between young and older participants (e.g., see Hartwright et al., 
2016 for an example of TMS modulation in the context of FB reasoning).  
 There is evidence to suggest that certain mental health conditions can modify 
ToM proficiency, including schizophrenia (see meta-analysis by Sprong et al., 2017) and 
depression (for recent example, see Washburn et al., 2016). Depression is of particular 
note as it has been shown to impair multiple cognitive domains, including EF, attention, 
and memory, (Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and Blackwell, 2014), all of which are important for a 
functioning ToM. Further, depression has been found to exacerbate executive 
dysfunction particularly in old age (Nakano et al., 2008; Pantzar et al., 2014). The current 
work in this thesis did not account for depression in terms of statistical adjustment 
and/or explicit screening—though, participants did self-declare no current diagnoses of 
neuropsychiatric disease. Given the evidence linking depression to cognitive dysfunction, 
particularly late life depression, it is plausible that depression was a contributing factor 
to the heterogeneity in ToM deficits seen in Chapter 2 in the meta-analysis. Future work 
might benefit from including measures of depression (or mental health disorders more 




As is typical with scientific investigation, the research presented in this thesis has 
spawned many questions, perhaps more than it has answered. It is of course not 
feasible to outline every possible extension of the current work, so I will focus on the 
areas that are perhaps most pressing.  
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Developmental studies of age-related changes in socio-cognitive function have 
found detectable alterations in ToM abilities as early as the third decade of life (for 
example, see Figure 5.3 below). While changes are most pronounced in advanced age, 
studies employing ‘lifespan’ approaches have shown a linear downward trajectory from 
early-to-middle adulthood. Likewise, wider domain-general abilities, such as processing 
speed or memory, have also been shown to follow a similar developmental trajectory, 









Figure 5.3. Cognitive and affective theory of mind performances across the adult lifespan. From 
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Figure 5.4. Trajectories of memory, processing speed, reasoning, and vocabulary against age. Note 
that vocabulary has been classically reported to increase (or at least, remain preserved) with age. 
From Salthouse (2019) – reproduced with permission. 
 
 
It is important, therefore, to study a lifetime arc of social cognitive function which may 
provide greater insights into the precursors of group differences and ToM in advanced 
age. While there are examples in the extant literature of lifespan studies (e.g., 
Giovagnoli, 2019; Laillier et al., 2019) these are typically marred with issues surrounding 
low samples sizes and power. For example, Laillier et al. (2019) administered the MASC 
film paradigm to neurologically-healthy participants aged 20-75, with a mean age of 42. 
In total, 60 participants were recruited; while the authors do not report the frequencies 
and/or distribution of participant ages, there are still nevertheless fewer than 10 
participants, on average, per age decile. Laillier and colleagues employed a regression-
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based approach and thus did not perform between-groups analyses; still, such small 
sample sizes in the context of lifespan studies is relatively small. Therefore, future 
studies investigating belief representation in ageing should include a more 
comprehensive sample, both in terms of age range – i.e., through a lifespan approach – 
and participant numbers. 
Finally, the current investigation only employed functional approaches and did not 
utilise structural techniques, such as fibre/neural tractography or other volumetric 
methods. There is a body of evidence to suggest that individual differences in white 
matter integrity may account for variability in ToM performance. For example, Charlton 
et al. (2009) tested 106 older adults on a subset of Happé’s Strange Stories (Happé et 
al., 1998) after which participants’ structural brain data were acquired through diffusion-
tensor imaging. The authors reported that performance on the stories task significantly 
correlated with white matter integrity even after controlling for performance on non-ToM 
conditions. Further, connectivity-based approaches have also shown that age-related 
changes in SCF can be traced back to dysregulated connectivity, especially in regions 
commonly thought to be associated with ToM – i.e., the mentalizing network. Hughes et 
al. (2019) recently tested 75 adults (40 young, 35 older) on Saxe and Kanwisher’s (2003) 
well-known localizer task in addition to acquiring functional resting-state data. 
Participants’ brain activity during resting-state scans were used as an index for intrinsic 
or baseline connectivity. Hughes and colleagues found that OA displayed poorer 
behavioural performance and weaker intrinsic connectivity within the mentalizing 
network compared to YA. Intrinsic connectivity between the right TPJ and the right 
temporal pole mediated age differences in ToM. More precisely, OA had weaker intrinsic 
connectivity between the right TPJ and right temporal pole that explained their poorer 
mentalizing behavioural performance. Taken together, it is important therefore to build a 
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more comprehensive account of age-related changes in SCF by including both structural 
and functional neuroimaging approaches. While the omission of structural measures is 
indeed a limitation, additional data, including two resting state sequences, are currently 
being collected for the fMRI study presented in Chapter 4. These additional data will 
also be analysed using connectivity-based approaches, which was not possible with the 
current, incomplete data. Once data collection is complete, the full dataset will be 
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Conclusion 
Social-cognitive abilities, and in particular ToM, are important for everyday social 
interactions and interpersonal relationships. While the early literature on ageing ToM 
produced somewhat contradictory findings, contemporary work has suggested that there 
is a general deterioration of ToM in advanced age. To bring greater clarity on an effect of 
age, and delineate the precise sources of difficulty when reasoning about others’ beliefs 
in older age, three studies were presented in this thesis: one meta-analysis and two 
empirical investigations. In our quantitative review, we found that ToM competence does 
indeed seem to diminish with age, but importantly, the magnitude of this decline is 
modified – and in some cases, abolished – depending on task and sample 
considerations. Our behavioural and neuroimaging investigations showed that FB 
reasoning is effortful for OA beyond the non-social cognitive demands of classic ToM 
investigations. Individual differences in inhibitory control and spatial working memory 
partially explained some ToM performance in both young and older adults. However, the 
magnitude of conflict experienced and the cognitive systems used to resolve this were 
condition specific: managing competing cognitive perspectives was supported by 
attentional abilities whereas invalid cueing appeared to draw on spatial working memory. 
In our fMRI work, we again differentiated between possessing (vs. not possessing) a 
privileged knowledge of reality and found this to improve performance, and highlighted 
distinct regions – namely, the right TPJ and fusiform and cingulate gyri – involved in this 
process. We were also able to show specificity of the knowledge of reality effect within 
the anterior TPJ, a region thought to be associated with wider attention mechanisms. We 
further observed an interaction between knowledge of reality and self-other congruence, 
again both on a behavioural and neural level, with classic mentalizing nodes emerging as 
significant clusters, including the precuneus, TPJ, and STS involved in resolving 
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incongruence in self-other beliefs when participants did not possess a privileged of 
reality. However, we did not observe differences based on a core manipulation of self-
other congruence ([in]compatibility in self-other beliefs), either in the behavioural or 
neuroimaging data. While we showed emerging group differences in certain cortical 
regions, as informed by a ToM localizer, we did not observe statistically relevant effects 
or contrasts between young and older subjects in the neuroimaging data. In light of the 
evidence presented in this thesis, while we do not negate the presence of age-related 
decline of ToM abilities, we propose that an effect of age has been overestimated due to 
non-social executive demands embedded within typical ToM tasks. We recommend that 
researchers studying ageing ToM carefully construct tasks in a way that minimizes (or at 
least controls for) cognitive load beyond what is ordinarily required to reason about the 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Appendix A. List of studies and their associated taxonomy. 
 
Study Year Task Description Taxonomic Label 
Bernstein DM, Thornton WL, 
Sommerville JA. 
2011 Sandbox Task ToM comics / 
cartoons 
Calso C, Besnard J, Allain P. 2019 MPS-TOMQ; ToM 
Picture Story Task variant 
ToM comics / 
cartoons 
Calso C, Besnard J, Allain P. 2019 ToM Picture Story Task ToM comics / 
cartoons 
Calso C, Besnard J, Allain P. 2020 ToM Picture Story Task ToM comics / 
cartoons 
Duval C, Piolino P, Bejanin A, 
Eustache F, Desgranges B. 
2011 False Belief: Comic 
Strips 
ToM comics / 
cartoons 
Duval C, Piolino P, Bejanin A, 
Eustache F, Desgranges B. 
2011 ToM Comic Strips - 
Attribution of intention 
ToM comics / 
cartoons 
El Haj M, Raffard S, GÃ©ly-
Nargeot MC. 
2016 False Belief: Comic 
Strips 
ToM comics / 
cartoons 
Fischer AL, O'Rourke N, Loken 
Thornton W. 
2017 Yoni - cognitive ToM comics / 
cartoons 
Phillips LH, Bull R, Allen R, Insch 
P, Burr K, Ogg W. 
2011 False Belief: Comic 
Strips 
ToM comics / 
cartoons 
Baksh RA, Bugeja T, MacPherson 
SE. 
2020 ESCoT (Cog ToM Only) ToM movies 
Grainger SA, Steinvik HR, Henry 
JD, Phillips LH. 
2019 TASIT ToM movies 
Johansson Nolaker E, Murray K, 
HappÃ© F, Charlton RA. 
2018 Strange Stories Film Task ToM movies 
Lecce S, Ceccato I, Cavallini E. 2019 MASC ToM movies 
Reiter AMF, Kanske P, Eppinger B, 
Li SC. 
2017 EmpaToM ToM movies 
Zhang X, Lecce S, Ceccato I, 
Cavallini E, Zhang L, Chen T. 
2018 Geometric Shapes 
Animation 
ToM movies 
Sarah A. Grainger, Vidhya 
Rakunathan, Alexandra G. Adams, 
Allana L. Canty & Julie D. Henry 
2020 VAMA (cog.) ToM-VR Immersive 
Cavallini E, Lecce S, Bottiroli S, 
Palladino P, Pagnin A. 
2013 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Elizabeth A. Maylor, Jane M. 
Moulson, Ann-Marie Muncer and 
Louise A. Taylor 
2002 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Elizabeth A. Maylor, Jane M. 
Moulson, Ann-Marie Muncer and 
Louise A. Taylor 
2002 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Fischer AL, O'Rourke N, Loken 
Thornton W. 
2017 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
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Grainger SA, Henry JD, Naughtin 
CK, Comino MS, Dux PE. 
2018 ToM Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Happé, FG., Winner, E., Brownell, 
H. 
1998 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Hughes C, Cassidy BS, Faskowitz J, 
Avena-Koenigsberger A, Sporns O, 
Krendl AC. 
2019 False Belief False Photo Vignettes - False 
belief 
Lecce S, Ceccato I, Cavallini E. 2019 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Li X, Wang K, Wang F, Tao Q, Xie 
Y, Cheng Q. 
2013 False Belief: Vignette Vignettes - False 
belief 
Moran JM, Jolly E, Mitchell JP. 2012 False Belief False Photo Vignettes - False 
belief 
Rakoczy H, Harder-Kasten A, Sturm 
L. 
2012 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Rakoczy H, Wandt R, Thomas S, 
Nowak J, Kunzmann U. 
2018 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Sarah A. Grainger, Vidhya 
Rakunathan, Alexandra G. Adams, 
Allana L. Canty & Julie D. Henry 
2020 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Slessor G, Phillips LH, Bull R. 2007 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Sullivan, S., & Ruffman, T. 2004 Strange Stories Vignettes - False 
belief 
Bottiroli S, Cavallini E, Ceccato I, 
Vecchi T, Lecce S. 
2016 Faux Pas Test Vignettes - Faux pas 
Li X, Wang K, Wang F, Tao Q, Xie 
Y, Cheng Q. 
2013 Faux Pas Test Vignettes - Faux pas 
Zhang X, Lecce S, Ceccato I, 
Cavallini E, Zhang L, Chen T. 
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Appendix B 
Appendix B. List of studies precluded from the OA education (i.e., <14 years vs. >14 years) sub-
analysis, due to either not reporting education data or reporting education in discrete categories. 
Zhang X, Lecce S, Ceccato I, Cavallini E, Zhang L, Chen T (2008) 
Franco MG, Smith PK. (2013) 
Johansson Nolaker E, Murray K, Happé F, Charlton RA. (2018) 
Moran JM, Jolly E, Mitchell JP. (2012) 
Reiter AMF, Kanske P, Eppinger B, Li SC. (2017) 
Sullivan, S., & Ruffman, T. (2004) 
Rakoczy H, Harder-Kasten A, Sturm L. (2012) 
Phillips LH, Bull R, Allen R, Insch P, Burr K, Ogg W. (2011) 
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Appendix C 
Ethics approval letter for behavioural false belief study (Chapter 3). 
 
Life and Health Sciences Ethics Committee’s Decision Letter 
To: Dr Charlotte Hartwright 
Cc: Samantha Brown 
Administrator, Life and Health Sciences Ethics Committee 
From: Dr Rebecca Knibb 
Chair, Life and Health Sciences Ethics Committee 
Date: 8/2/2017 
Subject: Project #1065: Differences in Social Cognitive Function Across Healthy Adults 
Thank you for your submission. The additional information for the above proposal has been considered by the 
Chair of the LHS Ethics Committee. 
Please see below for details of the decision and the approved documents. 
Reviewer’s recommendation: Favourable opinion 
Please see the tabled list below of approved documents: 
Documentation Version/s Date Approved 
Participant information sheet Version 2 as per electronic ethics application #1065 Jan 2017  
Consent form Version 2 as per electronic ethics application #1065 Jan 2017  
Task_ordering Version 1 as per electronic ethics application #1065 Dec 2016  
all_advertisements Version 1 as per electronic ethics application #1065 Dec 2016  
Screening_advisory Version 1 as per electronic ethics application #1065 Dec 2016  
Response to reviewers As per electronic ethics application #1065 Jan 2017  
 
After starting your research please notify the LHS Research Ethics Committee of any of the following: 
Substantial amendments. Any amendment should be sent as a Word document, with the amendment highlighted. 
The amendment request must be accompanied by all amended documents, e.g. protocols, participant information 
sheets, consent forms etc. Please include a version number and amended date to the file name of any amended 





The end of the study 
 
Please email all notifications and reports to lhs_ethics@aston.ac.uk and quote the original project reference 
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Ethics documents can be downloaded from: http://www.ethics.aston.ac.uk/documents-all. Please note that these 
documents can ONLY be opened using Mozilla Firefox or the latest Internet Explorer version (IE9). 
 
Statement of Compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Government Arrangements for Research Ethics 
Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics 
Committees in the UK. In accord with University Regulation REG/11/203(2), this application was considered to 
have low potential risk and was reviewed by three appropriately qualified members, including the Chair of the 





Dr Rebecca Knibb 




F. Rahman, Ph.D. Thesis, Aston University 2021. 
Appendix D 
Ethics approval letter for fMRI false belief study (Chapter 4). 
Date: 3rd April 2019 
Dr Charlotte Hartwright 




Study title: Thinking about other people’s thoughts in healthy ageing 
REC REF: Ethics application #1486 
 
Confirmation of Ethical Opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable opinion for the above research based on the 
basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation listed below. 
 
Approved documents 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
 
Document Version Date 
Participant Information Sheet 1.04 03/04/2019 
Consent Form 1.04 03/04/2019 
Study measures comprising: 
• Wide Range Achievement Test 4th Edition (WRAT-4) – screening 
for impairment in reading. 
• Autism Quotient (AQ-10) – screening for suspected autism. 
• Mini Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (M-ACE) – dementia 
screening for older adults. 
• Edinburgh Handedness Inventory – to determine handedness. 
• Broad Autism Phenotypes Questionnaire (BAPQ) – captures 
personality and language characteristics that reflect the phenotypic 
expression of genetic liability to autism 
  
 
With the Committee’s best wishes for the success of this project. Yours sincerely 
 
Professor Richard Booth 
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Appendix E 
Aston Brain Centre MRI Safety & Screening Form 
 
MRI CONSENT & SAFETY INFORMATION FORM 
Please answer all questions by ticking YES or NO. If you answer YES to any please give DETAILS below 
 
 








1 * A pacemaker/artificial heart valve or stent    
2 * Any electrical devices e.g. cochlear implant (in your ear) nerve/neuro 
stimulator, implantable pump or other device anywhere in your body 
  
3 * Aneurysm clips in your head or hydrocephalus shunt   
4 * False eyes   
5 Any body piercing, tattoos or permanent eye makeup   
 
HAVE YOU EVER HAD 
   
6 * Metal fragments in your eyes or shrapnel in your body    
7 * Any surgery within 6 weeks of appointment   
8 *  Any surgery which involves implants to the head or body   
 
DO YOU WEAR 
   
9 Removable dentures or dental brace with metal    
10 A hearing aid   
11 An artificial limb, surgical support or brace   
12 Foil-backed patches for HRT, Nicotine, pain relief, etc.   
 
DO YOU SUFFER FROM 
   
13 Asthma attacks    
14 Epilepsy or Blackouts   
15 Diabetes or thermoregulatory problems   
 
FOR WOMEN OF CHILD BEARING AGE ONLY 
   
16 * Are you or could you possibly be pregnant    
17 * Do you have an IUCD / coil in place or sterilisation clips   
 
Name and Address of your Doctor: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Due to the very strong magnetic fields it is VERY IMPORTANT for your own safety and the safety of the MRI Unit staff that 
you do not go into the Magnet room with any objects which may become dislodged. 
 
PLEASE ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE REMOVED ALL METAL OBJECTS INLUDING. ZIPS, JEWELLERY, HAIR 
GRIPS, WATCHES, CREDIT CARDS, BELTS, MONEY, MOBILE PHONES AS WELL AS COLOURED CONTACT 
LENS. 
 
   To be signed by visitor, contractor or staff to confirm the information provided on this form is correct  
 
   Signature: ………………………………………………………………. Date: ….…………………20 
 
Radiographer Signature: …………………..…………………………………………………. Date: ………………….....20 
